NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-5824 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 5:23-cr-00226-SSS-1 v.

MEMORANDUM*

CHRISTIAN ERNEST BEYER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 9, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Defendant Christian Ernest Beyer appeals from his sentence following his

guilty plea to transmitting interstate threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). He

challenges the district court’s application of the official victim enhancement under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2, and he argues that the district court violated his Fifth

Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his decision not to

allocute at sentencing.1 As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm in part, and we vacate and remand for resentencing in part.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the official

victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 to Beyer’s sentence or clearly err in

finding that Beyer was motivated by the victims’ official status. Beyer threatened

his victims because he was dissatisfied by actions they took in their official

capacities—which included arresting him and participating in his court-martial

proceedings, testifying against him, and ultimately contributing to his required

retirement from the Army. Further, Beyer’s words themselves underscore that the

victims’ official status motivated the threats. In his October 30 video, Beyer

referenced the victims’ official identities, including their positions within law

enforcement and the military, their authority on the installation, and their

performance of official duties. He also identified individuals by title and uniform

1 A defendant’s Fifth Amendment protections barring adverse inferences from silence extend to sentencing, and a guilty plea does not waive this right. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999); United States v. Johnston, 789 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2015). On remand, the district court should not consider a failure to allocute when rendering the sentence.

2 24-5824 and framed his threats in terms that presupposed their continued exercise of official

power.

The fact that Beyer knew his victims does not negate the applicability of the

official victim enhancement. Official action may be experienced as personal,

particularly where, as here, the official action is directed at the defendant and

carries serious consequences. Yet where the defendant’s actions respond to the

exercise of official authority, the offense is properly understood as motivated by

official status under § 3A1.2, regardless of whether or how the official and the

defendant are otherwise acquainted. See United States v. Rivera-Alonzo, 584 F.3d

829, 837 (9th Cir. 2009). We have upheld a district court’s application of the

official victim enhancement where a defendant “obviously refer[s] to the [victim’s]

official duties,” and the victim’s official status was thus “not incidental to the

conduct at issue.” United States v. McAninch, 994 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.

1993). Here, Beyer’s threats were born from his anger toward the victims over his

arrest, investigation, and court-martial—official acts and proceedings in which the

victims participated in their official capacities. The victims’ official roles therefore

played a central, not “incidental,” role in Beyer’s decision to threaten them. Id.

Further, the text of the Sentencing Guidelines does not require official status

to be the defendant’s sole or even primary motivation. § 3A1.2(a)–(b). As Beyer

acknowledges, it is sufficient that the victim’s official role was one motivating

3 24-5824 factor in the offense. See McAninch, 994 F.2d at 1386 (holding that the defendant

was “motivated by” his victim’s official status for §3A1.2 purposes, even though

the defendant also had an additional, separate motivation).

2. A district court commits procedural error when it “select[s] a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);

see also United States v. Ghanem, 143 F.4th 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2025). At the

sentencing hearing, the district court emphasized that it was “very telling” that

Beyer chose not to “show remorse” for his threats. Yet Beyer did show remorse

and apologize in writing by saying, “I am sorry for causing anyone . . . anxiety or

distress . . . I never meant to cause the fear and harm I did and would never do it

again.” Indeed, the court was on notice that Beyer had apologized for his threats.

Earlier in the hearing, the court had factored in his written apology when it

deducted three offense levels “based upon some . . . acceptance of responsibility

that has been presented to the probation officer and to the court, albeit not today by

any statement of Mr. Beyer.” Hence, the district court committed procedural error.

Because the district court’s false impression that Beyer had not expressed

remorse for his threats is a clearly erroneous factual determination qualifying as

“significant procedural error,” we vacate Beyer’s sentence and remand this case for

resentencing. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

4 24-5824