BACKGROUND

20 On June 27, 2025, Petitioner Luis Ricardo Chapa (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition 21 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum. Doc. # 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). On the 22 same day he submitted an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum. 23 Doc. # 5. 24 Petitioner is currently incarcerated at FCI Victorville Medium II in Victorville, 25 California (“FCI Victorville”). Pet. ¶ 1. He is serving a 192-month sentence imposed 26 after he pleaded guilty to three firearm-related offenses. See United States v. Chapa, et 27 al., No. 1:10-cr-589-SS (W.D. Tex.), Doc. ## 15, 67, 99, 153. His projected release 28 1 Petitioner seeks a writ compelling his in-person appearance to testify at a civil 2 trial scheduled for January 26, 2026, in Cause No. DC-22-154, Lauro Chapa, Sr., et 3 al. v. Luis Ricardo Chapa, pending in the 229th Judicial District Court of Duval 4 County, Texas (“the Texas lawsuit”). Pet. ¶¶ 2–3, 5; Doc. # 5-1. In that case, 5 Petitioner is the sole defendant and a “counter-plaintiff” in a dispute involving real 6 property and alleged fraud. Pet. ¶¶ 2–3, 6. Petitioner states that the state trial judge has 7 rejected his request to appear by remote means. Id. ¶ 4. He therefore asks this Court to 8 order the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to transport him to San Diego, Texas, 9 and to house him in a state or federal facility in Duval County until the civil trial 10 concludes, after which he would be returned to FCI Victorville. Id. ¶ 5. 11 On July 16, 2025, Respondent—the Warden of FCI Victorville Medium II, 12 Federal Bureau of Prisons (“Respondent”)—filed a Response to the Petition. Doc. # 9. 13 Petitioner filed a reply on September 2, 2025. Doc. # 16. 14 On September 16, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered supplemental briefing on 15 whether this Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 16 directing Petitioner’s transfer to appear in the Texas lawsuit. Doc. # 17. The parties 17 submitted supplemental briefs on September 23, 2025. Doc. ## 18, 19. Respondent 18 conceded that the Court has jurisdiction to issue such a writ and that issuance lies 19 within the Court’s discretion. Doc. # 19 at 2. Respondent nevertheless urged the Court 20 not to exercise that discretion. Id. 21 On October 21, 2025, Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo issued a Report and 22 Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the Petition be denied and the action 23 dismissed without prejudice. Doc. # 21. The magistrate judge reasoned that viable 24 alternatives existed for Petitioner’s participation in the Texas lawsuit that did not 25 require issuance of the requested writ. 26 Petitioner filed objections to the R&R on November 10, 2025. Doc. # 24. He 27 argued that the alternatives identified by the magistrate judge were not viable because 28 Texas state courts lack authority to compel the release or transfer of a federal prisoner 1 housed in California, a stay of the Texas proceedings would be impractical, and the 2 interests of justice require issuance of a writ to permit his in-person testimony. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus 5 to compel a prisoner’s presence in court when “[i]t is necessary to bring him into court 6 to testify or for trial.” The parties do not dispute that this Court has jurisdiction to 7 issue the requested writ. See Doc. ## 18, 19; see also Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 8 77 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985). 9 “When determining whether it should issue a writ of habeas corpus ad 10 testificandum . . . the district court must exercise its discretion based upon 11 consideration of such factors as whether the prisoner’s presence will substantially 12 further the resolution of the case, the security risks presented by the prisoner’s 13 presence, the expense of the prisoner’s transportation and safekeeping, and whether 14 the suit can be stayed until the prisoner is released without prejudice to the cause 15 asserted.” Wiggins v. Alameda Cty., 717 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Ballard 16 v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977)). 17 DISCUSSION 18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition (Doc. # 1), the 19 parties’ briefing (Doc. ## 9, 16, 18, 19), the R&R (Doc. # 21), Petitioner’s objections 20 (Doc. # 24), and the record as a whole. After having made a de novo determination of 21 the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Objections were directed, 22 the Court concurs with and accepts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate 23 Judge. In addition, the Court concludes that the issuance of the requested writ is not 24 warranted after having independently weighed the Wiggins factors. 25 First, Petitioner’s in-person testimony would undoubtedly further the resolution 26 of the Texas lawsuit, and Petitioner has shown that the state court is not inclined to 27 allow remote testimony. As the Magistrate judge observed in the R&R, however, 28 Petitioner has not shown that he is without options for his defense in the Texas 1 lawsuit.1 Although these alternatives may be less advantageous to Petitioner than in- 2 person, live testimony, “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal 3 or limitation of many privileges and rights.” McKinney v. Boyle, 447 F.2d 1091, 1094 4 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285–86 (1948)). Although 5 Petitioner’s presence would likely benefit his case, he is still represented by counsel in 6 the Texas lawsuit and has not demonstrated that he lacks meaningful avenues to 7 present his defense absent the requested writ. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor 8 of granting the writ, but only modestly. 9 Second, security concerns weigh against issuance of the writ. Petitioner is 10 serving a lengthy sentence for serious firearm-related offenses and is classified as a 11 medium-security inmate. Transporting him approximately 1,500 miles for a civil 12 trial—where the nearest federal facility is roughly 80 miles away—would require 13 continuous escort by federal personnel and coordination with state officials. See Doc. 14 # 19 at 5–6; Doc. # 16 at 15. While the security concerns are not insurmountable, they 15 are substantial. This factor weighs modestly against granting the writ. 16 Third, the cost of transporting and housing Petitioner for the duration of a 17 private civil trial would be significant. Petitioner has not offered to bear those costs 18 and instead asks that they be imposed on the government. See Doc. # 16 at 15; Doc. # 19 5-1. Given that the Texas lawsuit concerns a dispute over private rights, with no 20 government witnesses or public-law claims at issue, shifting these expenses to the 21 22 23 1 For purposes of this order, the Court accepts Petitioner’s argument that it is unlikely a Texas state court could or would independently issue an writ compelling his attendance at the civil trial. Doc. # 24 24 at 4–5; see, e.g., In re C.P.V.Y., 315 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App. 2010) (“[T]he trial court granted 25 M.P.’s request for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum; however, because M.P. was incarcerated in a federal facility in another state, the trial court lacked the authority to compel M.P.’s attendance, 26 and the federal government refused to honor the trial court's order.”). Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Petitioner has not shown that other viable options for his defense have 27 been adequately explored, such as seeking reconsideration of the order forbidding Petitioner’s remote appearance, seeking leave to permit Petitioner to testify via deposition testimony, or to seek a 28 | | public would be unwarranted. See Pet. § 3. This factor weighs heavily against granting 2 | the requested relief. 3 Fourth, the Court is not persuaded that a stay of the Texas lawsuit would be as 4 | prejudicial to Petitioner and the other litigants as Petitioner argues. Although a stay of 5 | approximately two years is substantial, Petitioner has a defined release date of July 9, 6 | 2028. This factor therefore weighs in favor of granting the writ, but not strongly. 7 Considering all of the circumstances, the Court concludes that the requested 8 | writ—an “extraordinary measure”—is not justified here. See Davidson v. Desai, 964 9 | F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2020). 10 Conclusion 11 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 12 1. The Report and Recommendation is ACCEPTED as stated herein; 13 2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED; 14 3. The Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum is DENIED; 15 4. Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action without prejudice; 16 5. All other matters in this case are TERMINATED; and 17 6. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 | Dated: 1/12/26 yptthia Valenzuela

HON. CYNTHIA VALENZUELA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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