NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 25 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIANGFANG WENG, No. 21-70342 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-762-744 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2026** Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges

Petitioner Liangfang Weng, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal from an

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her asylum and withholding of removal claims on

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the ground that she was not credible. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),

and we deny the petition.

Our “review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied upon by the [BIA].”

Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). When the BIA

“relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.” Id. (citation

omitted). We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations,

under the substantial evidence standard and must treat them as conclusive if “any

reasonable adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Garland v. Ming Dai,

593 U.S. 357, 368 (2021) (emphasis in original).

The BIA expressly relied on four of the IJ’s rationales supporting its adverse

credibility determination. First, the IJ found that Petitioner’s credibility was

undermined by inconsistencies and omissions between statements Petitioner made

during her credible fear and border interviews and her subsequent application and

testimony. Petitioner’s application is predicated in large part on her alleged long-

term and violent persecution at the hands of China’s Family Planning Authorities

(FPA), but Petitioner never mentioned this alleged persecution during her initial

interviews. Petitioner’s argument that these “inconsistences” are actually

“omissions,” which are generally “less probative of credibility than inconsistencies

created by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,” Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d

966, 971 (9th Cir. 2014), is unpersuasive. We have squarely held that “an applicant’s

2 21-70342 omission of information from a written application or interview that is later revealed

through testimony” may “support an adverse credibility determination.” Dong v.

Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1297 (9th Cir. 2022).

Second, the IJ found that it was implausible for Petitioner to “have thrown a

conspicuous celebration for her third child, including a banquet and fireworks,

essentially announcing to the community the birth of a third child in violation of

family planning policies.” Common sense supports that conclusion in light of

Petitioner’s testimony that she went to great lengths to hide the birth of her second

child from FPA—ultimately sending the child to live with a relative—and that FPA

previously came to her home, dragged her into a van, and forcibly inserted an IUD

because she had two children in violation of China’s family planning rules.

Petitioner’s argument that the IJ’s implausibility analysis was “nothing but

speculation and conjecture” as to what Petitioner “likely would and would not do

under certain circumstances” is unavailing. “Although ‘speculation and conjecture’

alone cannot sustain an adverse credibility finding, an IJ must be allowed to exercise

common sense in rejecting a petitioner’s testimony even if the IJ cannot point to

specific, contrary evidence in the record to refute it.” Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d

1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005).

Third, the IJ found implausible Petitioner’s testimony that she discovered she

was “more than 20 days pregnant” sometime in March 2012 but that her third child

3 21-70342 was born on January 16, 2013—at least eleven months later. The BIA did not err in

refusing to accept new evidence on appeal in the form of a “one page internet

article,” which purportedly claimed that “10-month pregnancies are not so

uncommon,” because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) expressly forbids the BIA from

accepting new evidence on appeal or “engag[ing] in factfinding in the course of

deciding cases.” It was thus reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Petitioner’s

testimony undermined her credibility. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043

n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The willingness to deceive a regulatory body may be disclosed

by immaterial and useless deceptions as well as by material and persuasive ones.”

(citation omitted)).

Fourth, the IJ found that Petitioner did not offer sufficient corroborative

evidence to rehabilitate her credibility. The IJ was entitled to require Petitioner to

provide evidence corroborating her claims. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). However,

Petitioner was unable to provide medical documentation regarding her three IUD

removal procedures, a receipt for the 27,000 RMB fine her husband purportedly paid

to register their son, or a receipt for the 2,000 RMB bail payment. Contrary to

Petitioner’s arguments, the lack of corroboration was not an independent basis for

the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Rather, the IJ merely concluded that Petitioner’s

inability to corroborate her already suspect testimony “underscored her lack of

credibility.”

4 21-70342 Considering the IJ’s four rationales together and the totality of the

circumstances, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility

determination. Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[O]nly the most

extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility

determination.”)

The petition is DENIED.

5 21-70342