NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SWISS RE CORPORATE SOLUTIONS No. 24-5479 AMERICA INSURANCE D.C. No. CORPORATION, formerly known as North 2:23-cv-01880-SVW-PD American Specialty Insurance Company,

Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM*

v.

TMX HOLDCO, LLC, a Delaware corporation formerly known as Terminix International Inc,

Defendant - Appellee.

SWISS RE CORPORATE SOLUTIONS No. 24-5480

AMERICA INSURANCE

CORPORATION, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01880-SVW-PD Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TMX HOLDCO, LLC,

Defendant - Appellant.

SWISS RE CORPORATE SOLUTIONS No. 24-6198

AMERICA INSURANCE

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. CORPORATION, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01880-SVW-PD Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

TMX HOLDCO, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Swiss Re Corporate Solutions America Insurance Corporation (“Swiss Re”)

appeals the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to TMX Holdco,

LLC (“Terminix”) in Swiss Re’s action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had

no obligation under the insurance policy (“policy”) it provided to indemnify

Terminix for part of an $8 million judgment awarded in a jury trial (the “Ferrera

judgment”). In the alternative, Swiss Re appeals the district court’s application of

judicial estoppel to deny Swiss Re’s motion to amend its complaint. Terminix

cross-appeals, challenging the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment to

Swiss Re regarding when pre-judgment interest began to run.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Desire,

LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We review both

2 24-5479 a district court’s interpretation of state law and its interpretation of an insurance

policy de novo. Westport Ins. Corp. v. Cal. Cas. Mgmt. Co., 916 F.3d 769, 773

(9th Cir. 2019). We review a district court’s application of judicial estoppel for

abuse of discretion. Arconic, Inc. v. APC Inv. Co., 969 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.

2020). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in holding that the pesticide that caused the

injuries at issue in the Ferrera judgment was Terminix’s “product” for the

purposes of the policy because the company’s technician “handled” the substance

during application, or in concluding that the “physical possession” exception to the

policy’s products-completed operations hazard coverage does not apply.

Under California law, our first task is “to determine whether the language of

the policy, as it would be construed by a layperson, is ambiguous.” Baker v. Nat’l

Interstate Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565, 571 (Ct. App. 2009). The word

“handled,” as used in the policy, is not ambiguous. The district court correctly gave

the term its plain meaning and determined that Terminix’s technician “handled”

the pesticide as he applied it. The district court also correctly held that “Terminix

could not have ‘physically possessed’” the airborne pesticide particles after they

migrated to “the other side of a wall, in an area inaccessible to it.” “[A]pplying the

plain meaning of the unambiguous provisions of the policy,” our coverage inquiry

thus ends. See id.

3 24-5479 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in judicially estopping Swiss

Re from advancing an inconsistent position regarding the policy’s general liability

coverage. Before the district court’s decision on summary judgment, Swiss Re

consistently stated that a previous claim (“Esmond claim”) paid out under the

policy was covered under the policy’s general limit for ongoing operations

coverage and that this coverage had been exhausted. The district court relied on

Swiss Re’s original position and treated whether the Ferrera judgment fell into the

products-completed operations provision of the policy as the sole issue in dispute.

In the wake of the decision, Swiss Re reversed course, and sought to have

the Esmond claim reclassified. But as the district court concluded, Terminix would

be prejudiced if Swiss Re was not estopped as Terminix was deprived of the

chance to argue against reclassifying the Esmond claim before the district court’s

decision classifying the Ferrera judgment as a products-completed operations

hazard. All three factors of the Supreme Court’s New Hampshire v. Maine test for

determining whether judicial estoppel should apply have thus been met. 532 U.S.

742, 750–51 (2001) (discussing factors).

3. The district court did not err in determining that prejudgment interest

should be calculated from the date the primary policy paid its coverage limit.

Terminix argues that Swiss Re owes prejudgment interest beginning from when

Swiss Re initially denied coverage on April 13, 2020, as opposed to from the date

4 24-5479 the primary policy paid its coverage limit on March 13, 2023. But, consistent with

the district court’s ruling, the policy clearly states that, “Liability under this policy

with respect to any occurrence, loss or claim shall not attach unless and until the

limit of liability of Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by the actual payment

of Loss.”

AFFIRMED.

5 24-5479