INTRODUCTION

Shevon Harrington appeals from a judgment denying her petition for writ of

administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) seeking to overturn the Housing

Authority of Riverside County’s (the HA) decision to terminate her Section 8 financial

1 assistance (42 U.S.C. § 1437f et seq.).1 In supplemental briefs filed at our direction,

Harrington contends that the trial court misunderstood the scope of judicial review under

section 1094.5 and that the findings the hearing officer made at Harrington’s

administrative hearing are not supported by the evidence. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) We

agree.

The HA provided Harrington with a notice of its intent to terminate her financial

assistance and informed her of her right to request an administrative hearing. Following

that hearing, the hearing officer issued a written decision concluding that termination was

mandatory under the Section 8 federal regulations, because Harrington had been evicted

from her apartment and the unlawful detainer judgment was upheld on appeal. In fact,

Harrington’s appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment was pending at the time of the

hearing and, shortly after she filed her writ petition in the trial court, the appellate

division of the Riverside County Superior Court reversed the judgment for insufficient

evidence.

In ruling on Harrington’s mandamus petition, the trial court correctly concluded

that the hearing officer’s findings were not supported by the record. However, the court

also concluded that the “independent judgment” standard authorized it to independently

determine whether the record supported any alternative grounds for termination. The

court found that Harrington had violated three of the “family obligations” set out in the

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Section 8 regulations. On the basis of those findings, the court concluded that

discretionary termination was appropriate and upheld the HA’s decision.

We conclude that the court misunderstood the scope of judicial review because

section 1094.5 requires a determination of whether the agency’s factual findings, not its

ultimate decision, are supported by the record. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) The HA concedes

the error but argues that we can affirm the judgment on the additional violations found by

the trial court. However, because those violations were not at issue during the

administrative hearing, they cannot provide a basis for affirming the HA’s decision. We

therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Background

Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (Section 8)

(42 U.S.C. § 1437f et seq.) is “a federally funded and regulated program that provides

housing assistance to financially eligible families.” (Johnson v. Housing Authority of

City of Oakland (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 603, 606 (Johnson).) The program is

administered and funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

and operated on the local level by “public housing authorities” like the HA. (Morrison v.

Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860,

864, fn. 1.)

The Section 8 regulations, enacted by the HUD, “provide both mandatory and

discretionary grounds for termination from the program.” (Johnson, supra,

38 Cal.App.5th at p. 606, citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (2019).) A public housing authority

3 must terminate a participant from the program if the participant has been evicted for

“serious or repeated” violations of his or her lease. (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(e) (2026).) A

public housing authority may terminate a participant from the program if the participant

has violated any one of the “family obligations” contained in the regulations. (24 C.F.R.

§ 982.552(c)(1)(i) (2026).) Those obligations include (1) submitting any information the

public housing authority requests as part of its annual or interim eligibility

“reexamination” process; (2) complying with the housing quality standards by preventing

damage to the unit beyond normal wear and tear; and (3) allowing the public housing

authority “to inspect the unit at reasonable times and after reasonable notice.” (24 C.F.R.

§ 982.551(b)-(d) (2026).) When termination is discretionary, the regulations advise the

authority to “consider all relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the

extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, mitigating

circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of denial or

termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or

failure.” (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2026).)

Before terminating a participant from the Section 8 program, the public housing

authority must (1) provide notice of its proposed decision with a “brief statement of the

reasons for the decision” and (2) allow the participant to request an informal

administrative hearing to determine whether the authority has acted in accordance with

law. (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)(2)(i) (2026).) The hearing officer who conducts the review

may be “any person or persons designated by” the public housing authority. (24 C.F.R.

§ 982.555(e)(4)(i) (2026).) The hearing officer must “issue a written decision, stating

4 briefly the reasons for the decision.” (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2026).) The officer’s

factual findings “shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at the

hearing.” (Ibid.)

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Notice of Intent to Terminate Assistance

In 2017, Harrington began renting a subsidized apartment in Moreno Valley and

receiving Section 8 financial assistance from the HA. Her lease required her to comply

with the Section 8 regulations and refrain from damaging the premises.

In May 2022, Harrington failed an inspection because the carpet in her apartment

was torn in places, a closet door was off its track, the water heater was damaged, and

there were cracks in the ceiling. In June 2022, after fixing those issues and watching a

video on housekeeping standards provided by her landlord, Harrington passed the follow-

up inspection.

In December 2022, Harrington’s landlord sent her a 30-day notice to quit stating

that a November 2022 inspection revealed that her unit was in an “unsanitary condition”

with “excessive damages” and “poor housekeeping.” When Harrington did not vacate

her apartment, her landlord filed an unlawful detainer action in the Riverside County

Superior Court.

In January 2023, the HA sent Harrington a notice regarding its annual eligibility

reexamination. The notice informed Harrington that she was required to (1) submit her

eligibility information by February 15 and (2) make her apartment available for the

annual inspection. After sending the HA multiple emails explaining that she was

5 working on gathering her information but was running behind, Harrington submitted her

eligibility reexamination information on April 10, 2023.

Harrington’s annual inspection was scheduled for February 6, 2023. The day

before, she informed the HA by email that her landlord was trying to evict her and that

she would not be able to go forward with the inspection “[d]ue to the overwhelming

emotional distress.” She asked the HA to “reschedule [the inspection] if and when a

judge determines if my disabled household can remain here.” The HA rescheduled the

annual inspection for the following month, and she passed that inspection on March 14.

A few weeks later, on April 26, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in the

landlord’s favor in the unlawful detainer action and ordered Harrington to return

possession of the apartment to the landlord.

On May 3, 2023, the HA sent Harrington a “Pretermination of Assistance” letter,

requiring her to meet with an HA housing specialist to “discuss whether your assistance

will be terminated for the following reasons.” The letter contained a bullet-point

summary of the facts described above and cited to the following five “family

obligations:” (1) submitting reexamination information in a timely manner, (2) allowing

inspection, (3) complying with housing quality standards, (4) refraining from serious or

repeated lease violations, and (5) promptly notifying the public housing authority of an

eviction notice. (24 C.F.R. § 982.551 (2026).) The letter also contained the text of 24

Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) part 982.552, which provides that termination is

discretionary if the participant fails to comply with any of the family obligations and

6 mandatory if the participant has been evicted “for serious violation of the lease.” (Ibid.

(2026).)

The meeting with the housing specialist took place on May 15, 2023. Harrington

informed the specialist that she was appealing the unlawful detainer judgment, and the

specialist replied that the HA would put the termination process on hold while her appeal

was pending. According to the specialist’s notes, Harrington returned about a week later,

on May 23, to request a “grievance hearing.” The specialist believed that Harrington was

confusing the eviction process, which was controlled by the landlord, with the Section 8

program termination process, which was controlled by the HA. The specialist’s response

to Harrington’s request was to “go ahead and process [the] Intent to Term[inate]” and let

Harrington “request a hearing about rental assistance being terminated.”

On May 25, 2023, the HA sent Harrington a “Notice of Intent to Terminate

Assistance.” The contents of the notice were identical to that of the pretermination letter,

except that the notice included the housing specialist’s notes from the May 15 and 23

meetings and concluded by stating: “You were evicted by the Landlord, Riverside

County Superior Court upheld the eviction at initial Hearing and Appeal. You are not

eligible for a relocation voucher or continued housing assistance. [¶] IF YOU DO NOT

REQUEST AN INFORMAL HEARING IN WRITING, YOUR ASSISTANCE WILL

BE TERMINATED ON JUNE 25, 2023 . . . .”

2. The Administrative Hearing and Decision to Terminate

At Harrington’s request, an administrative hearing was held on July 5, 2023.

Harrington appeared on her own behalf, and the HA’s housing specialist appeared on

7 behalf of the HA. The hearing officer accepted evidentiary submissions from both parties

and heard argument before taking the matter under submission. On July 12, 2023, the

hearing officer issued a written decision upholding the HA’s decision to terminate

Harrington’s housing assistance under 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(b) (2026), which provides

that termination is mandatory if a participant has been evicted for serious or repeated

lease violations.

The decision summarized the parties’ arguments during the administrative hearing

as follows. The housing specialist stated that the “controlling” regulation was the

mandatory termination provision, 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(b) (2026), which provides that

the HA “must terminate program assistance for a family evicted from housing assisted

under the program for serious violation of the lease.” She also stated that her

understanding was that “the appeal [of the unlawful detainer judgment] is done” and that

“the finding was against” Harrington. Harrington responded that “the appeal is still

active” and “recited the points that she is appealing.” The housing specialist responded

that she had “not received any documents to show that the appeal is still active,” and that,

“[b]ecause of the eviction, my supervisors all agreed that it is proper to terminate rental

assistance.”

The hearing officer’s decision concluded: “The [Section 8] regulations . . . state

that ‘The [HA] must terminate program assistance for a family evicted from housing

assisted under the program for serious violation of the lease. [¶] The [HA] is bound by

this Federal Regulation and must adhere to it. Due to the fact that there was a court

ordered eviction, and that it was upheld on appeal, the [HA] has no choice but to

8 terminate assistance. Therefore, the [HA’s] decision to terminate Ms. Harrington from

the program is UPHELD.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

C. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus

In September 2023, Harrington filed a petition for writ of administrative

mandamus under section 1094.5 seeking an order compelling the HA to set aside its

decision. Harrington alleged that the hearing officer’s finding that the unlawful detainer

judgment was upheld on appeal was not supported by the record, because that judgment

was still pending before the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court.

On February 20, 2024—before the trial court set a briefing schedule and hearing

on Harrington’s petition—the appellate division issued a decision in the unlawful

detainer appeal, reversing the judgment for insufficient evidence. The decision

concluded that the landlord’s basis for eviction—i.e., that during the November 2022

inspection, Harrington’s apartment was found to be in “unsanitary conditions” with

“excessive damages”—was not supported by the record. The opinion states: “[The

property manager] provided no testimony as to what she observed that day nor did she

attempt to describe what the photographs purportedly showed. She did not testify that

she observed any physical damage to the property, or that she observed any signs of

rodents, ants, cockroaches or other vermin that would support the finding of unsanitary

conditions. . . . [¶] Moreover, we are not persuaded that the photographs . . . are a

sufficient basis to conclude that the property was in such an unsanitary condition that it

. . . violated the terms of the lease.”

9 Relying on that decision, Harrington filed a motion asking the trial court to

exercise its discretion to temporarily stay the termination of her housing assistance under

section 1094.5, subdivision (g), pending the resolution of her petition. At the hearing on

the motion, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the temporary stay. The court

explained that, at Harrington’s administrative hearing, the hearing officer based its

decision to uphold termination upon the finding that “the court ‘upheld the eviction’ and

that ‘the appeal was done.’ ” The court took judicial notice of the appellate division’s

decision under the mandatory judicial notice provision in Evidence Code section 451,

subdivision (a), and concluded that Harrington had demonstrated a likelihood of success

on her petition for administrative mandate, because the decision “suggest[s] that the

hearing officer’s findings that the appeal had been completed cannot possibly be

supported by the evidence.” By the end of the hearing, however, the court concluded the

temporary stay was unnecessary because the HA presented evidence that Harrington was

no longer in possession of the apartment. After denying the motion as moot, the court set

a briefing schedule and date for the hearing on Harrington’s mandamus petition.

In her brief, Harrington argued that the appellate division’s decision demonstrated

that the hearing officer’s finding that her eviction had been upheld on appeal was not

supported by the evidence. In response, the HA argued that, under the “independent

judgment” standard, the trial court was not bound by the hearing officer’s factual

findings. According to the HA, the independent judgment standard empowered the trial

court to review “all of the evidence contained within the Administrative Record” to

10 “independently” determine if termination was appropriate on “any of the other grounds

presented by the [HA].”

The HA argued that, in addition to the eviction, it had alleged the following three

additional grounds for termination in its notice of intent to terminate: (1) failure to timely

submit reexamination information; (2) failure to allow an inspection; and (3) breach of

the housing quality standards. The HA further argued that the record contained evidence

to support a finding that Harrington committed each of those violations. Specifically, the

weight of the evidence showed that Harrington: (1) submitted her reexamination

information late, because she missed the February 15, 2023 deadline and submitted her

information on April 10; (2) failed to allow an inspection, because she declined the

February 6, 2023 inspection due to the stress of eviction; and (3) failed to comply with

the housing quality standards, because the inspector observed excessive damages and

unsanitary conditions during the November 2022 inspection.

Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court issued a written decision

agreeing with the HA’s position. Regarding the scope of judicial review under section

1094.5, the court concluded: “Although the Hearing Officer did not specifically identify

other violations as the basis for the decision, the Court must determine, based on its

independent judgment, whether the weight of the evidence support[s] the Housing

Authority’s decision to terminate [Harrington’s] housing assistance. [¶] Thus, the issue

comes down to whether the administrative record supports the . . . decision . . . for the

reasons/violations identified in the Notice of Intent to Terminate Assistance dated

May 25, 2023, which was admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing.”

11 The court found that “the weight of the evidence shows that [Harrington] failed to

provide timely information for annual recertification in violation of 24 C.F.R. [parts]

981.551(b) and 982.552(c)(1)(i), . . . to allow inspectors to access the unit for annual

recertification inspection in violation of 24 C.F.R. [parts] 981.551(d) and

982.552(c)(1)(i), . . . and to keep [her] unit in clean and sanitary condition.” The court

concluded that, because the record supported findings that Harrington violated three of

the family obligations, and because the HA had alleged those violations in its notice of

intent to terminate, the HA’s decision to terminate was proper under the discretionary

termination provision—24 C.F.R. part 982.552(c).

The court denied Harrington’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, and

Harrington filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Harrington represents herself on appeal, as she did at her administrative hearing

and in the trial court. In her opening brief, she focuses on the trial court’s reasons for

denying her petition, arguing that there is insufficient evidence that she violated three of

the family obligations set out in 24 C.F.R. part 982.551 (2026). Specifically, she argues

that: (1) there is no evidence that she failed to submit her annual reexamination

information in a timely manner because she submitted the information in April, which

was well within the suggested timeframes set out in HUD’s policy manual; (2) there is no

evidence that she failed to allow the annual inspection, because she rescheduled it for

March and passed that inspection; and (3) there is no evidence that she failed to comply

with the housing quality standards, because the appellate division held that her landlord

12 failed to demonstrate the unsanitary conditions and excessive damages cited in the

November 2022 inspection. In its brief, the HA responds that substantial evidence

supports each of the trial court’s factual findings.

After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the record, we asked the parties to brief

the issue of whether the trial court misunderstood the scope of judicial review under

section 1094.5 by failing to use its independent judgment to determine whether the

hearing officer’s factual findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. In

supplemental briefs, Harrington argues, and the HA concedes, that the trial court did

misunderstand the scope of its review, but the HA contends that we can nevertheless

affirm the judgment. We agree with the parties that the court erred, and we conclude the

error requires reversal.

A. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions under Section 1094.5

Section 1094.5 “governs judicial review by administrative mandate of a final

decision or order rendered by an administrative agency.” (Johnson, supra,

38 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) Subdivision (b) of section 1094.5 states that the trial court’s

“inquiry . . . shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without,

or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any

prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) As relevant here, an “[a]buse of

discretion is established if . . . the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or

the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 provides: “Where it is claimed that

the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized

13 by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is

established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the

evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that

the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.”

(Emphasis added.) The “independent judgment” standard applies where, as here, the

interest at issue is a “fundamental vested right.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County

Employees Ret. Ass’n. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34-35 (Strumsky); see Johnson, supra,

38 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [Section 8 housing assistance is a fundamental vested right].)

The independent judgment standard is less deferential to the agency’s factfinding

process than the substantial evidence standard. Under the latter, the trial court must draw

all reasonable inferences to support the agency’s factual findings and may reverse only if

the findings are so lacking in evidentiary support as to render them arbitrary, capricious,

or unreasonable. (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing

Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1583.) By contrast, the independent judgment

standard gives the trial court “the power to draw its own reasonable inferences from the

evidence and to make its own determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses.”

(Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107

Cal.App.4th 860, 868.)

The purpose of the independent judgment standard is to provide an extra layer of

protection to petitioners in cases where an important right is at stake by affording less

deference to the agency’s decision-making process. (Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at

p. 34.) As our Supreme Court explained: “When an administrative decision affects a

14 right which has been legitimately acquired or is otherwise ‘vested,’ and when that right is

of a fundamental nature from the standpoint of its economic aspect or its ‘effect . . . in

human terms and the importance . . . to the individual in the life situation,’ then a full and

independent judicial review of that decision is indicated because ‘[t]he abrogation of the

right is too important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive administrative

extinction.’ ” (Strumsky, at p. 34.)

B. The Trial Court Misunderstood the Scope of Review under Section 1094.5

Under section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the task before the trial court was to

determine whether the HA’s decision to terminate was supported by the hearing officer’s

factual findings and whether those factual findings were supported by the record.

(§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) The trial court did not undertake that review. If it had, it would

have necessarily concluded that the hearing officer’s factual findings were not supported

by the evidence and, as a result, Harrington had established an abuse of discretion under

section 1094.5, subdivision (b). The record compels such a conclusion because it is

undisputed that the unlawful detainer judgment—which was ultimately reversed for

insufficient evidence—was still under appeal at the time of the administrative hearing.

Indeed, the trial court drew that very conclusion at the hearing on Harrington’s motion to

temporarily stay the HA’s decision.

Instead of reviewing the hearing officer’s factual findings, the court concluded that

the independent judgment standard authorized it to determine whether the record

supported the HA’s decision on any of the other grounds alleged in the notice of intent to

terminate. By concluding that the weight of the evidence showed that Harrington had

15 violated three family obligations, the court effectively made its own factual findings to

support the HA’s termination decision. That was error because section 1094.5 requires a

court to determine whether the agency’s “decision” is “supported by the findings” and

also whether those “findings” are “supported by the evidence.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).)

“Section 1094.5 clearly contemplates that at minimum, the reviewing court must

determine both whether substantial evidence supports the administrative agency’s

findings and whether the findings support the agency’s decision.” (Topanga Assn. for a

Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-515 (Topanga),

emphasis added.)

As our Supreme Court has explained, when conducting the latter inquiry, the trial

court’s focus must be on the factual findings made in support of the agency’s decision:

“[I]mplicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the

challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw

evidence and ultimate decision or order. . . . By focusing, instead, upon the relationships

between evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate action, the Legislature

sought to direct the reviewing court’s attention to the analytic route the administrative

agency traveled from evidence to action. In so doing, we believe that the Legislature

must have contemplated that the agency would reveal this route. Reference, in section

1094.5, to the reviewing court’s duty to compare the evidence and ultimate decision to

‘the findings’ (italics added) we believe leaves no room for the conclusion that the

Legislature would have been content to have a reviewing court speculate as to the

administrative agency’s basis for decision.” (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 515.)

16 The trial court’s failure to review the hearing officer’s factual findings for

evidentiary support appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the independent

judgment standard. The trial court agreed with the HA’s characterization, which was that

the standard authorizes an independent review of the evidence to find support for the

agency’s decision. However, by concluding that the record supported three alternative

grounds for termination that were not found true by the hearing officer, the trial court

circumvented section 1094.5’s requirement that an agency’s factual findings be supported

by the record. The independent judgment standard is intended to add an extra layer of

judicial scrutiny to agency fact-finding, not to add more protection to the agency’s legal

conclusions by allowing the trial court to make its own factual findings in support of

those conclusions.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its

review under section 1094.5 and failed to undertake the required independent review of

the hearing officer’s factual findings.

C. Reversal Is Necessary

In its supplemental brief, the HA concedes the legal error but contends that we

may nevertheless affirm the judgment. As we explain, we find each of the HA’s

arguments unpersuasive.

First, the HA asserts that Harrington forfeited the issue on appeal by failing to

raise it in her opening brief. But the rule requiring an appellant to raise every issue in

their opening brief is designed to “ensure that opposing parties are fairly apprised of

contentions so as to afford a full and fair opportunity to respond.” (Golden Door

17 Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 555.) But when the

court directs the parties to brief a particular issue, as we did here, then the briefing order

necessarily ensures that the respondent is fairly apprised of the issue and has a full

opportunity to respond.

We also reject the HA’s argument that Harrington “invited” the error because she

failed to object to the HA’s characterization of the independent judgment standard in her

briefing on her petition. The doctrine of invited error applies when “a party by its own

conduct induces the commission of error.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54

Cal.3d 202, 212.) If any party induced the trial court’s error, it was the HA, who argued

for an incorrect characterization of the independent judgment standard, not Harrington.

Rather, Harrington placed the issue of the hearing officer’s factual findings lacking

evidentiary support squarely before the trial court, both in her petition and in her briefs

submitted before the hearing.

Second, the HA argues that the appellate division’s decision was “inadmissible,”

because Harrington failed to satisfy “her burden of laying a foundation for augmenting

the record with evidence of the appellate division’s decision.” But the foundation

requirement does not apply to the introduction of state court decisions. Instead, Evidence

Code section 451, subdivision (a), requires courts to take judicial notice of the

“decisional . . . law of this state.” By the time of the hearing on Harrington’s petition, the

trial court had already taken judicial notice of the appellate division’s decision (at the

hearing on Harrington’s request for a stay) and had already concluded that the decision

18 rendered the hearing officer’s finding that the eviction had been upheld on appeal

“impossible.”

Third, the HA contends that we can affirm the judgment because, even if there is

no evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the unlawful detainer judgment

was upheld on appeal, the record contains “substantial evidence . . . sufficient for the

hearing officer to reasonably conclude that [Harrington] had been evicted, mandating

eviction under 24 [Code of Federal Regulations part] 982.552(b)(2).” We are not

persuaded. Mandatory termination under 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(b) (2026) applies when

a participant has been evicted for a “serious” lease violation. The only document in the

administrative record that discusses the reason for Harrington’s eviction is the landlord’s

notice to quit. That document bases the eviction upon a failed November 2022 inspection

that purportedly revealed “excessive damages” and “unsanitary conditions,” but the

document does not say what the damages or conditions were. Furthermore, the appellate

division held that the landlord failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding of

excessive damages or unsanitary conditions. Because the record contains no evidence to

support a finding that Harrington was evicted for a serious lease violation, we cannot

affirm the judgment on a finding of eviction only.

Fourth, the HA argues that the court’s failure to review the hearing officer’s

findings for evidentiary support was harmless because the record contains substantial

evidence that Harrington violated the three family obligations identified by the court,

each of which, on their own, justifies termination. But as we explained above, section

1094.5 does not allow a trial court to make its own factual findings to provide alternative

19 support for an agency decision, and for good reason. “To terminate section 8 housing

assistance, due process requires, among other things, timely and adequate notice of the

reasons for the proposed termination and a written decision following a pretermination

hearing that states the reasons for the determination and the evidence on which the

decision maker relied.” (Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 607.) “At the hearing, the

hearing officer must determine whether the termination of benefits is in accordance with

the law, federal regulations, and departmental policies and issue a written decision.”

(Ibid.) The purpose of the written decision is “to demonstrate that ‘the decisionmaker’s

conclusion as to a recipient’s eligibility . . . rest[s] solely on the legal rules and evidence

adduced at the hearing.’ ” (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Here, the sole focus of the administrative hearing was whether the mandatory

termination provision applied to Harrington because she had been evicted for a serious

lease violation. During argument, the HA’s representative cited the mandatory

termination regulation (24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b) (2026)) as the sole legal basis for

termination and stated that, “[b]ecause of the eviction, my supervisors all agreed that it is

proper to terminate rental assistance.” It would violate Harrington’s due process rights to

uphold the HA’s termination decision based on violations that were alleged in the

termination notice but not placed at issue at the administrative hearing. After all, it is the

hearing officer who must make the factual determinations in the first instance.

In addition to the due process violation, we also note that, based on our review of

the record, we have doubts about whether the evidence would even be sufficient to

support the three alleged violations of the family obligations. In her opening and reply

20 briefs, Harrington raises potentially valid arguments as to why she did not violate those

obligations. At the very least, her arguments are relevant to the discretionary termination

factors set out in 24 C.F.R. part 982.552(c) (2026). Because the discretionary termination

was not at issue during the administrative hearing, the hearing officer did not consider

those factors.

Finally, the HA argues that if we determine that the error is reversible, then the

proper remedy is either to (1) “remand to the trial court to confine its independent

examination to the issue of eviction” or (2) remand to the trial court “with instructions to

enter an order directing the agency to clarify or make further findings.” On this record, it

is unnecessary to remand to the trial court to limit its analysis to “the issue of eviction”

because the relevant facts are undisputed and thus there is only one conclusion the trial

court could properly draw on remand. We also decline to direct the trial court to remand

to the HA to clarify or make further factual findings, because that remedy is only

appropriate when “[t]he absence of specific findings prevents us from fulfilling our duty

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to conduct a meaningful judicial review of

the challenged administrative decisions.” (Glendale Mem’l Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. State

Dep’t (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 129, 139.) In this case, there is no absence of findings or

confusion about what the findings are. The hearing officer made clear factual findings

that permit judicial review.

Because it is undisputed that the hearing officer’s factual findings are not

supported by the record, the proper remedy is reversal with directions to grant the petition

for administrative mandamus on the ground that Harrington established an abuse of

21 discretion under section 1094.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1094.5, subd. (b); see generally

Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 522; City v. Bd. of Permit Appeals (1989) 207

Cal.App.3d 1099, 1111.)

DISPOSITION

We reverse the order denying Harrington’s petition for writ of administrative

mandamus. We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order

granting the petition and issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the HA to vacate its order

terminating Harrington’s financial assistance. Harrington shall recover her costs on

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

FIELDS

Acting P. J. We concur:

MENETREZ

J.

LEE

J.

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