facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1). We deny Esteban Lucas’s petition for review.

We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for

substantial evidence. Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).

Where the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision, as it did here, “we review [] the reasons

explicitly identified by the BIA, and then examine the reasoning articulated in the

IJ’s oral decision in support of those reasons.” Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291,

1296 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. In his arrival interview, recorded on an I-867A form, Esteban

Lucas informed U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents that he entered the country

“to live and work in California” and that he did not fear returning to his home

country. Esteban Lucas’s statements directly contradict his later testimony to an

asylum officer and before the IJ concerning the alleged threats to his life—the

basis of his fear-based claims. Because Esteban Lucas first “affirmatively denied”

a fear of returning to Guatemala and later expressed that precise fear, the agency

reasonably concluded there was a “valid discrepancy” that goes to the heart of his

2 claims. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding an

adverse credibility determination where petitioner affirmatively denied any fear of

mistreatment during an initial airport interview then later asserted a fear of return),

superseded on other grounds by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “This

inconsistency bears directly on [Esteban Lucas’s] claim of persecution, thereby

permitting the [BIA and IJ] to afford it substantial weight.” See Manes v. Sessions,

875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

As required, Esteban Lucas was afforded an opportunity to explain these

inconsistencies on cross-examination. See Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138,

1143 (9th Cir. 2022). When asked why he failed to state he was seeking asylum

during his arrival interview, Esteban Lucas explained that he was afraid and did

not understand the questions because the interviewing agent “had a different

accent.” Esteban Lucas’s counsel had an opportunity to clarify or further explain

the inconsistent statements on re-direct examination but failed to do so.

The agency did not err in declining to credit Esteban Lucas’s explanation.

Esteban Lucas was interviewed in Spanish, a language he attested to speaking

fluently, and provided accurate information in response to the rest of the agent’s

questions. The agent also gave Esteban Lucas the opportunity to ask questions or

volunteer information about his fear of returning to Guatemala before concluding

the interview.

3 Under the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence therefore

supports the BIA’s reliance on this inconsistency in upholding the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding. See Dong, 50 F.4th at 1300 (“Although one suspect document

is unlikely to constitute substantial evidence of adverse credibility on its own,

under the totality of the circumstances, the BIA reasonably concluded that it

supported the IJ’s credibility determination.”).1

2. In the absence of credible testimony, there is no evidence in the record

showing, or even suggesting, that Esteban Lucas would suffer persecution based on

a protected ground. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir.

2017). Accordingly, the agency reasonably denied Esteban Lucas’s asylum and

withholding claims. See Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1091, 1094 (9th

Cir. 2021) (“Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that without

credible testimony, [the petitioner] failed to establish eligibility for asylum or

withholding of removal.”).2

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

1 We do not address the other grounds relied on by the IJ because the BIA did not adopt or rely on such findings. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016). 2 Because Esteban Lucas did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim before the BIA, he has waived this ground for relief. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2019).

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