NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 13 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR ALEXANDER LOPEZ- No. 20-72966 MEJICANOS; YOSELIN YADIRA Agency No.

RAMIREZ-MARROQUIN; BYRON A201-755-408

ALEXANDER LOPEZ-RAMIREZ; A201-755-409

SANTIAGO ALEJANDRO LOPEZ-

A201-755-410

RAMIREZ,

A201-755-411

Petitioners,

MEMORANDUM*

v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 11, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. Petitioners Cesar Alexander Lopez-Mejicanos (Lopez-Mejicanos), his wife

Yoselin Yadira Ramirez-Marroquin (Ramirez-Marroquin), and their two minor

children (collectively, Petitioners),1 natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their

appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT). We deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal because Petitioners did not establish a nexus between any

past or future harm in Guatemala and a protected ground. “For both asylum and

withholding claims, a petitioner must prove a causal nexus between one of her

statutorily protected characteristics and either her past harm or her objectively

tenable fear of future harm. . . .” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012,

1016 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). An asylum claim requires evidence that

the protected characteristic was “one central reason” for the harm, and a

withholding of removal claim requires evidence that a protected characteristic will

be “a reason” for future harm. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358-59

1 Petitioners Lopez-Mejicanos and Ramirez-Marroquin have filed their own applications and listed their two minor children, Byron Alexander Lopez- Ramirez and Santiago Alejandro Lopez-Ramirez, as derivative beneficiaries of their applications.

2 20-72966 (9th Cir. 2017).

Petitioner testified that he was threatened, beaten, robbed, and extorted by

gang members, but there was insufficient evidence that any harm was motivated by

membership in a particular social group (PSG), or any other statutorily protected

ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended

(holding that “criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members

bears no nexus to a protected ground”). This lack of nexus is fatal to Petitioners’

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch,

841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016).2

2. On appeal to the BIA, Petitioners asserted for the first time membership

in the following PSGs: “whistleblowers,” “Guatemalans who have opposed or

resisted gang or criminal violence,” “Guatemalans perceived as wealthy

businessowners,” and “Guatemalans who are family members of victims of gang

crime or criminal violence.” The BIA construed the articulation of these newly

asserted PSGs as a motion to remand and determined that Petitioners failed to

establish that these new PSGs would change the result of their case. See Fonseca-

Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2023) (requiring “a petitioner to

establish that it is at least more probable than not that the new evidence would

2 Because there was a finding of no nexus, the distinction between “one central reason” and “a reason” does not matter to the outcome. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019).

3 20-72966 change the outcome of the claim”). The BIA did not abuse its discretion because

Petitioners failed to establish that these PSGs are cognizable. See, e.g., Diaz-

Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that victims of

“gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors” does not support a

cognizable social group assertion); Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877,

882 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing the lack of “evidence that Mexican society

perceives wealthy business owners as a distinct group”).

3. “To be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant bears the burden of

establishing that she will more likely than not be tortured with the consent or

acquiescence of a public official if removed to her native country. . . .” Xochihua-

Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Under our

precedent, evidence of threats and one physical attack by gang members do not

establish a particularized risk of torture. See Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757,

769 (9th Cir 2022) (noting that “a petitioner who was twice kidnapped and, during

one kidnapping, beaten with brass knuckles that caused hearing damage, had not

shown past torture”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021) (denying relief

after concluding that “unfulfilled threats” were not sufficiently extreme).

Petitioner testified that he filed a police report when his motorcycle was stolen and

that the police response was ineffective. However, perceived ineffectiveness of

4 20-72966 police response to criminal activity does not sufficiently demonstrate that the

police would “acquiesce or be willfully blind” to any torture. See Andrade-Garcia

v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended (stating that “general

ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not

suffice to show acquiescence) (citation omitted). Therefore, substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners failed to establish eligibility for

protection under the CAT. See Singh v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 1142, 1156 (9th Cir.

2025).

PETITION DENIED.3

3 The stay of removal will remain in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal (Dkt. #1) is otherwise denied.

5 20-72966