NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOAQUIN MURILLO, No. 25-225 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:15-cv-00266-DC-SCR v.

MEMORANDUM*

K. HOLLAND, Warden; J. GUTIERREZ,

Deputy Warden,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

G. YBARRA, JORGE ANDRADE RICO,

MAHER CONRAD SUAREZ,

CHRISTOPHER LIPSEY, Jr.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dena M. Coggins, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District Judge.**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States Chief District Judge for Wardens Holland and Gutierrez (Defendants) appeal the district court’s denial

of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. This case relates to a

decades-long class action related to mental health services provided to inmates in

the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).

See Coleman v. Newsom, No. 2:90-cv-0520-TLN-SCR (E.D. Cal.) (the Coleman

litigation). Plaintiff Joaquin Murillo brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

he suffered sleep deprivation in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights due to

excessive noise caused by Defendants’ implementation of CDCR’s Guard One

system, a protocol for welfare checks on inmates in administrative segregation and

security housing units, at California Correctional Institution (CCI). Defendants

moved for summary judgment arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity;

the district court denied their motion.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the “denial of a

motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity” de novo. Felarca

v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is granted

only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. On summary judgment, we “view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “Our

interlocutory review jurisdiction is limited to resolving a defendant’s purely legal

the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

2 25-225 contention that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution and, in any event,

did not violate clearly established law.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726,

731 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). We reverse and remand to the district court for

dismissal of Defendants, who are entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct

was clearly established at the time.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,

62–63 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A right is “clearly established” if,

“at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Id. at 63

(cleaned up). We must consider “whether the violative nature of [the defendants’]

particular conduct is clearly established,” and we must do so “in light of the specific

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821

F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis and alterations in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

We have “discretion to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis

to address first.” West v. City of Caldwell, 931 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2019).

Because we conclude that our reasoning in Rico v. Ducart, extends to the

circumstances of this case, we begin and end our analysis with the clearly-

established prong. 980 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 2020).

3 25-225 In Rico, an inmate incarcerated at CDCR’s Pelican Bay prison filed a lawsuit

pursuant to § 1983 alleging an “Eighth Amendment condition-of-confinement claim

for sleep deprivation caused by excessive noise” resulting from Pelican Bay’s

implementation of the same Guard One system, under the direction of the Coleman

court. Id. at 1295–97. We held that there was no clearly established law that creating

such noise was unlawful under the “specific facts presented” by the case before us.

Id. at 1299. We thus concluded that “every reasonable official would not have

understood that how they performed the court-ordered Guard One checks violated

the Constitution.” Id. We found no analogous case law and determined that “the

challenged noise arose from activity that was inherently noisy in a facility the very

construction of which made difficult quietly conducting round-the-clock welfare

checks that defendants were ordered by the Coleman court to perform.” Id. The

same is true of the circumstances here.

Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Rico are unavailing. Plaintiff overstates the

impact of Pelican Bay’s design on our reasoning in Rico. We noted that the activity

itself is “inherently noisy” when carried out at a “facility built of concrete, metal,

and steel.” Id. at 1299–300. That describes all prisons, including CCI, as the record

before us makes clear. And Plaintiff testified that even if correctional officers “are

being considerate,” there is still “loud noise” from the “opening and closing” of cell

doors “all night every half hour,” rendering the entire Guard One system

4 25-225 “disruptive.” We acknowledged as much in Rico, explaining that “the officers were

undoubtedly and unavoidably going to make noise simply by complying with the

court-mandated use of the Guard One system within the SHU at Pelican Bay,” and

that even “[a]ssuming perfect implementation of the system, inmates were still

susceptible to being awoken every hour each night when heavy entry doors to the

pods opened and closed.” Id. at 1302.

Plaintiff also alleges excessive noise by correctional officers in retaliation for

inmates’ complaints. We explained in Rico that even if “floor officers”

were “causing extra noise by running on the metal stairs, hitting the Guard One discs

with more force than necessary, and rushing through checks, it is not ‘beyond debate’

that every reasonable floor officer would be aware that this conduct violated the

law.” Id. at 1301. Given the breadth of Rico’s reasoning on excessive noise, we

cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s case is sufficiently different as to require the

opposite conclusion.

Plaintiff next argues that Rico is distinguishable due to “the number of

grievances and appeals filed by CCI prisoners,” compared with “only a handful of

grievances” filed in Rico. But even accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that

Defendants were aware of all grievances filed against Guard One at CCI, that does

not compel the conclusion that a reasonable supervisory official would have been

“on notice” that the conduct of several unnamed floor officers “was illegal.” Inouye

5 25-225 v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). Rather, as we explained in Rico, “no

reasonable official would believe that creating additional noise while carrying out

mandatory suicide checks for prisoner safety clearly violated . . . constitutional

rights.” 980 F.3d at 1303.

In sum, Rico held that the clearly-established prong was not met where

correctional officers implemented an “inherently noisy” system for inmate welfare

pursuant to a court order. Id. at 1300. Plaintiff does not identify any case that

compels the conclusion that Defendants should have understood their supervisory

conduct was unlawful. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. The cases Plaintiff cites in

support of his argument were specifically distinguished by Rico because none had

considered circumstances where “officials were carrying out a court order designed

to benefit at-risk inmates” and where the mandated “activity . . . is inherently noisy.”

980 F.3d at 1300. Plaintiff’s claim concerns implementation of the same “inherently

loud” policy, id. at 1303, “in a maximum security facility built of concrete, metal,

and steel.” Id. at 1299. Our reasoning in Rico therefore applies.

Accordingly, as in Rico, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

6 25-225