DISCUSSION

Section 4336, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part, “Except on written agreement of the parties to the contrary or a court order terminating spousal support, the court retains jurisdiction indefinitely in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties where the marriage is of long duration.” (§ 4336, subd. (a).)5 Martha’s theory on appeal is that the court erred in denying her 2024 request for spousal support because the court premised its denial on the vitality of its 2021 termination ruling. She contends the June 2021 termination ruling is in fact void and unenforceable, as section 4336 required the court to maintain jurisdiction indefinitely in the absence of an agreement between the parties or a prior order of the court terminating spousal support, neither of which exist here. We see no merit to this argument. The error Martha asserts is not an error—her reading of the governing statute is incorrect, since many kinds of specific orders may be and often are set forth within a dissolution judgment— but even taking her interpretation of section 4336 on its own terms, at most the argument would render the June 2021 termination ruling voidable, so she forfeited it by failing to raise it in the trial court.

5 The court’s 2021 judgment indicates the marriage exceeded 20 years

in duration. The parties do not dispute that it therefore qualifies as a marriage of “long duration.” (See Fam. Code, § 4336, subd. (b) [stating in relevant part, “For the purpose of retaining jurisdiction, there is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that a marriage of 10 years or more, from the date of marriage to the date of separation, is a marriage of long duration.”].)

3 Void orders or judgments are entered where a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction or there is some other kind of defect of fundamental jurisdiction, such as a due process violation. All other erroneously entered orders and judgments are voidable. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661 [“ ‘ “[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable.”].) What we have here, at most, falls in the latter category. “Errors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless ‘unusual circumstances were present which prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.’ ” (People v. American Contractor’s Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Because Martha does not point to any such circumstances, her voidness argument has been forfeited. The time to raise it was in 2021.

DISPOSITION

The order appealed from is affirmed. Gilardo is awarded costs of appeal.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.

MOORMAN, J.*

* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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