NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 24 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAMON SOLANO-TENORIO, No. 23-963 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-934-623 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Ramon Solano-Tenorio seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his

cancellation of removal application and request for voluntary departure. He claims

that the agency erred in concluding that his wife had not established exceptional and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). extremely unusual hardship. He also argues that the agency abused its discretion in

denying his request for voluntary departure.

We generally lack jurisdiction to review denials of cancellation of removal

applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and denials of voluntary departure

requests under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f). But we retain jurisdiction to review

“constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The Supreme Court has held that a determination of

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is a mixed question of fact and law that

is reviewable. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024).

We review the decisions of the BIA and of the IJ insofar as the BIA adopts the

IJ’s conclusions. See Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.

2018). We determine “whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts [] by reviewing for

substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir.

2025).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship determination. Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

requires hardship “substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to

result” from removal. Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 59 (BIA 2001)).

2 23-963 Determining whether exceptional hardship is present requires a cumulative analysis

of all hardship factors. Salcido-Salcido v. INS, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 n.1 (9th Cir.

1998) (per curiam). Here, Petitioner’s wife acknowledged that she “has the ability

to care for and sustain herself.” She independently held a job for 15 years, would

have continued in that position had her employment not been terminated for

violating a workplace policy, and is actively seeking employment. The IJ considered

these factors in making the hardship determination and the BIA appropriately upheld

that determination.

Petitioner’s claim that the IJ violated his due process rights by exhibiting bias

is also meritless. A due process violation necessitating reversal requires that the

proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case,” resulting in prejudice. Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d

967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th

Cir. 1986)). Prejudice was not present here, as Petitioner has not established that the

hardship determination turned on the IJ’s single comment about Petitioner’s wife

knowingly marrying an undocumented immigrant.

2. The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for

voluntary departure. “[A]dministrative agencies have great latitude in exercising

their discretion to grant or deny requests for voluntary departure.” Campos-Granillo

v. INS, 12 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended (Feb. 16, 1994). The agency

3 23-963 “must weigh both favorable and unfavorable factors,” such as “the nature and

underlying circumstances of the deportation ground at issue; additional violations of

the immigration laws; the existence, seriousness, and recency of any criminal record;

and other evidence of bad character or the undesirability of the applicant as a

permanent resident.” Rojas v. Holder, 704 F.3d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “the agency must indicate how it

weighed the factors involved and how it arrived at its conclusion.” Yepes-Prado v.

U.S. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended (Nov. 12, 1993) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Petitioner argues that the IJ did not engage in the requisite discretionary

analysis, an error that was sustained by the BIA. Petitioner is wrong. The agency

properly found that Petitioner’s negative factors outweighed the positive factors.

These negative factors included Petitioner’s illegal reentry two weeks after agreeing

to voluntarily depart the United States, a forgery conviction, a DUI conviction, and

multiple violations for driving without a license following the DUI conviction.

Petitioner’s claim that the IJ gave undue weight to his arrests is unavailing. The IJ

was well within her discretion to find that Petitioner’s criminal history outweighed

the benefits of his continued presence in the United States.

The motion to stay removal (Dkt. 20) is denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 23-963