Cordova

facts from her DVRO application, which, in the court’s words, showed “she has used the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the purpose of it and the tools [of it] to manipulate and to harass and to control Mr. Cordova” and “not” out of any genuine “fears for [her] safety.”1 Teasdale similarly omits from her appellate brief material evidence that supports the trial court’s credibility determinations, factual findings, and exercise of discretion. We affirm the order. We review the grant or denial of a DVRO for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) To the extent the court’s exercise of discretion rests on factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Ibid.) The court’s decision is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate error affirmatively. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509; In re Marriage of Gray (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 974, 977– 978.) To meet this burden, an appellant like Teasdale “ ‘must set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence [relevant to her

Among other things, the trial court found, and the evidence showed, that Teasdale seemingly timed her ex…