1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TANYA LISETTE KEYES, et al., Case No.: 25-cv-2556-RSH-VET

12 Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

13 v. REMAND

14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., [ECF No. 8] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by plaintiffs Tanya Lisette Keyes and 20 Nathaniel Leon Keyes. ECF No. 8. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court 21 finds the motion presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the 22 reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 The instant action arises out of Plaintiffs’ purchase of an allegedly defective 25 vehicle. 26 Plaintiffs allege they purchased a 2018 GMC Yukon (hereinafter “Subject 27 Vehicle”) on November 30, 2018 that “suffered and continues to suffer from significant 28 defects and non-conformities[.]” ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 6, 9. 1 On May 15, 2025, during pre-litigation settlement discussions, Plaintiffs provided 2 Defendant with documents identifying the Subject Vehicle’s purchase price and repair 3 history. See ECF No. 8 at 7; Declaration of Michelle Yang (“Yang Decl.,” ECF No. 8-1) 4 ¶ 7. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in San Diego Superior Court on May 29, 2025. ECF 5 No. 1-2 at 6–15. Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts claims for: (1) violation of California Civil 6 Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) violation of California Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3) 7 violation of California Civil Code Section 1793.2 (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied 8 warranty of merchantability; (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 9 (“MMWA”); and (6) violation of California’s Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 7–14. 10 Defendant was served with the Complaint on May 30, 2025. ECF No. 8-1 at 5–6. 11 On September 26, 2025 Defendant removed the case to this Court on the basis of 12 diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. On October 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to 13 remand. ECF No. 8. Defendant filed a response and Plaintiffs filed a reply. ECF Nos. 14, 14 15. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 “The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the 17 statutory authorization of Congress.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 18 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action brought 19 in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 20 jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Only state-court actions that originally could have 21 been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court[.]” Caterpillar, Inc. v. 22 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[R]emovability is generally determined as of the 23 time of the petition for removal[.]” Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. 24 Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 25 1215 (9th Cir. 1988). In cases where “state-filed complaints are removed to federal court 26 . . . the removing party ‘has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 27 removal is proper.’” Watters v. Parviz, No. 23-35601, 2024 WL 5423073, at *3 (9th Cir. 28 1 Feb. 21, 2025) (quoting Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 2 599 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010)). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 A. Timeliness 5 In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue Defendant’s removal is untimely because 6 Defendant did not file its notice of removal within thirty days of being served with 7 Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ECF No. 8 at 11–15. 8 1. Deadlines for Removal 9 “The mechanics and requirements for removal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.” 10 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA Ltd. Liab. Co., 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). 11 “[S]ection 1446(b) identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.” Carvalho v. 12 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). “The first thirty-day 13 removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its 14 face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139 (“To avoid 15 saddling defendants with the burden of investigating jurisdictional facts, we have held 16 that the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading in order 17 for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.”) (internal quotation marks 18 omitted). “The second thirty-day removal period is triggered if the initial pleading does 19 not indicate that the case is removable, and the defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended 20 pleading, motion, order or other paper’ from which removability may first be 21 ascertained.” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 885 (quoting § 1446(b)). 22 A removing defendant must comply with the mandatory time limits of 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1446(b). Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A 24 defendant has thirty days to remove a case on diversity or federal question grounds.”); 25 Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 26 statutory time limit for removal “is mandatory[.]”). While untimely removal is a 27 procedural rather than jurisdictional defect, “a timely objection to a late petition will 28 defeat removal[.]” Id. 1 2. The Complaint 2 Plaintiffs first contend that their Complaint is removable on its face because it 3 asserts a claim under the federal Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. ECF No. 8 at 11–12. 4 “The [MMWA] provides a [federal] cause of action for express and implied 5 warranty claims under state law.” Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 966 F.3d 1027, 1032 6 (9th Cir. 2020); see Anda v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07354-MCS-SSC, 2025 WL 7 2938454, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (“[A]n MMWA claim based on breach of a 8 written or implied warranty is effectively a federal cause of action for express and 9 implied warranty claims under state law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Sony 10 Grand WEGA KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV TV Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 11 1077, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2010). It permits “‘a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a 12 supplier [or] warrantor . . . to comply with any obligation under this [title 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 2301 et seq.], or under a written warranty [or] implied warranty’ to sue in United States 14 district court provided that ‘the amount in controversy is [not] less than the sum or value 15 of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be 16 determined in this suit.’” Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., 377 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) 17 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)). 18 Although the MMWA is a federal statute, it does not confer federal jurisdiction in 19 every case. Instead, the statute precludes federal jurisdiction “if the amount in 20 controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) 21 computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 2310 22 (d)(3); see Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the 23 MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA 24 claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000.”); Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 25 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The MMWA is a somewhat unique federal statute in that 26 merely alleging a violation of the act is insufficient to confer federal question 27 jurisdiction; a separate $50,000 amount in controversy requirement must also be 28 satisfied.”). 1 Accordingly, to trigger the first thirty-day removal period, it must have been 2 apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim satisfied the 3 $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. 4 Here, Plaintiffs concede their Complaint “does not allege a specific dollar amount 5 in controversy.” ECF No. 8 at 13. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue Defendant could have 6 ascertained that the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $50,000 based on: 7 (1) the Complaint’s allegations that Plaintiffs had purchased a new 2018 GMC Yukon; 8 and (2) Plaintiffs’ request for restitution, consequential and incidental damages, civil 9 penalties, and attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 8 at 13. In support, Plaintiffs cite the Supreme 10 Court’s Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) decision 11 for the proposition that Defendant was only required to make a plausible allegation that 12 the amount in controversy requirement had been met in its notice of removal. Id. at 13– 13 14. 14 The Supreme Court’s decision in Dart, however, was directed at the sufficiency of 15 a defendant’s allegations in a notice of removal, not to when the thirty-day deadline 16 under § 1446 is triggered. Specifically, in Dart, the Supreme Court held that where a 17 defendant removes a class action to federal court based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 the defendant’s notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation that the 19 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 20 89. But “whether a defendant can establish that federal jurisdiction exists and the 21 question of when the thirty-day time period begins are not two sides of the same coin.” 22 See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3; see Diaz v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-08673- 23 MEMF-PVC, 2025 WL 3496771, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (“The issue here is not 24 whether Defendant could have removed, but rather whether Defendant [was] obligated to 25 remove within thirty days of service. Dart does not address this question at all[.]”) 26 (emphasis in original); Parra v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07316-SPG-JC, 2025 27 WL 3201870, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Dart set out the standard for a 28 1 defendant’s notice of removal, not the standard to trigger either of the thirty-day 2 deadlines in § 1446(b).”). 3 In this case, “[t]he fact that Defendant could have made a further inquiry to 4 estimate the subject vehicle’s purchase price is insufficient to trigger the [first] thirty-day 5 clock.” Moran v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23CV845 JM (BLM), 2023 WL 4532755, at *2 6 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023). Instead, the timeliness of removal “is determined through 7 examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective 8 knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 9 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). This “objective baseline rule avoids the spectre of 10 inevitable collateral litigation over whether the pleadings contained a sufficient ‘clue,’ 11 whether defendant had subjective knowledge, or whether defendant conducted sufficient 12 inquiry.” Id. at 697. 13 As the Ninth Circuit held in Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.: 14 [A] defendant does not have a duty of inquiry if the initial pleading or 15 other document is “indeterminate” with respect to removability. Thus, even if a defendant could have discovered grounds for removability 16 through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove because it 17 did not conduct such an investigation and then file a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the indeterminate document. 18 19 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013); see Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 (“[W]e don’t 20 charge defendants with notice of removability until they’ve received a paper that gives 21 them enough information to remove. This principle helps avoid a ‘Catch—22’ for 22 defendants desirous of a federal forum. By leaving the window for removal open, it 23 forces plaintiffs to assume the costs associated with their own indeterminate pleadings.”) 24 (internal quotation marks and citation removed). 25 Similarly, here, while Defendant could have made a further inquiry as to whether 26 the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $50,000, Defendant was “under no 27 obligation to do so where [Plaintiffs’] complaint was indeterminate.” Tirado-Lizarraga v. 28 Ford Motor Co., No. 23-CV-01411-RS, 2023 WL 3868377, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1 2023) (holding the thirty-day removal period was not triggered by mere allegation 2 plaintiff purchased a 2018 Ford F-150 pickup truck); see also Diaz, 2025 WL 3496771, at 3 *3 (thirty-day period not triggered by allegation plaintiff purchased a 2021 GMC Sierra 4 1500); Parra, 2025 WL 3201870, at *3 (“[A]bsent any specific allegations of the dollar 5 value of the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the vehicle and claims for 6 broad categories of damages are insufficient to trigger the removal deadline.”). 7 3. Notice by Pre-Litigation Documents 8 Plaintiffs next contend Defendant was required to file its notice of removal within 9 thirty days after being served with the Complaint because Plaintiffs provided Defendant 10 with documents identifying the Subject Vehicle’s purchase price and repair history 11 during pre-litigation settlement discussions. ECF Nos. 8 at 7; 15 at 6–7. 12 Plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Carvalho v. 13 Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010). In Carvalho, plaintiff contended 14 her settlement demand sent months before she filed her complaint put defendant on 15 notice as to the amount in controversy. 629 F.3d at 885. The Court of Appeals rejected 16 this argument, holding this pre-litigation letter did not trigger a thirty-day removal period 17 under § 1446: 18 It is axiomatic that a case cannot be removed before its inception. If 19 the second paragraph of section 1446(b) were meant to include as 20 “other paper” a document received by the defendant months before receipt of the initial pleading, the requirement that the notice of 21 removal “be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant” of 22 the “other paper” would be nonsensical. Moreover, that the second paragraph lists “an amended pleading, motion, order”—all documents 23 which logically cannot predate the initial pleading—before “or other 24 paper” leads us to conclude that “other paper” does not include any document received prior to receipt of the initial pleading. 25 Accordingly, we conclude that any document received prior to receipt 26 of the initial pleading cannot trigger the second thirty-day removal period. 27 28 Id. at 885–86 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Nor can “a pre-complaint 1 document containing a jurisdictional clue [] operate in tandem with an indeterminate 2 initial pleading to trigger some kind of hybrid of the first and second removal 3 periods.” Id. at 886; see Mora v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-8700-JFW(PVCX), 2025 4 WL 3124075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (“[P]re-litigation documents are irrelevant 5 to the deadlines to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”); Lopez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 6 5:25-CV-01742-JLS-DTB, 2025 WL 3022849, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2025) (rejecting 7 argument that removal clock started triggered defendant was served with complaint 8 because defendant received pre-litigation demand letter containing sales contract, service 9 records, and registration). Accordingly, under Carvalho, Defendant’s receipt of pre- 10 litigation materials—when combined with an indeterminate complaint—cannot trigger 11 the first or second thirty-day removal periods. 12 For the above reasons, the Court concludes Defendant’s removal was timely. 13 Defendant was not—upon service of Complaint here—required to file its notice of 14 removal within thirty days. 15 B. Amount in Controversy 16 Plaintiffs additionally contend Defendant has not met its burden of establishing the 17 amount in controversy in this case exceeds $50,000. ECF No. 8 at 15–17. Notably, 18 Plaintiffs’ argument that this case is not removable at all is at odds with Plaintiffs’ 19 separate argument, in the same motion, that the Complaint is removable on its face. In 20 response, Defendant submits that the amount in controversy in this case comprises: 21 (1) $42,549.94 in actual damages; (2) $85,099.88 in civil penalties; and (3) at least 22 $15,000 in attorneys’ fees and therefore exceeds the $50,000 amount-in-controversy 23 threshold under the MMWA and $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 14 24 at 27–29.1 25 /// 26

27 1 There is no dispute between the Parties that the diversity of citizenship requirement 28 1 1. Remedial Scheme 2 The MMWA “does not include a remedial scheme.” Hastings v. Ford Motor Co., 3 No. 19-CV-2217-BAS-MDD, 2021 WL 1238870, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021). 4 “Instead, for claims raised under the MMWA, courts look to ‘applicable state law’ to 5 determine damages.” Id.; see Urie v. Lucid Grp. USA, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-0837-BTM- 6 AHG, 2025 WL 2080805, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (“Because the MMWA is silent 7 on the question of remedies, courts ‘turn[] to the applicable state law to determine what 8 remedies are available under the Act, which of necessity informs the potential amount in 9 controversy.’”) (quoting Tadevosyan v. Kia Am., Inc., No. CV 24-11232-DMG (JCX), 10 2025 WL 1425545, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)). The Court therefore applies the 11 same analysis as under California’s Song-Beverly Act to establish the amount in 12 controversy for Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim. See Lewis v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV- 13 07484-SVW-MAR, 2026 WL 40899, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026). 14 2. Actual Damages 15 Under California’s Song-Beverly Act, actual damages are measured by the 16 “amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly 17 attributable to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. 18 Code §§ 1793.2(d)(1). “This reduction, also known as a mileage offset, is calculated by 19 dividing the number of miles driven prior to first delivery for correction by 120,000 and 20 multiplying the resulting fraction by the actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or 21 payable by the buyer.” Diaz v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. EDCV 25-02208-KK-MBKX, 22 2025 WL 3034060, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 23 1793.2(d)(2)(C)). “In addition, amendments to the [Song-Beverly Act] that took effect 24 January 1, 2025, provide for other statutory offsets based on third-party supplied 25 equipment and services, negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, and unpaid interest or 26 financing costs.” Clay v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07962-AH-(MARX), 2025 27 WL 3632732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025). 28 /// 1 Here, Defendant contends the actual damages at issue in this case total 2 $42,549.94. ECF No. 14 at 27. Specifically, Defendant calculates the amount of actual 3 damages available to Plaintiffs by subtracting an estimated mileage offset of $14,154.30 4 and $4,178.00 in offsets for optional third-party contracts from the $60,882.24 sales price 5 of the Subject Vehicle. Id. 6 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant does not submit evidence supporting this 7 calculation. ECF Nos. 8 at 16; 15 at 7–8. The Court disagrees. As evidence, Defendant 8 submitted: (1) an agreement showing the Subject Vehicle was purchased for $60,882.24 9 with 6,313 miles on the odometer; (2) a repair history from which Defendant contends 10 the Subject Vehicle was likely first presented for repair with the alleged defect in March 11 19, 2021 with 44,062 miles on the odometer; and (3) a loan payoff letter showing 12 Plaintiffs paid off the Subject Vehicle on December 17, 2024. ECF Nos. 14-1 at ¶¶ 2–4; 13 14-2 at 2; 14-3 at 2; 14-4 at 2. Plaintiffs do not address this evidence or explain why it is 14 insufficient. 15 In the absence of any meaningful rebuttal, the Court concludes Defendant has met 16 its burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of substantiating its calculation of actual 17 damages. See Brindas-Puga v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV-25-08425-AGR, 2025 WL 18 3072628, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (holding defendant had reasonably calculated 19 actual damages based on lease contract, repair history, and payment history); Larch- 20 Miller v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-8460-JFW(BFMX), 2025 WL 3043354, at *3 21 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (holding defendant had reasonably calculated actual damages 22 based on sales contract, repair history, and payment history); Sosa v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 23 No. 8:25-CV-01185-JVS-RAO, 2025 WL 2938075, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) 24 (holding defendant had reasonably calculated actual damages based on sales contract and 25 repair history). 26 3. Civil Penalties 27 The Song-Beverly Act provides for civil penalties up to two times the amount of 28 damages if a defendant’s failure to comply with the Act was willful. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1 1794(c). Here, Defendants contend that the maximum civil penalties available under the 2 Song-Beverly Act should be considered in determining the amount in controversy. ECF 3 No. 14 at 28. In response, Plaintiffs contend Defendant has not met its burden of 4 establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, “the willfulness that might support such an 5 award” of civil penalties. ECF No. 15 at 11. 6 “Courts in this District and throughout the Ninth Circuit disagree as to whether the 7 Song-Beverly Act’s civil penalties should be included in the calculation of the amount in 8 controversy.” Stars Bay Area, Inc. Ramos v. McLaren Auto., Inc., No. 24-CV-324 TWR 9 (SBC), 2024 WL 3635561, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2024) (collecting cases). 10 Nevertheless, “[t]he majority of courts in recent years have included the maximum 11 penalties in determining the amount in controversy.” Id. (collecting cases). 12 In this case, the Court concludes it is appropriate to include the maximum civil 13 penalty that Plaintiffs could be awarded in calculating the amount in controversy. 14 Plaintiffs’ Complaint specifically alleges that Defendant’s actions were “willful” and 15 requests a “civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiffs’ actual damages[.]” ECF 16 No. 1-2 ¶¶ 24, 28, at 14. To the extent Plaintiffs contend Defendant must affirmatively 17 offer evidence of willfulness, “[i]t would be absurd to suggest a defendant must offer 18 evidence showing it willfully failed to comply with the Song-Beverly Act.” Urie, 2025 19 WL 2080805, at *3 (quoting Brooks v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 20-302 DSF (KKX), 20 2020 WL 2731830, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020)); Modiano v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 21 No. 21-CV-00040-DMS-MDD, 2021 WL 973566, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021) (“The 22 Court declines to require defendants to justify civil penalties by arguing their own 23 conduct was willful.”); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872, 902 (S.D. Cal. 24 2021) (“[T]his Court sides with the majority of courts and more recent cases, which find 25 civil penalties appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in controversy 26 without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against itself’ with respect to liability for 27 civil penalties.”). 28 /// ] As outlined above, Defendant calculates the actual damages to be $42,549.94. 2 |}When combined with the maximum potential civil penalties of $85,099.88, the total 3 |}amount in controversy—exclusive of attorneys’ fees—is $127,649.80. This exceeds the 4 ||$75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity cases and $50,000 threshold for 5 ||MMWA cases. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant has met its burden 6 ||to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy 7 requirement is satisfied.’ 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Dated: January 21, 2026 ‘ ferhut S Uw 12 B Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 {17 Defendant also contends that the amount-in-controversy includes at least $15,000 in attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 14 at 28-29. Plaintiffs contend Defendant has not met its evidentiary burden to establish attorneys’ fees in this case. ECF No. 15 at 13-15. As the 27 |;}amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds for both diversity jurisdiction 28 and jurisdiction under the MMWA even without including attorneys’ fees, the Court does not reach this issue. 19