Luke Hunton v. Stephen Sinclair

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

In Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), the Supreme Court established an equitable rule under which the failure of a pro se prisoner or of an ineffective counsel to raise in a state court initial collateral review proceeding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) at trial is “cause” for the state court procedural default, such that the default may be excused. The question in this case is whether the Martinez rule applies to ineffectiveness of state court habeas counsel in failing to raise a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). I conclude that it does.

Hunton was convicted in 2002 of second degree robbery in Washington state court and was sentenced to life in prison without parole under that state’s three strikes law. With some assistance from counsel, Hun-ton appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals. Hunton argued on appeal that the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland by delaying the production of some evidence and failing to disclose other evidence. The Court of Appeals refused to decide Hunton’s Brady claim on direct appeal. It wrote:

The…

BACKGROUND

After Hunton was convicted in the State of Washington of bank robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for life, he appealed and raised a claim that his due process right to discovery had been violated. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196–97. The Washington Court of Appeals, in effect, informed him that the claim must be raised in post- conviction relief proceedings. He, without benefit of counsel, did file a post-conviction relief proceeding, but did not raise the Brady claim. When review of the claims he did raise was denied, he filed this petition for habeas corpus relief in the

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). district court. The district court ultimately dismissed the Brady claim because Hunton had procedurally defaulted in the state courts. He appeals and asserts that he can now raise the claim despite that default. We disagree.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief de novo. See Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). By the same token, we review the district court’s…

Opinion by Judge Fernandez; Dissent by Judge W. Fletcher.

OPINION

Luke M. Hunton appeals the district court’s dismissal of part of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . He asserts that because he is raising a Brady 1 claim, he is not bound by the holdings of Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), that preclude relief when a claim was not exhausted during the post-conviction review process on account of lack of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

After Hunton was convicted in the State of Washington of bank robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for life, he appealed and raised a claim that his due process right to discovery had been violated. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The Washington Court of Appeals, in effect, informed him that the claim must be raised in post-conviction relief proceedings. He, without benefit of counsel, did file a post-conviction relief proceeding, but did not raise the Brady claim. When review of the claims he did raise was denied, he filed this petition for habeas corpus relief in the district court. The district court ultimately dismissed…