In Re Clark

The majority opinion alters our existing habeas corpus procedures in two significant respects. First, in part III.B. of the opinion, the majority establishes a general rule that all habeas corpus claims must be raised in a single petition, and that when a party files successive petitions asserting different claims, all later petitions must justify the failure to assert the claims in the first petition. Second, in part III.C., the majority holds that when a petitioner raises claims that would have warranted relief had they been timely asserted in an initial petition, but which were untimely or were omitted without justification from an earlier petition, this court will grant relief only in extremely limited circumstances.

I agree with the majority’s first holding. Strong societal interests require the imposition of reasonable limits on successive petitions 1 for habeas corpus. I disagree, however, with the second holding, the impact of which will fall with particular force on death row inmates. When a habeas petition by a prisoner under sentence of death raises claims that should have been raised earlier, the majority’s rigid standard, under which the petitioner must show that “no…

*759 Opinion

William John Clark petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the judgment pursuant to which he is confined under a sentence of death is invalid. We conclude that his unjustified delay in presenting his claims bars consideration of the merits of the petition.

An exception to this bar would be recognized if, as a result of the defects of which petitioner complains, the conviction and/or sentence were shown to constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A fundamental miscarriage of justice is established by showing: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that absent the error or omission no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (4) that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid statute.

The allegations of the petition and supporting exhibits fail to…

I generally agree with the reasoning and conclusions in the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize a few points.

1. The Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death

As the majority opinion recognizes, this court promulgated the Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3 (hereafter Supreme Court Policies), to facilitate and standardize the filing of petitions for writs of habeas corpus in capital cases. These Supreme Court Policies, announced in 1989 and since amended, established, inter alia, timeliness requirements for habeas corpus petitions related to death penalty cases.

As originally adopted, standard 1-1 stated: “Appellate counsel in capital cases shall have a duty to investigate factual and legal grounds for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. . . .” (Supreme Court Policies, supra, policy 3, former std. 1-1.) Today’s opinion clarifies the intended scope of *800 that duty, making clear it arises only if counsel has become aware of “triggering information” that would lead a reasonable attorney to initiate an investigation. In order to avoid confusion, we have also simultaneously…

I concur in the judgment.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus before this court collaterally attacks a judgment of death. In the words of Justice Holmes, the Great Writ “cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, . . . and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.” (Frank v. Mangum (1915) 237 U.S. 309, 346 [ 59 L.Ed. 969, 987-988 , 35 S.Ct. 582 ] (dis. opn. of Holmes, J.).) With that understanding, I have carefully reviewed the petition. After such scrutiny, I have concluded that it lacks merit. I would accordingly deny relief on that basis.

In all other respects, I dissent.

The majority do all that they can to tear the heart out of the Great Writ and to put in its place a knot of lifeless technicalities. Of course, they are condemned to failure. For the writ is greater than individual judges.

At first, the majority’s excursus into California habeas procedure seems strange. Why do they write so many confused and confusing pages on this topic when they could deny the petition on the merits in a short and simple opinion?

On reflection, at least one of…

William John Clark petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the judgment pursuant to which he is confined under a sentence of death is invalid. We conclude that his unjustified delay in presenting his claims bars consideration of the merits of the petition.

An exception to this bar would be recognized if, as a result of the defects of which petitioner complains, the conviction and/or sentence were shown to constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A fundamental miscarriage of justice is established by showing: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which he was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that absent the error or omission no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (4) that the petitioner was convicted under an invalid statute.

The allegations of the petition and supporting exhibits fail…