This is an appeal from an order granting a family allowance and homestead in probate proceedings.

The record reveals the following as correctly recited in appellant’s brief:

The pertinent portion of the prenuptial agreement is as follows:

In deciding in favor of respondent, the court commented as follows at the conclusion of the trial:

The court found as a fact that “it is true that the language of said pre-nuptial agreement does not show that said parties thereto intended that said Myra B. Howe thereby waived her right to claim a probate homestead and a widow’s allowance; and it is true that said Myra B. Howe did not, by or through said pre-nuptial agreement waive her right either to a probate homestead or to a widow’s allowance.” Also that the property described as the homestead was the separate property of the deceased.

It is contended by appellant that ‘ ‘ The only question presented by this Appeal, as it was the only question presented to the Court below, is whether or not by the pre-nuptial agreement Myra B. Howe waived her right to a probate homestead and to a family allowance.”

The prenuptial agreement also contained the following language:

The argument is without merit; there is no logical relation between the two subjects and the conclusion that the parties were more interested in the one than the other is unwarranted.

It is contended by respondent that the waiver of the rights involved herein, “must appear in clear language,” and that such language is lacking in the agreement. Numerous cases are cited wherein such language as “clear and convincing evidence,” “clear and decisive proof” and “clear and explicit language,” appears. Although such expressions may be appropriate as used in the cases cited or in any case where an agreement becomes the subject of construction for the purpose of determining the intent of the parties, it does not follow that the quantum of evidence necessary to establish a waiver is any different from that required to establish proof of any other fact. Nor is it necessary that the so-called waiver must appear in the instrument in any particular language or precisely and affirmatively. If it appears from the language used that a waiver is included, then necessarily it must be held to have been intended. In this connection it must be assumed from the very nature of things that the parties contemplated the existence of rights, obligations and liabilities that result by operation of law from the marriage and marital status. And this is especially true of homesteads and widow’s allowances for neither exists in the absence of marriage. Obviously, the respondent could have no claim to either except as a widow. Nevertheless, the parties deliberately entered into an agreement to prevent them so far as the separate property of each is concerned.

The agreement declares that neither party should at “any time” claim “any interest” in the separate property of the other. It would be difficult, if indeed possible, to select simpler and more comprehensive words. They require no amplification; any time includes all time and any interest includes every interest. There is no need to be specific for the law never has demanded emphasis. The respondent’s efforts to obtain the homestead therefore asserts a “claim” clearly foreclosed by the terms of the agreement. And the agreement being valid in every respect it must be upheld. (See Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 550 [ 129 P. 999 ]; Estate of Schwartz, 79 Cal.App.2d 308 [ 179 P.2d 868 ].)

With regard to the widow’s allowance the record on appeal is silent as to whether there was community property from which it could be paid. The parties were married about 13 years before the husband died and it therefore must be assumed that there was evidence to support the court’s order to this extent.

For the foregoing reasons, the order awarding the probate homestead is reversed but affirmed as to the widow’s allowance.

York, P. J., and White, J., concurred.

Respondent Howe’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 25, 1947. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for a hearing.