Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside and recall an execution issued and levied under a judgment entered against him in this action for damages.

Stripped of unnecessary and burdensome detail, the sole issue here presented is whether a judgment in the sum of $2,174.39 for damages growing out of the negligent operation of an automobile may be enforced against the adult owner of said automobile when the operator thereof, and codefendant in the action, disaffirms the judgment and has the same and the execution issued and levied thereon against him set aside because of his minority. The action was brought under former section 1714]4 of the Civil Code (the counterpart of the present section 402 of the Motor Vehicle Code), which at the time of the accident provided, in part, as follows: “Every owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable and responsible for the death of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle ... by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner provided . . . [amount of recovery limited] . . . and provided that in a,ny action against an owner on account of imputed negligence as imposed by this section the operator of said vehicle whose negligence is imputed to the owner shall be made a party defendant provided personal service of process can be had upon said operator within this state, and upon recovery of judgment, recourse shall first be had against the property of said opera tor so served; . . . and provided, further, that in the event a recovery is had under the provisions of this section against an owner on account of imputed negligence such owner shall be subrogated to all the rights of the person injured or whose property has been injured and may recover from such operator the total amount of any judgment and costs recovered against such owner; ...”

Though personally served with summons, the owner and operator, who were father and son, defaulted and judgment was entered against each in the amount specified. Thereafter, upon a showing that the son was but 19 years of age, the father was appointed his guardian ad litem and, following disaffirmance on behalf of the minor, the judgment and execution issued thereon, upon motion duly noticed, were set aside and recalled as to said minor. This, the defendant owner now contends is fatal to the enforcement of the judgment against him. His argument proceeds largely on the erroneous assumption, so prevalent in his opening brief, that the judgment entered against an owner and a negligent operator of an automobile is a joint judgment which, prior to its enforcement against the owner must, in effect, be extant against the negligent operator, from whom payment must first be sought. In this, the appellant owner is in error. It is now well settled that “In eases which predicate liability of an owner defendant under this section [1714%, Civ. Code] when ownership of the automobile and permission to operate the same has been proved, the owner becomes directly liable for damage suffered in an amount limited by the statute, and this liability is direct and several, as well as joint, and is not dependent upon a judgment against the operator.” (Milburn v. Foster, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 478, 480 [ 47 Pac. (2d) 1106 ]; Guberman v. Weiner, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 401, 404 [ 51 Pac. (2d) 1141 ]; Brush v. Kurtstin, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 258, 262 [ 53 Pac. (2d) 777 ]; Sayles v. Peters, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 401, 404 [ 54 Pac. (2d) 94 ]; Pascoe v. Payne, 124 Cal. App. 528 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 1091 ].)

In his reply brief the appellant owner alters his position to the extent of recognizing, as he must, that under the authorities such a judgment is joint and several. He maintains, however, that the respondent should be precluded from satisfying the judgment against him because by failing to have a guardian ad litem appointed for the minor defendant operator the respondent has assertedly deprived him, as the nonnegligent owner, of the benefit of the restrictions on the liability imposed upon him by section 17141/4, supra. A somewhat similar contention was advanced in Pascoe v. Payne, supra, in response to which it was declared: “However, the right to have a guardian ad litem appointed was available to said appellant [owner], as well as to the respondent, and, upon application by said appellant to the trial court, such a guardian, no doubt, would have been appointed. . . . Said appellant should not, therefore, be heard to complain on appeal because a guardian ad litem was not appointed. ’ ’ Moreover, it is stated in respondent’s brief herein that he was unaware of the minority of the defendant operator until after the entry of judgment, when proceedings were prosecuted on behalf of the minor to disaffirm and set aside the judgment and the execution issued thereon.

In our opinion, the decision in Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal. App. (2d) 256, 261, 262 [ 44 Pac. (2d) 430 ] (hearing denied by this court), accurately analyzes and applies section 171414, supra, and the reasoning therein appearing, satisfactorily answers the arguments of the appellant in the present case. In the cited case the jury brought in a verdict for $5,000 against the defendant owner and rendered no verdict as to the defendant operator. There, as here, it was urged, in effect, that in the absence of a judgment against the operator, it was improper to enter and enforce a judgment against the owner. After pointing out that the failure to find against the operator was not the equivalent of finding in his favor, in which latter event there would be no negligence to impute, the court declared:

So it is here. In the present case the respondent made both the operator and the owner a party defendant and both were personally served with summons. There was no finding or judgment favorable to the defendant operator. In fact, by his default, the implied findings are against him and his negligence is imputable to the appellant owner, with whose permission he was operating the automobile. As in the Broome case, supra, where the owner was held to have waived his right of “recourse”, but not his right of subrogation against the operator, by failing to demand that the jury also pass upon the liability of the operator, so here, by his failure to request the timely appointment of a guardian ad litem for his minor son and operator of the automobile, as was his privilege, the appellant must be held to have waived his right of “recourse”.

The italicized language in the Broome decision, supra, to the effect that the “recourse” provision of'section 171414, supra, “can only apply where a judgment is recovered both against the operator and the owner”, serves to distinguish and dispose of the case of Cook v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 608, 612 [ 55 Pac. (2d) 1227 ], relied on by the appellant owner, for there a judgment had been entered against both the operator and owner, necessitating that “recourse” first be had against the property of the operator.

What has been said sufficiently disposes of the appellant’s contentions.

In concluding, we desire to state that we express no opinion upon a factual situation wherein it is charged and proved that a judgment against an owner alone is the result of collusion or fraud between the injured party and the operator. Such issue is not here involved and we refrain from determining the same.

The motion to dismiss, noticed when the cause was pending in the District Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District, Division Two, is denied and the order appealed from is affirmed.

Houser, J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Seawell, J., and Langdon, J., concurred.