This was a suit by two employees of the defendant to recover minimum wages and overtime provided for by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A., sections 201 et seq. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, and the trial court made findings and gave judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The defendant appeals from the judgment and presents two grounds of appeal: (1) that the agreed statement of facts does not support the finding that defendant corporation “was engaged in the manufacture and production of ice for interstate commerce, ’ ’ and (2) assuming for the purposes of argument that it was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the act, the plaintiffs’ rights were governed by the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 U.S.C.A., sections 301 et seq.

The defendant was engaged in the manufacture and production of commercial ice. Over 85 per cent of the two plaintiffs’ working time was spent in hauling ice from the ice plant to the buyers’ packing sheds. At the buyers’ packing sheds the ice was crushed and put in the tops of crates of vegetables, the remaining ice being put in the tops of the freight cars into which the crates of vegetables were loaded. Ninety-five per cent of these vegetables were shipped to consumers outside of the State of California.

The pertinent provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act read as follows: Section 206(a) “Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates—”

Section 203(b) “ ‘Commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof. ’ ’

Section 203(i) “ ‘Goods’ means goods . . ., but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.”

Section 213(b): “The provisions of section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 304 of Title 49. . . .”

In respect to the first point urged by appellant, it contends that the ice which was produced was delivered to the “ultimate consumer” when it was delivered to the buyers and hence was expressly exempted from the Fair Labor Standards Act by section 203 (i); and that by reason of the delivery to the buyer who used the goods within the state these employees were not engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The respondents assert that the manufacture of ice for the refrigeration of vegetables was essential to the interstate commerce in vegetables and constituted engaging in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the act.

In some of the early cases coming under the' act an interpretation was put on its provisions in harmony with the contentions here made by the appellant. But the scope of the act in the area of operations here under controversy was set at rest in Chapman v. Home Ice Co. of Memphis, 136 F.2d 353 , where the authorities herein cited by appellant were either disapproved or overruled. As the decision is not readily available we quote at length from it as fully determining the question here raised:

The Chapman ease, supported as it is by sound reason- • ing and citation of numerous authorities, is controlling upon the first three questions stated by appellant relating to the application of the act to the activities of the parties as shown by the agreed statement of facts.

But appellant argues that, aside from these considerations, its employees are not governed by the act because of the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The pertinent provisions of the latter act are:

The scope of the act must be determined by the specific definitions found therein of “private carrier” and “interstate commerce.” A private carrier is one who “transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle.” “The term ‘interstate commerce’ means commerce between any place in a State and any place in another State.” The wider scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act is apparent (sec. 206(a)). “Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. ...” . (Emphasis ours.) Under the rule of the Chapman case (supra) the respondents come under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act because they are engaged in the production of goods for commerce, and not because they are actually engaged in interstate commerce. The clear purpose of the Motor Carrier Act is to reach those employees engaged directly in the transportation of goods “in interstate or foreign commerce.” It is very definitely confined to the motor carrier and its employees engaged in interstate transportation. It has no relation to the employer who carries his own goods from warehouse or place of shipment to other points within the state for sale and distribution. What is said in Derer v. Snow Ice Co., Inc., 5 Labor Cases (C.C.H.) page 62,853, and McDaniel v. Clavin, (Cal.App.) 128 P.2d 821 , to the contrary is dicta, and all the language in the latter decision upon which appellant here relies was eliminated by the Supreme Court when the cause was transferred there for hearing. In the final opinion ( 22 Cal.2d 61 [ 136 P.2d 559 ]) the Supreme Court confined its decision to the one question involved—that the employee’s duties in taking the goods from the warehouse, transporting them to the employer’s plant and then to the customers were not within the purview of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The facts of that ease are widely different from what we have here where the employees are engaged directly “in the production of goods for commerce” as that phrase is interpreted in the Chapman case (supra).

The judgment is affirmed.

Sturtevant, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Hearing granted by Supreme Court.