Deceased died on November 25, 1956, and his will was admitted to probate. On the hearing of a petition to determine heirship, the widow Clara Mae Hale, appellant herein, claimed that a bequest to deceased’s son John Darrow Hale, and to deceased’s sister Katherine B. Hale, the respondents herein, of certain interests in a specifically described parcel of land had been adeemed by sale, and that 64.84 per cent of the value of said parcel was the community property of herself and deceased. Said widow’s claim was rejected by the trial court and she has appealed.

The property subject of dispute is approximately 40 acres described as Lots 31 and 32 (Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter) of Section 11, Township 30 South, Range 27 East, M. D. B. & M. in Kern County, California, and was acquired by deed to deceased November 9, 1912. In 1917, deceased and his then wife borrowed $3,000 on this property from the Federal Land Bank at Berkeley. Deceased married appellant herein December 19, 1931, and the evidence indicates that at that time there remained unpaid on the mortgage to the Federal Land Bank on said loan the sum of $2,402.12.

Paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of deceased’s will read as follows:

The respondent sister has never married and appellant has not remarried.

On February 24, 1955, deceased sold said 40 acres for the agreed purchase price of $80,000 (reserving a 50 per cent interest in petroleum and mineral rights), and received back a note and deed of trust thereon. The balance of principal and interest unpaid at deceased’s death was in the amount of $71,997.86. Appellant introduced testimony that she had assisted deceased in some of the clerical work on payrolls and weighing of crops produced on this and other property during the married relationship; that improvements in an amount totaling $7,000 or more were put on the property after the married relationship began; that all of the funds of deceased were handled through a single bank account, the details on which she did not have full information; and that deceased during their married relationship made certain oral statements to her indicating lack of intention by deceased to leave any property to either of respondents. She contends that the improvements were made with community funds and that she has a community interest in this property of 64.84 per cent.

The record before us shows that deceased owned other separate property, and the records of rentals and sales on the whole of deceased’s separate property indicate that the income from such sources were more than sufficient to have paid the mortgage to the Federal Land Bank as well as the improvements put on the property in dispute, and that the property in dispute was consistently dealt with by deceased his separate property. Appellant stated in the affidavit filed for inheritance tax purposes:

The evidence further shows that all of the real property acquired by the deceased after marriage was placed in joint tenancy with appellant, which joint tenancy property was appraised by the inheritance tax appraiser in the amount of $22,060, and no claim of ownership is made by the estate to any part of such joint tenancy property. In the later years of his life deceased had occasion to consult on some of these with his attorney, who had drawn the will in question, but made no change in his will. Contrary to some of the implications in appellant’s oral testimony deceased, at his own request, was taken to the home of the sister-respondent and there remained during his last illness until his death.

The rules relating to the province of the trial court and of the appellate court are the same in a proceeding of this kind as in any other civil case:

This rule continues to receive recognition in numerous cases and has been directly applied to decisions on whether or not property is separate or community. (Long v. Long, 88 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 [4] [ 199 P.2d 47 ]; Estate of Guidoiti, 155 Cal.App.2d 812, 813 [2] [ 318 P.2d 740 ].)

Appellant’s contention that the sale above referred to worked an ademption is without merit. Section 78 of the Probate Code reads as follows:

In Estate of Moore, 135 Cal.App.2d 122, 131, 132 [12] [16] [ 286 P.2d 939 ], the court was considering a claimed ademption alleged to have resulted from the sale, after the will was made, of a parcel of devised property with a trust deed back for the balance of the purchase price. The problem was identical with that of the case at bar, and the court said in holding that there was no ademption:

The next contention of appellant is that there is no evidence to support the finding by the court that the community had no interest in said 40 acres in dispute. The numerous documents produced by respondents show quite clearly that ample funds were received through the medium of sale and rentals to have paid for not only the balance on the trust deed to Federal Land Bank, but also all of the improvements. In addition thereto, appellant herself by her own affidavit states that the income was entirely consumed in the living expenses of decedent and wife or was consumed by the community. There is no evidence that the deceased had any substantial outside income from his efforts unconnected with his own separate property. Nowhere did appellant produce evidence that the deceased’s earnings exceeded the family living expenses, and no evidence was introduced in any way seeking to apportion any amount as being a fair estimate of deceased’s own productive efforts.

“ Real property purchased with the separate funds of the husband is his separate property. (Citations.) Likewise the rents, issues and profits therefrom and increase in value thereof are separate property. ...”

“In regard to earnings, the rule is that where the husband is operating a business which is his separate property, income from such business is allocated to community or separate property in accordance with the extent to which it is allocable to the husband’s efforts or his capital investment.” (Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal.2d 784, 791, 792 [8], [9], [11] [ 167 P.2d 708 ].)

When, however, the evidence shows that the family expenses equalled or exceeded the amount of money allocable from the husband’s personal efforts to community funds “. . . it is presumed that money used in the maintenance of the family is drawn from community funds before there is an encroachment on separate property. [Citations.] Evidence that there was no excess of community income over living expenses has been considered an effective manner of demonstrating the separate character of property remaining.” (Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128,136 [13], [14a] [ 274 P.2d 951 ]; Estate of Ades, 81 Cal.App.2d 334, 338 [4], 339 [5] [ 184 P.2d 1 ]; Estate of Guidotti, supra, 813 [3].) Separate property of a spouse, so held before marriage, presumably continues to be such. (Holmes v. Grange etc. Fire Ins. Assn., 102 Cal.App.2d 911, 917 [2] [ 228 P.2d 889 ].) There is no presumption that community funds were used to improve separate property. (Seligman v. Seligman, 85 Cal.App. 683, 690 [4] [ 259 P. 984 ].) While there áre some exceptions, it is nevertheless true that as a general rule “. . . in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where improvements are made upon the husband’s separate real property with community funds, the improvements have the character of his separate property and belong to the husband.” (Wheeland v. Rodgers, 20 Cal.2d 218, 222 [2] [ 124 P.2d 816 ].)

We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support the position of the trial court that the 40 acres under dispute did not become community property, nor did appellant acquire any community interest therein. This conclusion renders unnecessary the discussion of other points raised by respondents and appellant.

The decree appealed from is affirmed.

Griffin, P. J., and Mussell, J., concurred.