From a judgment enjoining the enforcement of a county, zoning ordinance in so far as the ordinance prohibits plaintiffs from using a portion of their residence as a display room and office in which to display sundry electrical fixtures, and in which they keep certain office supplies, defendants appeal.

The essential facts are these:

On June 15, 1939, plaintiffs purchased a parcel of real property known as 9200 Hooper Avenue, County of Los Angeles. They erected a single family residence to which is attached a storeroom approximately fifteen by twenty feet.

The reasonable value of the property is $2,400. Plaintiffs occupied the residence. Ever since the erection thereof they have used the display room and office located on the property for the purpose of displaying sundry electrical fixtures, and also for the purpose of keeping office supplies. Attached to the front of the storeroom is a sign approximately six by twenty-four inches which bears the following words: “O’ROURKE, ELECTRIC SHOP.”

It is likewise conceded that:

This is the sole question necessary for us to determine:

This question must be answered in the negative and is governed by the following principles of law:

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the instant case, it is apparent that none of the facts found by the court justified the conclusion that the questioned ordinance was clearly arbitrary or unreasonable and had no substantial relation to the public’s health, safety, morals or general welfare. Hence the general rule is applicable that a zoning ordinance will be deemed to be within the purview of the police power in the absence of a showing that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. (Acker v. Baldwin, supra, 344 .)

Any other conclusion would result in a situation where only those who have been so fortunate as to obtain enough worldly goods to enable them to erect their homes in districts beyond the possible approach of commercial enterprises could be protected in their residences from the encroachment of business, comtnercia], and manufacturing enterprises. It needs no argument to support the thesis that all classes of our citizens, rich and poor, of whatever race or creed, are entitled to the equal protection of our laws and the privilege of living in areas which have been, properly zoned for residential purposes pursuant to the recommendation of a duly created planning commission.

If the present judgment were to be sustained, such protection, instead of being extended to the Caucasian and Negro population, rich and poor alike, would be confined and reserved to the few wealthy inhabitants of Los Angeles.

Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal.2d 244 [ 83 P.2d 29 ], relied on by plaintiffs is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In the Reynolds case, a single lot was zoned for residential purposes which was completely surrounded by property used for nonresidential purposes. Clearly such ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore invalid.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed.

Moore, P. J., and Wood (W. J.), J., concurred.

The ordinance referred to in the opinion is Los Angeles County Ordinance No. 3474 (New Series) adopted November 14, 1939, which adds section 19-1/29 to the Los Angeles County zoning ordinance No. 1494 (New Series). The effect of the ordinance is to restrict the properties involved in the present action to single family residences, flats, apartment houses and bungalow courts. All of these uses were established prior to the effective date of Ordinance No. 3474 (New Series), and therefore legally existing under section 15 of the zoning ordinance.