This appeal transferred by the Supreme Court to this court for decision pursuant to the provisions of article VI, section 4c of the Constitution of the state of California, is from a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury denying probate to a document dated September 28, 1935, alleged to be the last will of Margaret Martha Little, deceased.

The essential facts are:

After the contest had been duly and regularly tried, the trial judge submitted to the jury the special interrogatories hereinafter set forth, which they answered in the negative.

Appellant relies for reversal of the judgment on the following propositions:

Appellant’s first proposition is untenable. In Clements v. McGinn, 4 Cal. Unrep. 163 [ 33 Pac. 920 ] (for proceedings in trial court see Estate of McGinn, 3 Cof. Prob. 26, 67 [1909]), our Supreme Court expressly held that a special interrogatory similar to that set forth in paragraph (a) of appellant’s first proposition called for a finding upon a question of fact and did not ask the jury to pass upon a conclusion of law. At page 167 the court says;

It is to be noted that this case has never been overruled and is therefore binding upon this court. The fact that this ease was not ordered reported in the official report of the Supreme Court does not detract from its binding force. (7 Cal. Jur. 644; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 155 Cal. 665, 672 [ 102 Pac. 927 , 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 45].)

In the early history of our Supreme Court it was the practice to have all of its decisions officially reported. Thereafter there was an interim during which only such cases as the court ordered published, appeared in the official reports. Subsequently the earlier practice was resumed and all opinions of the Supreme Court were printed in the official reports. The eases which had not been ordered officially reported have been collected and published in what is known as California Unreported Cases (see preface to vol. 1 of California Unreported Cases (1913). We make this statement in view of appellants’ contention that the foregoing case is not binding because it does not appear in the official reports of the Supreme Court. Estate of Clark, 180 Cal. 395, 397 [ 181 Pac. 639 ], also approves a special interrogatory similar to the one under discussion.

The special interrogatory set forth in paragraph (b) of appellant’s first proposition did not call for the jury to pass upon a conclusion of law but asked for their finding on an ultimate fact. (Estate of Gould, 188 Cal. 353, 365 [ 205 Pac. 457 ].)

The second proposition is untenable. It is the unquestioned duty of the trial court in a will contest to submit special interrogatories to the jury; however, the trial court need not submit any particular interrogatories requested by either side so long as the ultimate issues are by proper interrogatories placed before the jury. In the present case the interrogatories submitted to the jury were correct and called for the answer of the jury to the ultimate facts in issue.

Therefore the trial court properly declined to submit the interrogatories requested by appellant.

The final proposition urged by appellant is without merit. The jury’s findings that decedent was of unsound mind and also executed the document dated September 28, 1935, under undue influence are consistent. (Estate of Olson, 19 Cal. App. 379, 386 [ 126 Pac. 171 ]; Estate of Motz, 136 Cal. 558, 562 [ 69 Pac. 294 ].)

In Estate of Olson, supra, at page 386, the court says:

In Estate of Motz, supra, at page 562, our Supreme Court says:

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Crail, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.

A petition by appellants to have the canse heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on December 2, 1937.