In this action the plaintiff had judgment against the defendants for the sum of $20,000, for and on account of injuries suffered by the plaintiff in an automobile collision occurring in the city of Napa, on or about the 5th day of February, 1936.

The record shows that the defendant, Robert Merrill, an agent and employee of the other defendants, was driving an automobile easterly in the city of Napa, on a certain street called South Street, and that the plaintiff was riding with one Ben Riggs in an automobile being driven southerly on Randolph Street in the city of Napa. At the intersection of the two streets named the collision occurred, resulting in the injuries to the plaintiff hereinafter set forth.

Practically no contention is made that the defendant Robert Merrill was driving a Packard automobile other than in a careless and negligent manner. This is practically conceded in the appellants’ brief where they state that a new trial would probably result in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and that the purpose of seeking a new trial is really to obtain, if possible, a verdict against the defendants in a lesser sum.

To sustain their contention that a new trial should be granted the appellants urge, first, that the court erred in giving certain instructions, and second, that the verdict is grossly excessive. We may admit that some of the instructions given by the trial court are not worded technically as they should have been, but in view of certain instructions given at the request of the appellants, and under section 4% of article VI of the Constitution we must conclude that no injury has been suffered by the appellants for such reason.

Section 510 of the Vehicle Code reads: “No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. ’ ’

Section 511 of the same code then specifies certain lawful speeds under the conditions particularized. These, the court read to the jury, and also read section 513.

It is common knowledge that intersecting streets in cities present a continuing hazard, the degree of hazard depending upon the extent of the use of the intersecting streets and the surrounding circumstances or conditions of each intersection. Under such circumstances the basic law as set forth in section 510, supra, is always governing.

In the case of Graybiel v. Auger, 64 Cal. App. 679 [ 222 Pac. 635 ], the court said (referring to the basic rule then existing under a different numbered section, but which is now the section above numbered) : “This provision of the section is just as much a portion of the law as that which allows a speed of thirty-five miles per hour under certain specified conditions. ’ ’

In the case of Dam v. Bond, 80 Cal. App. 342 [ 251 Pac. 818 ], the court, in referring to the case of Graybiel v. Auger, supra, added: “In other words, it is not the absolute speed at which an automobile is being driven that determines whether it is, or is not being propelled at a reckless rate, but the conditions and circumstances of the highway at the instant of time must be taken into consideration, and if these conditions are such that the safety of persons and property require a much lesser rate of speed, it is the duty of the driver of the motor vehicle to slow down the speed of his ear.' ’ (Hearing by the Supreme Court in the ease of Dam v. Bond, supra, was denied.)

In the ease of Davis v. Brown, 92 Cal. App. 20 [ 267 Pac. 754 ], the same question was presented to the court for consideration, and the rule referred to in the two cases just mentioned was approved and followed.

The district where the collision occurred appears not to have been sign-posted, and the suggestion is presented by the appellants that therefore a speed limit of forty-five miles per hour was and is allowable. But whether sign-posted, or not sign-posted, the basic law is always operative and the speed limits mentioned in section 511, supra, are at all times subject to the basic rule set forth in section 510, supra.

The fact of negligence on the part of Merrill being practically conceded, relieves us from considering any questions as to burden of proof.

The instruction given by the court to the jury, at the request of the plaintiff, and specially objected to by the appellants as being prejudicial error, is worded as follows:

The errors in this instruction being set forth as follows:

In these particulars we may admit that the instruction is deficient, but an examination of the record shows that at the request of the appellants the court gave the following instructions to the jury in relation to the operation of the automobile then and there being under the control of Ben Biggs. The giving of this instruction, we think, is a complete answer to any objections urged by the appellants. For that purpose we set it forth in full as follows:

On the question of damages and what the jury might consider, the court read to the jury section 3283 of the Civil Code, as follows: “Damages may be awarded in a judicial proceeding for detriment resulting after the commencement thereof, or certain to result in the future.” Appellants rely upon the fact that no witness testified absolutely that future results were certain to occur, but only gave their opinions as to what might and might not occur. We take it that it is the province of the jury to determine from testimony whether the injuries are such that future detriment is certain to occur, or rather, may be shown by the testimony to be so reasonably certain to occur as to be considered by the jury in determining the damages to be awarded. The fact that a witness may testify that in his opinion a future detri ment is certain to occur, does not make it certain that such detriment will occur, any more than a modified opinion or statement that future detriments do occur under like conditions may reasonably be apprehended to occur.

The court also gave an instruction as to what constituted an obstructed intersection. The record shows .that the jury and the court, upon consent of counsel for the respective parties, viewed the premises and had before them a full view of the intersection where the collision occurred, and in support of the instruction we must assume that the conditions there presented warranted the giving of the same.

This brings us to a consideration of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, and for which it is alleged that the damages awarded are grossly excessive, and that either a new trial should be ordered, or the verdict reduced.

The record shows that the plaintiff suffered a fracture of the skull, some injuries to one of her shoulders, a slight injury to the back of her neck, and some injury to the brain, causing injury to one of the eyes, apparently by the nerves being affected.

Several doctors testified, the main portion of their testimony being corroborative and supporting the testimony of Dr. Orval L. Kirkle. Before quoting his testimony we may state that the X-ray picture taken of the plaintiff’s skull did not show the full extent of the fracture by reason of the fact that it was a fiat picture, and the skull being round the X-ray showed only about two and one-half inches of fracture, whereas it is claimed that the fracture extended for a length of about five inches, as shown by the testimony of the doctors, from where the fracture began and where it ended. The testimony of Dr. Kirkle covers practically the whole field, save as to what occurred at the plaintiff’s home, which is shown by the impaired condition of the plaintiff by reason of the accident, in the testimony of her mother and the testimony of her guardian ad litem which we need not set forth herein, but which shows the continuation of the effects of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Dr. Kirkle’s testimony is as follows:

We have taken the foregoing from the appellants’ summary of the testimony. Following this testimony the appellants schedule a number of cases where judgments in damage suits have been reduced and a number of others where judgments have been sustained. This schedule also appears in appellants’ memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss or affirm. While great industry has been shown by the appellants in the collection of these cases, the question of damages is one with which an appellate court can deal with no more certainty than the jury which heard the testimony, and before which the cause was tried. The cases all practically hold that the determination of whether the allowance of damages has been excessive is in the first instance for the trial court to determine. In the instant case the question of excessive damages was presented to the trial court, and the trial court denied the appellants’ motion for a new trial, which motion was based partly upon the alleged allowance of excessive damages. While the damages allowed in this case appear to be quite large, we find nothing in the record which indicates that the damages were augmented by reason of any passion or prejudice. The record shows that the case was fairly tried, and appears to have been conducted in such a manner as not to arouse any ill-feeling or in such a manner as to induce the jury to seek to punish the defendants, or any one of them, rather than to award just compensation. No allowance was made for special damages, and in considering the amount of damages awarded, we think an appellate court is justified in taking into consideration the costs which the plaintiff in such a case must incur that are not compensable as such. The damage to the brain and the injury apparently to the nerves of one of the eyes which causes the affected eye to turn up, presents a serious injury for which a sum of money may to the average person seem impossible of measurement. That question we think is as much within the judgment of the jury as within the province of any court, and unless we can say, with reasonable certainty, that such injuries will not affect the future of the plaintiff, we are at a loss to say that the damages awarded are the result of either passion or prejudice.

We do not consider that it would be at all helpful to lengthen this opinion by referring to the cases where verdicts have been modified or where damages have been allowed to stand as awarded by the jury. We may add, however, that in a number of cases it does appear that the jurors might have awarded a considerable sum in addition to the damages allowed, without crossing the line called excessive.

Being of the opinion that we are not justified in concluding that the damages in this case are neither excessive, nor were allowed by reason of any passion or prejudice, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed. And it is so ordered.

Thompson, J., and Pullen, P. J., concurred.