Petitioner has appealed from a judgment denying a writ of mandate to reinstate him as captain of police after he had been discharged by the chief of police of Modesto. It is alleged in the petition that “said discharge was arbitrary and without cause and said petitioner was entitled and is now entitled to be employed by the City of Modesto as Captain of Police under the terms of the charter of the City of Modesto, and by law, and that his discharge was illegal and void”.

The charter in question gives the chief of police power “to suspend or remove any members of the police force for disobedience of any lawful order, for violation of rules and regulations of the Police Department, and for neglect of duty, or for conduct unbecoming a member of the police force. He shall immediately file with the Mayor written charges, specifying the grounds upon which such suspension or removal is made.”

The record shows that on the morning of Saturday, July 17, 1937, E. E. Arington, Chief of Police, went to the home of the petitioner and announced to him that he had been dismissed. He then prepared written charges and served them upon the mayor on the following Monday, the office of the mayor having been closed when the statement was prepared. The following are the charges as filed:

After a trial of the matter the court filed findings as follows:

The conclusions of law were as follows:

Petitioner contends that inasmuch as the chief of police did not specify in his statement any one of the grounds which are set out in the charter provision, but charged intoxication, it became necessary for the court to determine whether intoxication is conduct unbecoming a member of the police force and also that petitioner was intoxicated, and that the judgment should be reversed because no such finding of fact or conclusion of law was made by the trial court.

The court found facts in its conclusions of law, but they are nevertheless to be regarded as findings of fact. (Linberg v. Stanto, 211 Cal. 771 [ 297 Pac. 9 , 75 A. L. R. 555]; 24 Cal. Jur. 962.) It sufficiently appears that the court found that the petitioner was dismissed because of conduct unbecoming a member of the police force. It is true that these precise words were not used in the written statement of charges,' but it is entirely clear that the chief of police dismissed the petitioner because of his conduct and that he considered that conduct unbecoming an officer. It is found further that the chief of police acted in good faith, and that he filed the written charges in accordance with the provisions of the charter. It was not. the province of the court to substitute its judgment for that of an administrative officer in this case. The issue before it was not the truth of the charges as such excepting in so far as the evidence might show fraud or oppression. Having determined that the chief of police acted in good faith, it was not necessary for the court to make findings with respect to the truth of the charges. (Dorothy v. Drapeau, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 280 [ 49 Pac. (2d) 343 ].)

As a rule, in the absence of civil service laws, the head of an administrative office is permitted to employ and discharge subordinates at will. This practice promotes efficiency. On the other hand, it is subject to abuse, in that it permits the head of a department to remove a deputy for mere political purposes or other improper motives. It is for this reason that such provisions as are contained in the Modesto charter have often been adopted. The requirement that the reasons for a dismissal must be stated in writing checks the tendency of the departmental head to act arbitrarily to a very appreciable extent.

This subject is discussed in the case of Cronin v. Civil Service Com., 71 Cal. App. 633 [ 236 Pac. 339 ], where the situation under discussion was similar to the one now before us. The charter of Los Angeles County empowered the sheriff to discharge any of his deputies but required him to serve a statement of the reason for the dismissal upon the deputy, allow him a reasonable time to answer and file the statement and a copy of the answer with the civil service commission. It was held in that case that the dismissal was incomplete until these acts had been done, but that when they had been done the employee had no right to a hearing before the commission.

The Supreme Court of this state has interpreted in a similar manner the provisions of the state Civil Service Act (Stats. 1913, p. 1035) which govern the dismissal of probationary civil service employees. In Neuwald v. Brock, 12 Cal. (2d) 662 [ 86 Pac. (2d) 1047 ], it was held that an employee in that status who was discharged because his services were unsatisfactory was not entitled to a hearing before the civil service commission or to a trial on the merits in court. Neuwald was discharged by the director of agriculture. He sought reinstatement by writ of mandate in the superior court. Judgment was entered in his favor, but was reversed on appeal.

Section 9 of the said act provided that:

A rule of the commission provided that:

It is said in the opinion:

In other words, the statement of grounds for dismissal may be couched in the words of the statute or rule. The particulars in which the employee has not been satisfactory need not be given.

In that case the employee sought to attack the truth of the reasons given for the dismissal and convinced the trial court that the true reason was not that his conduct and capacity had been unsatisfactory to the appointing power. As to this the Supreme Court said:

Where reasons are required to be stated, a dismissal does not become effective if the statement is not filed. (Nilsson v. State Personnel Board, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 699 [ 78 Pac. (2d) 467 ] ; Kelly v. State Personnel Board, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 443 [ 88 Pac. (2d) 264 ].) But in the case now before us the statement of the reasons was filed with the mayor pursuant to the terms of the city charter, and the discharge thereupon became complete.

Our attention has been called to the case of Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197 [ 116 Pac. 732 ], in which it is held that an officer who was appointed for a fixed term, under a charter provision that he could be removed for cause, could not be dismissed without notice and a hearing. That decision is not applicable here. There is nothing in the record which indicates that petitioner was appointed either for a fixed term or during good behavior. Nor are the grounds of removal set out in the charter equivalent to the term “for cause’’. And it has been held that where a mayor was authorized to dismiss “for cause’’ any officer appointed by him but was required to give notice thereof to the person removed and notify the common council, an opportunity for a hearing was not allowed the person dismissed. (Matter of Carter, 141 Cal. 316 [ 74 Pac. 997 ].) Furthermore, these eases deal with the right of a subordinate to a hearing on the charges before an administrative board or officer, not to a trial in court.

Our conclusion is that the chief of police complied with the provisions of the charter and that the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Tuttle, J., and Thompson, Acting P. J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on January 25, 1940.