This is an appeal from a judgment ordering the issuance of a writ of mandate to respondents requiring them to hold a special election to determine whether the members of the City Council and the City Clerk of the City of El Monte should be recalled.

The petition for writ of mandate alleged as follows:

A general demurrer was interposed to the foregoing petition, which was overruled, and a judgment entered ordering that a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.

These are the questions to be determined:

First: Does the petition for a writ of mandate state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

Second: Is the Municipal Elective Officers Recall Law (Stats. 1931, p. 563; amended by Stats. 1933, p. 2117), Act 5620a, Deering’s General Laws (1937), p. 2631, violative of any provision or provisions of the Constitution of the State of California?

The first question must be answered in the affirmative. From a reading of the petition it is evident that the essential facts required by the Municipal Elective Officers Recall Law are alleged in the petition; and the other objections to the pleading, such as, that in paragraph 6 thereof there is no specific allegation that the publication of the notice of intention to recall was accompanied by a printed statement not exceeding 500 words in length stating the reasons for the proposed recall, are not properly before this court for consideration. There was only a general demurrer filed to the petition, which does not reach (1) mere defects in allegations in matters of form, or (2) defects that the essential facts appear only inferentially, as conclusions of law, or by way of recital.

The second question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons:

(1) The Municipal Elective Officers Recall Law does not violate article I, section 11, of the Constitution of the State of California, requiring that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation, because the act has a uniform operation upon all of those who fall within its purview.

(2) It does not violate article IV, section 24, of the Constitution, requiring that each act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title. The purpose of the act in question is to provide a method for the removal and recall of elective officers in incorporated cities and towns. The title of the act reads: “An act to provide for the recall of elective officers of incorporated cities and towns.” Clearly, a mere reading of the title of the act shows that it embraces but one subject, and that the subject is clearly expressed in the title to the act.

(3) It is not violative of article IV, section 25, subdivision 11, of the state Constitution, providing that the legislature shall not pass local or special laws for conducting elections or designating the places of voting, except on the organization of new counties, because the Municipal Elective Officers Recall Law is not a special law but rather is a general law, uniformly applying to all who fall within its purview, to wit, the holders of elective offices of any incorporated city or town. It needs no citation of authorities to demonstrate that such a classification is a natural and reasonable one.

(4) It is not violative of article IV, section 25, subdivision 33, of the Constitution, prohibiting the legislature from passing a special law where a general law can be made applicable. Since the Municipal Elective Officers Recall Law is a general and not a special law, it does not fall within the purview of the section of the Constitution just mentioned.

The balance of appellants’ objections are criticisms of the policy, wisdom, and technique for recalling elective officers provided for in the act. These are matters with which the courts have no concern, such arguments being proper ones to address to the legislature for its determination.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.

A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on February 19, 1940.