A hearing was granted in this cause after decision by the District Court of Appeal, in order that we might give further consideration to the question of whether there was any substantial evidence of negligence on the part of the employee of the respondent school district. The fol lowing is taken from the opinion rendered by the District Court of Appeal:

With reference to the claim that it was negligence on the part of the instructor not to observe whether blocks were behind the wheels before the motor was started, the defendants introduced testimony to the effect that other auto shops in schools in and around Los Angeles did not require the wheels to be blocked, and that it was not customary to block the wheels. Some of this testimony was admitted without objection and some was admitted over plaintiff’s objection. The suggestion has been advanced that evidence with respect to trade garages was received, but a close study of the bill of exceptions shows otherwise and discloses that the specifications of error only relate to the custom existing in other schools. We cannot sustain the claim of appellants that the reception of this evidence was prejudicially erroneous. In the first place, testimony as to the general custom and practice of other auto shops in schools was competent on the question of care and diligence exercised by those charged with a lack thereof in the instant case. (Burns v. Sennett & Miller, 99 Cal. 363, 373 [ 33 Pac. 916 ], Hennesey v. Bingham, 125 Cal. 627, 635 [ 58 Pac. 200 ], Longuy v. La Societe Fran caise, 52 Cal. App. 370, 375 [ 198 Pac. 1011 ], and Thomas v. Southern Pac. Co., 116 Cal. App. 126, 131 [ 2 Pac. (2d) 544 ].)

Even if we assumed the introduction of such evidence to be erroneous, we should be compelled to hold that it was not prejudicial because like evidence was received without objection. The testimony received over objection being merely cumulative of that which was admitted without objection, it is difficult to see how appellants could have been injured.

Passing to the question of whether there was substantial evidence touching the liability of the respondent student which should have been submitted to the jury, we must first observe that it is now well settled that in order to fasten liability upon the school district negligence on the part of an officer or employee of the district must be alleged and proved. It is not sufficient to prove negligence on the part of a student, even when the student is attempting to carry out the directions of an instructor. (Ellis v. Burns Valley School Dist., 128 Cal. App. 550 [ 18 Pac. (2d) 79 ]; Hack v. Sacramento City Junior College Dist., 131 Cal. App. 444, 448 [ 21 Pac. (2d) 477 ]; Underhill v. Alameda E. School Dist., 133 Cal. App. 733 [ 24 Pac. (2d) 849 ]; McCloy v. Huntington Park Union H. S. Dist., 139 Cal. App. 237 [ 33 Pac. (2d) 882 ]; Goodman v. Pasadena City H. S. Dist., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 65, 68 [ 40 Pac. (2d) 854 ].) After commenting upon the liability imposed by the act and duties of school authorities, it was said in Underhill v. Alameda E.. School Dist., supra: “With the foregoing observations in mind we believe that whenever an attempt is made to recover damages from a school district for such injuries, the complaint in the action must set forth facts clearly showing a violation of a duty of care imposed upon school authorities.” A like observation may be made when considering the sufficiency of the evidence.

We may therefore consider whether there was substantial evidence of negligence on the part of Pick—the instructor. It is urged that “the school teacher and the Los Angeles City High School District were negligent in failing to carry out their own rules and regulations, as to safety in the conduct of said class ’ ’. As we have already indicated, the rules required students to see that the emergency brake was set, the gear shift lever in neutral, and the wheels blocked, before a motor was started. These instructions were repeated frequently during the school term. It is hardly necessary to note that the instructor did not himself violate any of these rules. The student George Wills did, it is true. Can negligence be predicated upon the theory that Pick did not keep Wills under closer scrutiny and observe his failure to comply with the rules ? The uncontradicted evidence discloses that there were twenty-six or twenty-seven pupils in the shop on the day of the accident ;■ that Wills had been a student in the shop for two years and was a good pupil; that he drove his own car; had a driver’s license; and had never been seen by the instructor taking any chances. With the duty resting upon the instructor to supervise all of the pupils, can it reasonably be said that Pick was guilty of negligence because he did not examine the car every time George Wills started the motor? We think that reasonable, minds cannot differ upon the question and that the answer must be in the negative. The directed verdict was therefore proper.

The appeal from order denying motions for new trial as to respondents Los Angeles High School District and Samuel Leonard Fick, being unauthorized (Gray v. Cotton, 174 Cal. 256 [ 162 Pac. 1019 ]; Williams Co. v. Quin, 44 Cal. App. 296 [ 186 Pac. 401 ]; United Casting Co. v. Duncan, 44 Cal. App 384 [ 186 Pac. 403 ]), is ordered dismissed.

The judgments are affirmed.

Shenk, J., Langdon, J., Edmonds, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied. Seawell, J., voted for a hearing.