Ethel Brisacher, petitioner herein, is the widow of Leo Brisacher, who died on March 17, 1958. On April 7, 1958, petitioner filed in the Superior Court of Riverside County a petition for a family allowance. Opposition to the petition was filed by William Brisacher, son of the decedent, in which he alleged that the petitioner and the decedent entered into an antenuptial agreement, dated April 14, 1947, in which it was stated that

It was further alleged that said agreement was in full force and effect, and the prayer was that the petition for family allowance be denied.

On June 12, 1958, the trial court entered the following order:

On June 30, 1958, there was filed by Ethel Brisacher a supplemental petition for family allowance, reciting, among other matters, that on June 16, 1955, the decedent created a trust to take effect upon his death, and under its terms petitioner was to be paid $500 per month for life thereafter; that when petitioner filed her first petition for family allowance she had not received any income from said trust; that on June 19, 1958, she received three monthly payments thereon and was advised that she would receive the monthly payments thereafter; that she therefore requested the court to reduce the family allowance to $250 per month. The court granted this petition and thereafter the contestor, William Brisacher, appealed from the order as amended.

There is no reporter’s transcript of the proceedings in which the superior court made the allowance and the appeal is presented on the clerk’s transcript, plus a stipulation that the antenuptial agreement involved is as set forth in appellant’s opening brief and may be considered by the court in lieu of the original. The agreement is as follows:

The principal question presented on this appeal is whether the antenuptial agreement by its terms precludes the granting of a family allowance to the widow, Ethel Brisacher.

Family allowances are strongly favored in the law (Estate of Jacobs, 61 Cal.App.2d 152, 155 [ 142 P.2d 454 ]) and it is also well established that an applicant may have waived her right to an allowance by an agreement to that effect (Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748, 750 [ 171 P.2d 724 ]). In order to bar a family allowance the intention to waive the right must be clear and explicit, and any uncertainty in the language of the agreement will be resolved in favor of the right. (Estate of Bidigare, 215 Cal. 28, 30 [ 8 P.2d 123 ].)

In Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 540 [ 129 P. 999 ], the widow petitioned for a- family allowance and as a ground of opposition thereto the special administratrix set up a postnuptial agreement between the decedent and his wife wherein the parties agreed to a division of their community property; that the execution of the agreement and the delivery of the various instruments involved was intended to be a full, complete and final adjustment of all the property rights of the parties thereto and that neither party thereto would at any time thereafter make or attempt to make any other or further claim than as therein stipulated. The agreement further provided:

The court there held that

While this ease was decided in 1913, it has been cited many times in subsequent decisions dealing with the question of waiver of family allowances and apparently, it has not been overruled.

In Estate of Schwartz, 79 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [ 179 P.2d 868 ], the antenuptial agreement involved provided as follows:

The court there said:

In Estate of Wamack, 137 Cal.App.2d 112 [ 289 P.2d 871 ], appellant, prior to Ms marriage to decedent, executed an antenuptial agreement with decedent providing that decedent should retain ownership of all her property with the “exclusive right to dispose of any and all property” she “now owns” or “may hereafter acquire or receive, as her own absolute and separate property without interference or claim” by Mr. Wamack, “and in like manner as if said marriage had not taken place.” The court held, at page 115:

In Estate of McCoy, 51 Cal.App.2d 483 [ 125 P.2d 71 ], a property settlement agreement entered into by the parties provided in part that

After discussing the holdings in Estate of Bidigare, 215 Cal. 28 [ 8 P.2d 123 ], Estate of Yoell, 164 Cal. 540 [ 129 P. 999 ], and Estate of Shapero, 39 Cal.App.2d 144 [ 102 P.2d 569 ], the court said:

In Estate of Howe, 81 Cal.App.2d 95 [ 183 P.2d 329 ], it was stated in the prenuptial agreement:

The court held as follows:

In the instant case, in the absence of a record showing the circumstances under which the agreement involved was made, our interpretation of it is confined to the document itself. It appears therefrom that the purpose was to provide j that each party would retain his or her separate property and to agree with respect to the distribution and division thereof in the event of death or in the event of unforeseen difficulty or disagreement. It was agreed that

In this quoted language Ethel Brisacher clearly states that she shall not have a claim as surviving widow against the estate of the decedent, thus waiving any claim for a family allowance from his estate.

In Estate of Lufkin, 131 Cal. 291, 293 [ 63 P. 469 ], the term “claim” is defined as follows:

In the instant ease the record before us is silent as to whether there was community property from which an order for a family allowance could be paid. Apparently the parties lived together as husband and wife for many years and it therefore must be assumed that there was evidence to support the trial court’s order to this extent. (See Estate of Howe , 81 Cal.App.2d, supra, 95, 99.)

The orders granting a family allowance are modified by adding to each of said orders the words “Said allowance is payable only to the extent of the community property being administered in said estate.’’ As so modified the orders are affirmed.

Shepard, J., concurred.