From a judgment in favor of defendants predicated upon the sustaining, without leave to amend, of their demurrer to the complaint in an action to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance of defendant city requiring a license fee for the maintenance of coin operated lock boxes in stations or terminals of railroads or bus lines, located in the city of Long Beach, plaintiff appeals.

So far as material here it is alleged in the complaint as follows:

(1) The charter of defendant city specifically prohib its the municipality from imposing a license tax for revenue purposes, hut its power is limited to imposing a license tax for regulatory purposes only.

This proposition is untenable. Section 33 of the charter of defendant city reads as follows:

The law is settled in California that the words “license and regulate” as used in the foregoing section of the City Charter of Long Beach include the authority to impose a license tax for revenue purposes only. {In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 700 [ 195 P. 406 ]; In re Nowak, 184 Cal. 701, 705 [ 195 P. 402 ].)

Section 329 of the City Charter of Long Beach reads thus:

Plaintiff argues that defendant city by the incorporation in its charter of section 329 has adopted the provisions of section 16000 of the Business and Professions Code (formerly section 3366 of the Political Code) which reads thus: rated cities may, in the exercise of their police power, and for the purpose of regulation, as herein provided, and not otherwise, license any kind of business not prohibited by law transacted and carried on within the limits of their jurisdictions, including all shows, exhibitions and lawful games, and may fix the rates of such license fee and provide for its collection by suit or otherwise.”

This argument is fallacious for the reason that the limitation in section 16000 of the Business and Professions Code is contrary to the power conferred by section 33 of the city charter. Section 329 of the city charter makes applicable to the defendant city only such laws of the State of California as are not in conflict with the provisions of the charter; since the section of the Business and Professions Code is in conflict with a provision in the city charter such section is not applicable to the defendant city and is not a limitation upon its powers. Hence, under the authority contained in section 33 of its charter the defendant municipality had the power to levy a license tax for revenue purposes only.

(2) Section 3.355 of the Long Beach License Code is too indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable because in its classification of those subject to the license tax it attempts to impose the tax upon those operating what is “commonly known as a locker club in the city of Long Beach.”

This contention is likewise without merit. Plaintiff urges that the ordinance is invalid upon the authority of Barker Bros., Inc. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 607 [ 76 P.2d 97 ], wherein an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles imposing a tax on “any store . . . commonly known as a department store or any store where a variety of goods, wares, and merchandise are arranged ... or offered for sale” was held invalid because there was not in the ordinance any definition of a department store by which a party might know whether a particular business was included in the terms of the ordinance, since the term “commonly known as a department store” could not be applied with any degree of certainty to any particular business and was too indefinite to be used as a classification for the purpose of taxation. This case is not here in point. There is no contention that plaintiff is being licensed under the provisions of an ordinance referring to locker clubs. The license tax is being imposed upon plaintiff under the provisions of the ordinance providing for the licensing of a person “operating any place wherein space is rented to persons for the storage of clothing or other personal property.” Clearly such a provision is definite and certain and is applicable to plaintiff since it admits that it is engaged in such a business.

(3) Plaintiff is liable to only one fee for all of its locked boxes located in defendant city.

This proposition is untenable. It is the general rule that where the same business is conducted at several different places the operator must procure the required license or pay the required tax for each establishment unless under the ordinance only one license or tax is required. (37 C.J. (1925) § 62, p. 210; Goldstein v. State Revenue Com,., 50 Ga.App. 317 [178 S.B. 164, 165]; Drumright v. Strand Amusement Co., 139 Okla. 162 [ 282 P. 128 ]. Cf. Bramman v. City of Alameda, 162 Cal. 648, 653 [ 124 P. 243 ] ; Steuer v. City of Atlanta, 176 Ga. 433 [168 S.B. 7].)

In the present case section 6.105 of the Long Beach License Code reads as follows:

Clearly under the foregoing section of the license code plaintiff could properly be required to pay a license fee for each different place where it conducted its business. There is no attempt by the city to impose a tax upon each locked box in the tier of the coin operated metal lock boxes at any place of business conducted by plaintiff.

(4) The tax sought to be collected by defendant municipality is confiscatory and therefore void.

This proposition is not sound. Plaintiff argues that since the amount it receives annually is approximately equivalent to the license tax, the license tax is confiscatory and therefore void. This position may not be sustained under the law of this state. The rule is established in California that a license tax imposing the same amount upon all engaged in the same business, regardless of business done or profits received therefrom, is not an unreasonable discrimination against any particular person engaged in the business because its net profit is less than that of others engaged in the same business or because the imposition of the tax may even result in some person engaged in the business operating at a loss. (City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Independent Gas Co., 152 Cal. 765 , 768 [ 93 P. 1006 ], and eases therein cited; Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48 [ 41 S.Ct. 219 , 65 L.Ed. 489 ].)

(5) Section 3.355 of the Long Beach License Code imposes an illegal burden on interstate commerce.

This proposition is devoid of merit. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff is engaged in interstate business or that the depositors’ lock boxes which it rents are used in interstate commerce. The test is not whether the activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce, but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of interstate commerce as to be a part of it. (Barker Bros., Inc. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 609 [ 76 P.2d 97 ]; Schroepfer v. A. S. Abell Co., 138 F.2d 111, 113 .) So far as appears in the record in the instant case there is nothing to indicate that plaintiff’s lock boxes are actually or closely related to the movement of interstate commerce.

Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 [ 55 S.Ct. 477 , 79 L.Ed. 934 ], relied on by plaintiff, is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In such case the State of Montana attempted to impose a license tax based upon the number of telephone instruments used in the telephone service in that state without regard to its character as intrastate or interstate business. Since the same instruments and equipment were in the command of the customers for either intrastate or interstate service, the court held that the licensing statute must distinguish between the intrastate and interstate character of the business. Clearly the present situation is not analogous to that which obtained in the case just mentioned.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed;

Moore, P. J., and Wilson, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 5,1946. Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a hearing.