Defendant was convicted after trial by jury of (1) statutory rape and (2) incest. This appeal is from the judgments.

The prosecution (respondent) introduced evidence tending to prove the following facts: That at noon on or about February 28,1943, defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecuting witness, his daughter, who was 16 years of age. At the conclusion of the trial defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:

Defendant relies for reversal of the judgments, among others, on the following proposition:

This proposition is tenable and is governed by the following rules:

(1) In prosecutions for sex offenses it is error for the trial court not to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that such charges are 1 ‘ easily made and difficult to disprove, ’ ’ and that “the testimony of the prosecuting witness, should be examined with caution. ’ ’ (People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 888-889 [ 129 P.2d 367 ]; People v. Williams, 55 Cal.App.2d 696, 700 [ 131 P.2d 851 ].)

(2) The refusal to give a cautionary instruction is prejudicial error where as in the instant case the (a) testimony of the prosecuting witness is uncorroborated, (b) evidence is sharply conflicting, and (e) appellate court cannot say that if the instruction had been given the jury would have reached the same verdict. (People v. Long, 63 Cal.App.2d 679 [ 147 P.2d 659 ] ; also People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 650 [ 140 P.2d 828 ] ; People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [ 108 P.2d 4 ].)

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the failure to give a “cautionary instruction” constituted prejudicial error. There is a direct conflict between the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness and the testimony of defendant. This conflict coupled with the conceded facts that:

This and other courts on previous occasions have called attention to the pronouncement of Lord Chief Justice Hale relative to the crime of rape which applies with equal force to the crime of incest. It is as follows:

For the foregoing reasons the judgments are and each is reversed and a new trial is ordered.

Moore, P. J., and Wood (W. J.), J., concurred.

People v. Benson (1856), 6 Cal. 221, 223 [65 Am.Dec. 506]; People v. Asavis (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 492, 497 [ 71 P.2d 307 ]; People v. Huston (1941), 45 Cal.App.2d 596, 597 [ 114 P.2d 607 ]. See, also, People v. Lucas (1940), 16 Cal.2d 178, 182 [ 105 P.2d 102 , 130 A.L.R. 1485 ].