On January 26, 1956, complaints were filed in the Municipal Court of the San Diego Judicial District, County of San Diego, charging the appellants with the commission of seven misdemeanors in violation of various sections of the City of San Diego Municipal Code. The sections involved deal with the regulation and licensing of auto wrecking establishments in the city of San Diego and are substantially as follows:

Appellants, by demurrer, challenged the constitutionality of these sections. After the municipal court judge overruled the demurrer, appellants entered pleas of “not guilty” and trial was set for December 3, 1956, in said court. Appellants then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Superior Court of San Diego County and an order restraining and prohibiting the said municipal court from entertaining, passing upon, hearing, trying and deciding motions, proceedings and trials based upon said complaints. An order granting an alternative writ of prohibition and order to show cause was issued by the said superior court and on August 9, 1957, said court ordered “That the alternative writ of prohibition is discharged and a peremptory writ is denied.” The appeal herein is from this order. Appellants contend that section 33.0903.7 is void for vagueness and uncertainty and that the remaining sections involved are arbitrary, unreasonable and impose unconstitutional burdens upon appellants, entirely foreign to the legitimate objects of the police power.

The record shows that there has been no trial in the municipal court on the charges contained in the complaints filed and that appellants seek to avoid further proceedings in said court by the use of a writ of prohibition. This is an extraordinary writ and the question arises as to whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant it under the circumstances of this case.

In 42 American Jurisprudence, Prohibition, section 7, page 143, it is said:

In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 466-467 [ 171 P.2d 8 ], the court, in deciding whether trial and appeal were adequate remedies under the circumstances of that case, said:

In the instant case the facts alleged are sufficient to justify the trial court in denying the writ on the ground that appellants have adequate remedy by trial in the municipal court and by appeal therefrom to the superior court. There are no facts alleged showing that trial and appeal would be inadequate. While it is alleged in the petition for the writ herein that petitioners will be subjected to unreasonable expense, inconvenience and delay if the trial in the municipal court is permitted to proceed, the mere fact that more time would be consumed by a trial is not sufficient to show that the court abused its discretion in denying the writ. The record shows that the complaints herein were filed on January 26, 1956, and it does not appear that further delay would prejudice the rights of the petitioners. The record further supports the inference that appellants have made no showing of hardship other than the expense ordinarily incident to trial and appeal. It may also be reasonably inferred that where, as here, there are several complaints and charges, questions of fact may be involved and the defense of unconstitutionality of one section of the ordinance may be available as to some of the charges and not as to the others. These matters can be considered and decided during a trial or on an appeal.

Since we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion shown in the order denying the writ and that the remedy of trial and appeal or other remedies are adequate under the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to here pass upon the constitutionality of the various questioned provisions of •the San Diego Municipal Code.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Griffin, J., and McCabe, J. pro tern., concurred.

Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 3, 1958, Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.