McGraw

In this rescission action plaintiff obtained judgment, and the defendant appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff Elizabeth Snyder died and the Title Insurance and Trust Company, a corporation, the executor of her will, has been substituted as plaintiff. Elizabeth Snyder will be referred to herein as the plaintiff.

On April 24, 1942, plaintiff, the owner of an apartment house in Los Angeles, executed a grant deed conveying that property to defendant. At that same time and as a part of the deed transaction, the defendant executed a document as follows: "Agreement For Value Received, I, Lily K. McGraw, agree and promise to pay all money derived from the operation and management of the Palomar Apartments, 979 South Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California, to Elizabeth Snyder. I will furnish reports and an accounting whenever so requested by Elizabeth Snyder and I promise to operate and continue to operate the business of said apartment house until a sale of said apartment house has been consummated; and the proceeds of said sale, I promise to pay to Elizabeth Ryland Snyder. Dated: April 24, 1942. Lily K. McGraw." Also at that time and as a part of the same…

this rescission action plaintiff obtained judgment, and the defendant appeals. During the pendency of *392 the appeal, the plaintiff Elizabeth Snyder died and the Title Insurance and Trust Company, a corporation, the executor of her will, has been substituted as plaintiff. Elizabeth Snyder will be referred to herein as the plaintiff.

On April 24, 1942, plaintiff, the owner of an apartment house in Los Angeles, executed a grant deed conveying that property to defendant. At that same tirhe and as a part of the deed transaction, the defendant executed a document as follows: “Agreement For Value Received, I, Lily K. McGraw, agree and promise to pay all money derived from the operation and management of the Palomar Apartments, 979 South Oxford Avenue, Los Angeles, California, to Elizabeth Snyder. I will furnish reports and an accounting whenever so requested by Elizabeth Snyder and I promise to operate and continue to operate the business of said apartment house until a sale of said apartment house has been consummated; and the proceeds of said sale, I promise to pay to Elizabeth Ryland Snyder. Dated: April 24, 1942. Lily K. McGraw.” Also at that time and as a part of the same…

I concur. By the terms of section 2250 of the Civil Code, the succeeding sections of the chapter, including section 2280, apply only to express trusts created for the benefit of another than the trustor, and defendant argues that the provisions for revocation contained in the latter section are not applicable here because the trust was for the benefit of the trustor as well as for others. Under original section 2280, a trust could not be revoked by the trustor after its acceptance, except by the consent of all beneficiaries, unless the declaration of trust reserved the power of revocation by the trustor. The clear implication of the section was that a *401 trust could be revoked by the consent of all beneficiaries, which is the law generally in the absence of statutory limitations (Perry on Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed., vol. 1, § 104), and there are none in California. If the trustor had been the sole beneficiary, she could have revoked the trust (Bradbury v. McClure (1892), 93 Cal. 133 [ 28 P. 777 ]; Fernald v. Lawsten (1938), 26 Cal.App.2d 552 [ 79 P.2d 742 ]), and consequently could revoke it as to her own interest as beneficiary, even though there were other beneficiaries.…