Bowen

Petitioner, a Los Angeles County civil service employee, was discharged because she refused to sign the oath required of all public employees by the Levering Act (Gov. Code, 3100-3109), and she has brought this original proceeding in mandamus seeking reinstatement and payment of compensation which was withheld following her suspension.

Before the Levering Act went into effect, petitioner executed an oath almost identical with that prescribed in section 3 of article XX of the state Constitution, and she also took the oath and made the affidavits required by the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County. [fn. *] Thereafter she was directed by her superior to take the oath prescribed by the Levering Act, and upon her refusal to do so she was suspended without pay as of October 30 and was discharged on November 29, 1950.

Nearly all of the questions raised by petitioner with respect to the constitutionality and application of the Levering Act have been answered adversely to her in Pockman v. Leonard, ante, p. 676 [ 249 P.2d 267 ]. She makes two additional contentions, however, with respect to asserted conflicts between the act and the provisions of the Los Angeles…

Petitioner, a Los Angeles County civil service employee, was discharged because she refused to sign the oath required of all public employees by the Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109), and she has brought this original proceeding in mandamus seeking reinstatement and payment of compensation which was withheld following her suspension.

Before the Levering Act went into effect, petitioner executed an oath almost identical with that prescribed in section 3 of article XX of the state Constitution, and she also took the oath and made the affidavits required by the hoard of supervisors of Los Angeles County. * Thereafter she was directed *715 by her superior to take the oath prescribed by the Levering Act, and upon her refusal to do so she was suspended without pay as of October 30 and was discharged on November 29,1950.

Nearly all of the questions raised by petitioner with respect to the constitutionality and application of the Levering Act have been answered adversely to her in Pockman v Leonard, ante, p. 676 [ 249 P.2d 267 ]. She makes two additional contentions, however, with respect to asserted conflicts between the act and the provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter.…

I dissent.

For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pock-man v. Leonard, this day filed, ante, p. 688 [ 249 P.2d 267 ], I would issue a writ of mandate as prayed for in the petition.

Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied November 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.