Moore

Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, Assistant Attorney General, Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attorney General, J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles), A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, Paul A. McCarthy,

John P. Fitzgerald, District Attorney (Santa Clara), and Leonard R. Avilla, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent. City Attorney (Redwood City), Ernest A. Wilson, City Attorney (San Mateo), and Kirkbride & Wilson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

TRAYNOR, J.

Petitioner seeks by this proceeding in mandamus to compel the auditor of Santa Clara County to issue a warrant in payment of a claim for the publication of a notice to terminate the right of redemption pursuant to section 3574 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

The real property described in the published notice was sold to the state on June 29, 1935, for nonpayment of county taxes for 1934-35. The law at that time required the tax collector to publish an annual delinquent list of property on which taxes for the past year were not paid. If the taxes remained unpaid the property was sold to the state. The practical effect of such a sale was to start the running of the five-year period of…

I agree that a delinquent taxpayer has no vested right in an existing procedure for the collection of taxes. (Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [ 61 S.Ct. 938 , 85 L.Ed. 1404 ]; League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 [ 22 S.Ct. 475 , 46 L.Ed. 478 ].) There is no contract between him and the state that the latter will not vary the method of. *279 collection. (Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371 ; League v. Texas, supra, p. 158 .) Nor does a statute changing the procedure for the collection of unpaid taxes conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution merely because it is retroactive in operation. (League v. Texas, supra, p. 161 ; Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371 .) For these reasons the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state constitutionally may impose interest upon delinquent taxes by a law enacted subsequent to the time of their accrual. (League v. Texas, supra.)

The due process clause does, however, prevent the state from taking one’s liberty or property in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. The private ownership of real property normally does not exist by virtue of a statutory grant, and the owner is entitled to notice of…

The question presented for consideration is whether section 3574 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, adopted by the Legislature in 1941, imposes more onerous conditions upon the right to redeem property from a delinquent tax sale made prior to the adoption of such section, and if so, did the Legislature have the power to impose such conditions so as to affect the right of redemption of property covered by such prior sales?

In my opinion, said section does impose more onerous conditions on the right of redemption, as it purports to limit the time within which redemption may be made to a period of four months after notice instead of permitting the owner to exercise the right of redemption at any time until the property is sold by the state to a third person. Such being the case, I shall proceed with the consideration of the question as to whether or not the Legislature had the power to impose such conditions so as to affect tax sales made prior to the adoption of such section.

This court has held in numerous cases, and it appears to be in agreement with the weight of authority, that the general relationship of sovereign and taxpayer is not founded on, nor does it create, any…

I dissent. In my opinion the legislation under consideration provides for a shortening of the period of redemption fixed by the law in force at the time of the sale for delinquent taxes. The question whether the shortening of that period is a substantial impairment of the redemption-er’s right cannot be answered by the citation of cases which declare that the Legislature may change the method of re *286 demption. It is not the method, but the period of redemption which is involved. Neither may it properly be said that the right of the redemptioner is amplified because he is given more notice when his period of redemption is terminated by public declaration than when it is terminated by sale to a third person. Such a pronouncement assumes the point in issue, namely, that the redemptioner’s right may be cut off at an earlier time than that provided by the law in force at the time of the sale to the state.

The case of South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2 Cal.2d 485 [ 42 P.2d 64 ], relied on by the majority, involved only the question whether the state could dispose of its tax-deeded lands at private sale for cash or on credit. The decision in that case was that the…

Petitioner seeks by this proceeding in mandamus to compel the auditor of Santa Clara County to issue a warrant in payment of a claim for the publication of a notice to terminate the right of redemption pursuant to section 3574 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

The real property described in the published notice was sold to the state on June 29, 1935, for nonpayment of county taxes for 1934-35. The law at that time required the tax collector to publish an annual delinquent list of property on which taxes for the past year were not paid. If the taxes remained unpaid the property was sold to the state. The practical effect of such a sale was to start the running of the five-year period of redemption. (Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575 [ 87 P. 102 ]; In re Seick, 46 Cal.App. 363 [ 189 P. 314 ].) If the property was not redeemed within the five years, or if the taxpayer failed to elect on or before April 20, 1936, to pay the delinquent taxes in installments (Pol. Code, sec. 3817c(3); extended to April 20, 1940, by Pol. Code, sec. 3817c (7), Stats. 1939, ch. 9) the property was deeded to the state. (Pol. Code, see. 3785.) Thereafter, under the law in effect when the property in question…