Hollender

New York Life Insurance v. Hollender

Good Law
1951 Cal. LEXIS 187·38 Cal. 2d 73·237 P.2d 510
Supreme Court of CaliforniaNovember 21, 1951L. A. 21561California14,532 words

Opinion

Opinion

Plaintiff brought this action to reform an insurance policy issued on the life of defendant Leo Hollender. Specifically, it sought a reduction in the face amount of the policy so as to conform with the alleged true age of the insured. Defendant cross-complained for the amount of total and permanent disability payments allegedly due under the policy, and for the refund of premiums allegedly paid to prevent forfeiture of the policy. The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted a motion for nonsuit on the complaint and made findings in favor of the insured on the issues embraced in the cross-complaint and the answer thereto. Judgment in favor of defendant was entered accordingly and from such judgment, plaintiff has appealed.

This case presents for determination the question of whether the incontestable clause of the policy bars the right of plaintiff to adjust the amount payable under the insurance contract in accordance with the provisions of the age adjustment clause thereof. The trial court adopted the theory of defendant insured in holding that the reformation sought by plaintiff constituted a contest of the policy after the time limitation therefor had expired,…

lead Opinion

Spence, J.

Plaintiff brought this action to reform an insurance policy issued on the life of defendant Leo Hollender. Specifically, it sought a reduction in the face amount of the policy so as to conform with the alleged true age of the insured. Defendant cross-complained for the amount of total and permanent disability payments allegedly due under the policy, and for the refund of premiums allegedly paid to prevent forfeiture of the policy. The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted a motion for nonsuit on the complaint and made findings in favor of the insured on the issues embraced in the cross-complaint and the answer thereto. Judgment in favor of defendant was entered accordingly and from such judgment, plaintiff has appealed.

This case presents for determination the question of whether the incontestable clause of the policy bars the right of plaintiff to adjust the amount payable under the insurance contract in accordance with the provisions of the age adjustment clause thereof. The trial court adopted the theory of defendant insured in holding that the reformation sought by plaintiff constituted a contest of the policy after the time limitation therefor had expired, and that…

dissent Opinion

Carter, J.

I dissent.

The decision reached here by the majority of this court is another instance where lip-service is paid to a salutary rule by recognizing its existence only to find that under the facts presented it has no application. The rule to which I refer is the old and just one—that a contract of insurance shall be construed most strictly against the insurer.

The incontestability clause in the policy under consideration here provided that “This Policy shall be incontestable after two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to disability and Double Indemnity Benefits.” In spite of the fact that none of the three exceptions is involved here, the majority of this court cites many authorities in sup *87 port of the following statement: “It is generally held that the incontestable clause, after the lapse of time it specifies, prevents nullification of the insurance contract for cmy cause not excepted in the clause.” Of course, it is explained that what we have here is not a nullification of the contract, and not a contest, but only an effort to have the policy enforced according to its terms. This…

concurrence Opinion

Schauer, J.

I concur in the conclusion reached by Justice Carter.

The argument that in this case the incontestable clause should not be operative because it would work an injustice on other insureds goes too far. On that reasoning the incontestable clause could be held utterly meaningless in any case of misrepresentation or innocent mistake as to a material matter of fact.

It seems incongruous to me to recognize the express declarations of the policy that the “policy and the application therefor [in which the insured’s age is stated] . . . constitute the *90 entire contract”; that “This policy shall he incontestable after two years from the date of its issue except for non-payment of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits”; and then to hold that “the matter of defendant’s ‘correct age’ would be ‘open to investigation during the life of the policy’.” The exceptions to the incontestable clause above quoted are specific; they do not include misstatement of age.

The majority, as I understand their opinion, avoid giving effect to the two-year contest limitation in the incontestable clause by holding that this action to reform…

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