Miller v. Superior Court

In 1990 the voters of this state enacted a constitutional amendment as part of Proposition 115 affirming that in criminal cases the people of the State of California have “the right to due process of law” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29). 1 In the present case, we consider whether the assertion of that state constitutional right by a district attorney can serve as a justification for holding a newsperson in contempt for refusing to surrender unpublished information, in spite of the newsperson’s immunity from contempt for such refusal expressly provided in article I, section 2, subdivision (b) (hereinafter article I, section 2(b)), and reaffirmed in article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (hereinafter article I, section 28(d)). We conclude that a newsperson cannot be held in contempt under these circumstances. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

*888 I. Facts and Procedural History

The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute and were largely set forth in SCI-Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 654, 657-659 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 868 ]:

The stay was extended when KOVR indicated its intention to petition the Court of Appeal for an…

Although I concur with the result and the bulk of the majority’s reasoning, I do not agree with the majority’s analysis of the alleged conflict between California Constitution, article I, sections 28, subdivision *902 (d) 1 and 29. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 895-896.) The principle that a specific provision governs over a general provision only applies if there is an actual conflict between the two provisions. No actual conflict exists here. The media exception in section 28, subdivision (d), by its terms, is confined to “this section” and does not expressly preclude a more general provision from narrowing the scope of a newsperson’s immunity. This qualified language should not insulate the media exception from future modifications or alterations, especially given that the electorate could have expressly done so. (See, e.g., §§ 27, 30, subd. (a).) Indeed, nothing in the pertinent ballot measures even suggests such an intent. Because this aspect of the majority’s analysis is both suspect and unnecessary to its holding and may affect other constitutional provisions with clauses analogous to section 28, subdivision (d) (see, e.g., §§ 7, subd. (a), 24, 31, subds. (c)-(e); art. IV, §…

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Edmund D. McMurray, Margaret Venturi and Susan J. Orton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney (Los Angeles), George M. Palmer, Head Deputy District Attorney, and Brentford J. Ferreira, Deputy District Attorney, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

MOSK, J.

In 1990 the voters of this state enacted a constitutional amendment as part of Proposition 115 affirming that in criminal cases the People of the State of California have "the right to due process of law" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29). [1] In the present case, we consider whether the assertion of that state constitutional right by a district attorney can serve as a justification for holding a newsperson in contempt for refusing to surrender unpublished information, in spite of the newsperson's immunity from contempt for such refusal expressly provided in article I, section 2, subdivision (b) (hereinafter article I, section 2(b)), and…