United States v. Smith

Opinion by Judge O’SCANNLAIN; Dissent by Judge D.W. NELSON.

We must primarily decide whether a jury instruction impermissibly relieved the government of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a “dangerous weapon,” an essential element of the crime.

I

In August 1999, four inmates at the federal penitentiary in Lompoc, California, were in the recreation cage of the Special Housing Unit: Malik Smith, Charles Wesley Helem, George W. Jeffries, and Milton Johnson. After hearing scuffling noises, prison guards went to the cage, where they saw Smith stabbing Jeffries with a sharpened plastic object while Helem held him from behind. The object snapped into two pieces, but Smith continued to use one of the pieces to stab Jeffries.

The object, a prison-made knife, was about six inches long, flat, and sharpened to a point at one end. Prison officials later found a similar knife wrapped in a towel in the recreation cage. The knives had been made by melting down very thin Styro-foam trays and forming them into a hard plastic.

After the incident, Reynaldo Nísperos, a physician’s assistant employed by the prison, examined the four inmates for injuries. Helem…

Dissenting:

I.

The rationale for reversing Smith’s conviction is straightforward. Smith was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon for attacking a fellow prisoner with a knife made out of plastic and Styrofoam. The knife broke during the assault, resulting in injuries requiring only “minor first aid.” The principal defense at trial was that the plastic knife was not a “dangerous weapon” because it was incapable, as used, of causing death or serious bodily injury.

The trial court gave the following jury instruction:

(emphasis added). 1

Smith objected to the instruction because it did not require the jury to find him guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the three elements, as enumerated in the instruction, do not even include the term “dangerous weapon,” even though use of such an instrument is an element of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 113 (a)(3). Furthermore, it is unclear how the jurors used the last statement of the instruction, if at all, in their deliberations. They could have interpreted the *1108 statement as a legal conclusion — that this prison-made knife was a dangerous weapon — which would have completely usurped the jury’s role as…

Davina T. Chen, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, argued the cause for the defendant-appellant, and filed briefs; Maria E. Stratton, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, was on the briefs.

Craig H. Missakian, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellee, and filed a brief; Debra Wong Yang, U.S. Attorney, and Thomas P. O'Brien, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on the brief.

Before: D.W. NELSON and DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges, and ROBERT C. JONES, [*] District Judge.

Opinion by Judge O'SCANNLAIN; Dissent by Judge D.W. NELSON.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must primarily decide whether a jury instruction impermissibly relieved the government of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a "dangerous weapon," an essential element of the crime.

In August 1999, four inmates at the federal penitentiary in Lompoc, California, were in the recreation cage of the Special Housing Unit: Malik Smith, Charles Wesley Helem, George W. Jeffries, and Milton Johnson. After hearing scuffling noises, prison guards went to the cage, where they saw Smith stabbing Jeffries with a sharpened plastic…