Banks

In this case we decide whether advance publicity is a prerequisite to the operation of a constitutionally permissible highway “sobriety checkpoint.”

In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ] (hereafter Ingersoll), this court upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints conducted pursuant to various safeguards, observing, in the course of our analysis, that advance publicity is one such safeguard “important to the maintenance of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint.” (I d. at p. 1346.) In the present case, the Court of Appeal interpreted Ingersoll to require advance publicity as a prerequisite to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint. As we shall explain, however, the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 412 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 ] (hereafter Sitz), decided three years after our Ingersoll decision, establishes that advance publicity is not a constitutional prerequisite to the operation of such a checkpoint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. Factual…

In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 42 , 743 P.2d 1299 ] (Ingersoll) this court held by a vote of four to three that it is constitutionally permissible for a police officer to stop a motorist at a sobriety checkpoint even though the officer does not suspect, reasonably or otherwise, that the motorist is intoxicated. The court reached that conclusion by applying the administrative search rationale articulated in Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 357 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 ] and by comparing sobriety roadblocks to metal detectors at airports. (See Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1329-1331.)

Justice Mosk and I joined Justice Broussard’s dissent in Ingersoll . Since then, most courts have yielded to the overwhelming public pressure to approve this type of warrantless, suspicionless search. Under these circumstances there is little point in writing another long dissent. However, when future courts are asked to approve still more intrusive “administrative” searches by analogy to the sobriety checkpoint, it may be useful for them to recall the reasons why some of us were unwilling to take even the first small steps in this direction. In Justice…

Ronald Y. Butler, Public Defender, Carl C. Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Thomas Havlena and Alan J. Crivaro, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendent and Appellant.

Amitai Schwartz, Paul L. Hoffman, Alan L. Schlosser, Ann Brick, Edward M. Chen, Matthew A. Coles and Margaret C. Crosby as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Michael R. Capizzi, District Attorney, Maurice L. Evans, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Wallace J. Wade, Assistant District Attorney, Kathleen M. Harper, James F. Bacin and Gregory J. Robischon, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald E. Niver and Charles R.B. Kirk, Deputy Attorneys General, James K. Hahn, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Debbie Lew and Lisa S. Berger, Deputy City Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

GEORGE, J.

In this case we decide whether advance publicity is a prerequisite to the operation of a constitutionally permissible highway "sobriety checkpoint."

In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321 [ 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 , 743…