Curry

Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge N.R. SMITH.

Supreme Court precedent spanning more than a century permits a trial judge to instruct a deadlocked jury about its duty to deliberate, but bars the judge from trying to force or coerce a verdict. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 , 123 S.Ct. 362 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam). The district court in this case granted the writ of habeas corpus, because the district court concluded the state trial court violated that rule when the trial judge, having learned who the holdout juror was and the specific evidence that was troubling that juror, instructed the jury to focus on particular evidence supporting conviction. We reach the same conclusion as the district court, and we affirm the grant of habeas relief. We hold that the Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the instruction was an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law.

The petitioner, Anthony Smith, was convicted in Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, of…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in Part II of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent with regard to Part I, because I believe the majority misapplies the exceptionally deferential standard of review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

With the AEDPA standard of review, Congress set the bar exceptionally high to ensure that federal courts afford the utmost deference to a state court adjudication. See Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir.2003) (“This standard is properly deferential because of the important role that state courts play in applying federal constitutional guarantees and because of federalism concerns that are evoked when we assess whether a state court system holds a state prisoner in violation of the federal constitution.”). Therefore, a federal court.may not grant habeas relief from a state court conviction unless it concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was…

Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, MARSHA S. BERZON and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge N.R. SMITH.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Supreme Court precedent spanning more than a century permits a trial judge to instruct a deadlocked jury about its duty to deliberate, but bars the judge from trying to force or coerce a verdict. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 , 123 S.Ct. 362 , 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam). The district court in this case granted the writ of habeas corpus, because the district court concluded the state trial court violated that rule when the trial judge, having learned who the holdout juror was and the specific evidence that was troubling that juror, instructed the jury to focus on particular evidence supporting conviction. We reach the same conclusion as the district court, and we affirm the grant of habeas relief. We hold that the Court of Appeal's decision upholding the instruction was an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court…