Carlin

In this case we address the question whether a plaintiff alleging injury from ingesting a prescription drug can state a claim against the manufacturer for strict liability and breach of warranty for failure to warn about the known or reasonably scientifically knowable dangerous propensities of its product. We conclude that she can.

In our recent decision in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1993) 53 Cal.3d 987 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 ] (hereafter Anderson), we held generally that manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries caused by their failure to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time they manufactured and distributed the product: “Whatever may be reasonable from the point of view of the *1109 manufacturer, the user of the product must be given the option either to refrain from using the product at all or to use it in such a way as to minimize the degree of danger.” (Id. at p. 1003.) In so doing, we expressly applied to manufacturers of all products the same rule of strict liability for failure to warn of known or reasonably scientifically knowable risks that we previously applied specifically to…

The manufacture of prescription drugs, a multibillion-dollar industry, has provided many of the 20th *1119 century’s greatest success stories and some of its worst tragedies. Because they cure disease, alleviate pain, and prolong life, prescription drugs have been a great benefit to society. But prescription drugs sometimes cause severe complications and side effects, inflicting great anguish as well as temporary and even permanent disability on some individuals.

This court’s task in the present case is to set rules defining prescription drug manufacturers’ tort liability for personal injuries caused by their products’ side effects. More particularly, the task is to determine under what circumstances a drug manufacturer should be held liable in tort for personal injury damages proximately caused by a failure to warn about the possibility of a particular drug complication.

The majority holds that a prescription drug manufacturer is liable in tort for all drug-related injuries about which it did not warn, provided only that the risk of injury was either actually known or in some manner scientifically ascertainable by the manufacturer when it distributed the drug. In his dissent,…

This case involves the efforts of seven justices to faithfully apply the holding of Brown v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1049 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 , 751 P.2d 470 ] (Brown, hereafter) to the first amended complaint of plaintiff, Wilma Peggy Carlin, which alleges defendant, the Upjohn Company, failed to warn her of a known or knowable risk concerning the drug Halcion. The four opinions filed in this matter involve an effort to apply Brown to the present case in light of considerations which have come to light since Justice Mosk, with the concurrence of six other justices, applied a modified form of failure to warn strict tort liability principles to prescription drugs in 1988.1 agree with the majority plaintiff has stated a cause of action for a failure to warn of a known risk of Halcion, the drug in question. I further agree that the cause is action for failure to warn is different from a negligence claim. In that *1136 respect, I respectfully disagree with Justice Baxter’s analysis that plaintiff’s failure to warn of a known risk cause of action is merely a negligence claim. My disagreement with the majority is that the failure to warn of a known risk theory is not really a…

I dissent.

In this case we must determine whether, under California law, when a plaintiff seeks recovery against a manufacturer of a prescription drug on a “failure-to-wam” theory, the liability of the drug manufacturer may be determined under the same strict liability principles that generally apply to the manufacturers of all other products, or, instead, must be limited to general negligence principles.

We faced a somewhat comparable issue in Brown v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1049 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 , 751 P.2d 470 ] (Brown). In Brown , a *1147 unanimous court concluded that, in light of the unique considerations related to the vital public interest in the development, availability, and reasonable pricing of prescription drugs, when a plaintiff seeks recovery against a prescription drug manufacturer for an injury allegedly caused by a “design defect” in the drug, the drug manufacturer’s liability should not be based upon the same strict liability design-defect principles applicable to manufacturers of other products under California law, but instead should be limited to ordinary negligence principles. We concluded that a drug manufacturer may be held liable for an…

Todd W. Kingma, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Michael F. Healy, Frederick D. Baker, Kirk C. Jenkins, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Marie S. Woodbury and Stephen E. Scheve for Real Party in Interest.

Catherine I. Hanson, Fred J. Hiestand, Marjorie E. Powell, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Peter W. Davis, James C. Martin, Nielsen, Merksamer, Parrinello, Mueller & Naylor, Steve Merksamer, John E. Mueller, James C. Gross, Gene Erbin, Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, Hall R. Marston and David R. Venderbush as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

MOSK, Acting C.J.

In this case we address the question whether a plaintiff alleging injury from ingesting a prescription drug can state a claim against the manufacturer for strict liability and breach of warranty for failure to warn about the known or reasonably scientifically knowable dangerous propensities of its product. We conclude that she can.

In our recent decision in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1993) 53 Cal.3d 987 [ 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 ] (hereafter Anderson ), we held generally that manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries caused by their failure to give warning of dangers that were…