Davenport

I concur in the views of the majority on torture-murder and therefore join in the affirmance on the judgment of guilt. I dissent from reversal of the penalty.

The other offenses admitted in evidence involved serious acts of violence and were therefore relevant as aggravating factors to be considered by the jury in assessing penalty. (See my dis. opn. in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 63 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 655 P.2d 77 ].) The other crimes need not be defined in instructions to the jury. After all, the jury should not become involved in extraneous law—i.e., legal definitions of prior crimes— but in the fact of violent conduct. Thus I find no error in the admission and consideration of other offenses.

Contrary to the majority holding, this case does not involve a Ramos (People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ]) error. Ramos was concerned with an instruction to the jury to consider the Governor’s commutation power; no such instruction was given here. While the prosecutor’s argument to the jury may have been suggestive of the commutation power, this error was cured by an appropriate admonition by the court to the jury, and by the usual…

Appellant stands convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree with the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. The jury fixed the penalty at death. The appeal to this court is automatic.

Appellant makes three challenges to the finding that the murder was committed under special circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 190.2 et seq.) 1 First appellant urges that the torture-murder special circumstance enacted by the initiative measure of 1978 is not sufficiently rational, precise and limited to provide a constitutional basis for imposition of the death penalty. (Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 611-612 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 ]; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 428 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ].) Secondly, appellant contends that the instructions to the jury defining the special circumstance were inconsistent with the definition of first degree murder by torture, and that the combination was likely to have misled the jury on the vital matter of the truth of the special circumstance. (Pe ople v. Bail (1943) 22 Cal.2d 642, 653 [ 140 P.2d 828 ].) Finally, appellant argues that the special…

Appellant stands convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree with the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. The jury fixed the penalty at death. The appeal to this court is automatic.

Appellant makes three challenges to the finding that the murder was committed under special circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 190.2 et seq.) [1] First appellant urges that the torture-murder special circumstance enacted by the initiative measure of 1978 is not sufficiently rational, precise and limited to provide a constitutional basis for imposition of the death penalty. ( Smith v. Goguen (1974) 415 U.S. 566, 572-573 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 611-612 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 ]; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 428 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 ].) Secondly, appellant contends that the instructions to the jury defining the special circumstance were inconsistent with the definition of first degree murder by torture, and that the combination was likely to have misled the jury on the vital matter of the truth of the special circumstance. ( People v. Dail (1943) 22 Cal.2d 642, 653 [ 140 P.2d 828 ].) Finally, appellant argues…