Cranston

Appellant Eric Cranston was discharged from his job as a Richmond City Police Officer. The city personnel board sustained the discharge, and the superior court denied a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The principal question presented by Cranston's appeal is whether a police officer may be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service" when, though previously warned about his driving habits and notified that his conduct was being closely observed, he drove his car with inoperative lights in the middle of the night and led fellow police officers on a wild chase over wet and slippery streets at speeds up to 95 miles per hour. Appellant contends that the rule in question is unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that the rule, viewed in the context of other rules and practices pertaining to police service, is not so vague as to preclude discipline for conduct which is so obviously improper for a police officer, and so clearly outside the scope of any substantive legal protection, as the reckless and unlawful conduct in which appellant engaged.

Appellant raises a number of other challenges both to his discharge and to the…

I respectfully dissent. I would hold that Richmond City Personnel rule XII, section 2, subdivision (a) (hereafter rule XII(2)(a)) is unconstitutionally vague because it provides no ascertainable standard of conduct.

As the majority note, where the statute challenged on vagueness grounds does not involve “First Amendment freedoms,” the statute is examined “in light of the facts of the case at hand.” (United States v. Mazurie (1975) 419 U.S. 544, 550 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 , 95 S.Ct. 710 ]; accord United States v. National Dairy Corp. (1963) 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; maj. opn., ante, at p. 763.) “In examining statutes challenged on vagueness grounds, courts have looked not merely at the hypothetical cases to which the statute has uncertain applicability, but also at the act allegedly committed by the charged defendant.” (Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 492 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 556 P.2d 1081 ].) However, it is impossible to determine whether a statute is vague as applied to the conduct at issue where the statute is so vague that it provides no standard whatsoever. Such a provision “is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person…

Appellant Eric Cranston was discharged from his job as a Richmond City Police Officer. The city personnel board sustained the discharge, and the superior court denied a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The principal question presented by Cranston’s appeal is whether a police officer may be disciplined for “conduct unbecoming an employee of the City Service” when, though previously warned about his driving habits and notified that his conduct was being closely observed, he drove his car with inoperative lights in the middle of the night and led fellow police officers on a wild chase over wet and slippery streets at speeds up to 95 miles per hour. Appellant contends that the rule in question is unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that the rule, viewed in the context of other rules and practices pertaining to police service, is not so vague as to preclude discipline for conduct which is so obviously improper for a police officer, and so clearly outside the scope of any substantive legal protection, as the reckless and unlawful conduct in which appellant engaged.

*760 Appellant raises a number of other challenges both to his discharge and to the decision of…