Boland

For some three years prior to April 3, 1943, plaintiff lived on and owned real property in El Monte, California, consisting of approximately one-half acre. He kept various kinds of livestock thereon. On April 2, 1943, he slaughtered a cow on said premises. He was not a licensed slaughterer (Agr. Code, 346-347), and the animal [ 65 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835 ] was not slaughtered under "inspection" (Agr. Code, 305), as is required in counties having over 28,000 population, as does Los Angeles County. Nor did that part of the meat from said cow which plaintiff had in his "possession for sale ... bear the 'Inspected and passed' stamp of ..." inspection ( 305). It was seized on April 3, 1943, by officials of the Department of Agriculture, who claimed to be acting under the provisions of section 311.1, Agricultural Code, and the meat was and now is stored in a freezing locker. The defendant Webb, against whom default judgment was taken and who is not a party to this appeal, operates said locker.

Plaintiff contended, and the trial court found from the evidence, that the meat from the animal so slaughtered was intended by plaintiff to be consumed by himself and family,…

For some three years prior to April 3, 1943, plaintiff lived on and owned real property in El Monte, California, consisting of approximately one-half acre. He kept various kinds of livestock thereon. On April 2, 1943, he slaughtered a cow on said premises. He was not a licensed slaughterer (Agr. Code, §§346-347), and the animal *Supp. 835 was not slaughtered under “inspection” (Agr. Code, §305), as is required in counties having over 28,000 population, as does Los Angeles County. Nor did that part of the meat from said cow which plaintiff had in his “possession for sale . . . bear the ‘Inspected and passed’ stamp of . . .” inspection (§305). It was seized on April 3, 1943, by officials of the Department of Agriculture, who claimed to .be acting under the provisions of section 311.1, Agricultural Code, and the meat was and now is stored in a freezing locker. The defendant Webb, against whom default judgment was taken and who is not a party to this appeal, operates said locker.

Plaintiff contended, and the trial court found from the evidence, that the meat from the animal so slaughtered was intended by plaintiff to be consumed by himself and family, and that excess portions thereof…

I dissent. I concur in all the foregoing opinion except its holding that the cow in question was a part of- plaintiff’s “own herd.” I think some further limitation should -be put upon the meaning of the phrase ‘ ‘ a part of his own herd,” as used in section 307 of the Agricultural Code. If it requires merely the presence of the animal on the producer’s premises and under his observation for a reasonable time to become familiar with it, the finding that such a time had elapsed in this ease when the cow was slaughtered is probably supported by the evidence. But on reading section 307 with its evident purpose to protect the public in mind, and looking for some more definite statement in explanation of the term “his own herd,” I find that only a “live stock producer” is entitled to the exemption from inspection provided by subdivision- (a). It is reasonable to suppose that such producer is related to “his own herd” as a producer, *Supp. 843 and not otherwise. Carrying out this idea is the provision later in subdivision (a) that “when cattle, sheep, swine or goats are sold by said producer in the vicinity where produced and slaughtered there shall be attached to said meat or meat…