This is an appeal from a judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandate sought to compel the State Board of Equalization to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued by its secretary. Declaratory relief was also denied in the same proceeding.

The appellant Redding Pine Mills, Inc., is an Oregon corporation qualified to do business in California, and the appellant Robert B. Toogood is its secretary. On or about March 20, 1957, appellant Toogood, as secretary of Redding Pine Mills, Inc., was served with a subpoena duces tecum, which directed him to appear before one of the board’s appraisers at the time and place designated therein and to produce the corporation’s ledger and other books of account “recording historical cost data for buildings and structures, machinery and equipment of the lumber mill of said corporation . . . for all years from the date of installation or acquisition of said mill by said corporation to and including 1956,” and “the inventory records for 1956 . . . and the record of said corporation of its most recent physical inventory taken prior to March 5, 1956,” defining “inventory,” as used therein, to mean “merchandise, materials, work in process, finished products, and supplies for the lumber mill. . . ”

The trial court found, among other things, that Redding Pine Mills, Inc., is a so-called “common property” taxpayer whose properties in Shasta County are subject to assessment by the assessor of that county and not by the State Board of Equalization.

The trial court also found that the State Board of Equalization was, at the time of the issuance of the subpoena, making a survey in 16 counties of the state, including Shasta County, and a statistical survey in each of the remaining counties of the state to determine the relationship between the total value of land, improvements and personal property entered upon the local assessment roll by the county assessor and the total market value thereof to enable it to perform the duties required of it by section 9 of article XIII of the California Constitution.

Appellants contend that, since the corporation owns no property subject to assessment by the State Board of Equalization, it is not subject to regulation by the board and, therefore, the board exceeded the constitutional and statutory limits that are imposed upon the use of a subpoena in the absence of an issue followed by a hearing and an opportunity afforded them to have rulings that are subject to review on the materiality and admissibility of the demanded documents. On the other hand, respondents claim the right to inspect the subpoenaed documents in order to enable the board to perform the duties required of it by section 9 of article XIII of the California Constitution. That section of the California Constitution established the State Board of Equalization, and in part provides:

To enable the board to perform the duties required of it by the above constitutional provision, the Legislature enacted section 1831 of the Revenue and Taxation Code which provides that:

It is obvious that, in order to perform these duties, it is essential that the board have access to many facts, often not voluntarily supplied by the taxpayer and we are convinced that the use of a subpoena, when the facts are not voluntarily supplied, violates no constitutional provision of due process of law. Nothing in section 1831 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires that a hearing be held at any particular stage of the investigation, nor can any order be made concerning the person whose property is being investigated. Such investigations concern a proper subject of inquiry since it seeks only information necessary and material to aid the board in carrying out the constitutional mandate. In so doing, the board does not exercise a quasi-judicial function. There is no need to observe the same procedural requirements in making investigation contemplated by the statute as are necessary in quasi-judicial proceedings. In 27 A.L.R.2d 1208 , 1209, annotation, it is said:

It has been so held even where the person subpoenaed was not subject to regulation. State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Com. v. Mees, 235 Minn. 42 [ 49 N.W.2d 386 , 27 A.L.R.2d 1197, 1206-1207 ].) In the Mees ease the court said;

Nor do we agree with appellants' contention that the board’s statutory authorization to issue subpoenas as an implementation to its investigatory powers is restricted to a compelling of the production and examination of records of persons whose property is subject to assessment by it or who was required to report to it under the provisions of sections 15617 and 15618 of the Government Code. While the board derives its authority to issue subpoenas under these sections in an investigation of property, subject to assessment by it for taxation, it does not follow that the board does not have the power to issue subpoenas in an investigation relating to inter-county equalization. Section 9 of article XIII of the California Constitution, section 1831 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and section 15611 of the Government Code are the substantive authority for such investigations. Under the provisions of section 15611 of the Government Code:

Section 15613 of the Government Code provides that:

It is our conclusion that under these sections the board was vested with the power to issue the subpoena duces tecum in question.

Nor is there any conflict between sections 15617 and 15618 of the Government Code and section 15613. Bach of the sections is a part of the substantive provisions authorizing the use of a subpoena provided for in section 15613.

No further points require discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Van Dyke, P. J., and Peek, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied February 10, 1958, and appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 19, 1958. Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.