This is an appeal from a decree determining that the appellant was entitled, on distribution, to receive only the personal effects of the deceased and that the respondent was entitled to all other property left by her.

The question presented in the trial court and upon this appeal is as to the proper interpretation of the next to the last paragraph of an holographic will left by the deceased, which reads as follows:

The appellant contends that it conclusively appears that the words “All my property” in the first paragraph of the will refer only to real property and that the words “personal property” in the next to the last paragraph should be interpreted as those words are defined in the Civil Code, (sec. 663). The respondent argues that the words “personal property”, as used in the bequest to Mrs. Eaton, should be interpreted in the more limited sense of purely personal effects.

In considering a similar problem the court, in Estate of La Fetra, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 599 [ 58 Pac. (2d) 678 ], said:

After commenting on several cases, the court further said:

In Estate of Combs, 136 Cal. App. 286 [ 28 Pac. (2d) 711 ], it is said:

In Estate of Puett, 1 Cal. (2d) 131 [ 33 Pac. (2d) 825 ], the court said:

In Estate of Cowden, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 481 [ 51 Pac. (2d) 1165 ], the court said:

Under- these established rules, the trial court was justified in interpreting the disputed clause of this will as giving to Mrs. Eaton only the personal effects of the testatrix and in refusing to give to her all of the personal property, as defined by the code, left by the deceased. It is apparent that the testatrix did not use both the word “property” and the words “personal property” in their legal and technical sense. This being true, it is hardly reasonable to suppose that she intended to give to either of these expressions its strict legal meaning. After providing that all of her property is to be sold and disposed of in a certain manner she proceeds to describe her property, both real and personal, and states where the various items of property and some of the evidence of ownership may be found. It appears that her personal property, which is thus described or particularly mentioned in the will, was of a value about equal to that of her named real property and it is a natural inference, from the language used and the place where these matters appear in the will, that she intended to include both of these classes in the property to be sold, and to which she refers as “all my property”.

She then refers to “my personal property” which is “to be given to” the appellant “for-her to distribute”. In speaking of this personal property which is to be given to the appellant she does not describe the same or tell where it is to be found, and does not even make an outright gift of it to the appellant, but provides that it is “to be given” to her “to distribute”. The latter clause indicates that the personal property thus to be given to the appellant is something other than the personal property theretofore specifically mentioned in the will, which seems to have been included in the property which was to be sold. It would be somewhat out of the ordinary for a testatrix to provide that bank accounts, building and loan certificates of deposit and shares of stock should be given to another for the purpose of distributing the same without providing to whom they should go. It would be more natural for a testatrix to do this with respect to her clothing, ornaments and other small articles which are usually considered as personal effects. Prom the context, it is reasonable to suppose that this testatrix had her personal effects in mind when she wrote the paragraph of the will in question, and that she intended thereby to give such articles to the appellant.

This interpretation gives effect to all clauses in the will. Taken in its entirety, the will indicates an intention on the part of the testatrix to provide for and set up a general scheme, whereby all of her property which was described or located should be sold and applied as set forth in the first paragraph of the will and whereby her personal effects, which were either too numerous or of too little value to justify specific mention, were to be turned over to the appellant to be distributed by her. The interpretation placed upon the will by the trial court must be sustained.

The judgment is affirmed.

Marks, J., and Griffin, J., concurred.