Minnie Hein, legatee and appellant, filed a petition in the above-entitled estate representing that she was the widow of the deceased, and under his will, dated May 11, 1922, duly admitted to probate on May 27, 1929, she was entitled to receive $2,500; that Robert E. Hein, son of the deceased, was appointed executor of the will, and letters testamentary were issued to him on May 27, 1929; that petitioner received from the executor on September 1, 1934, the sum of $400 in part payment of her legacy; that on September 4, 1936, she received the balance of the principal sum, to wit, $2,100, but alleges that she has not received any interest on said sums; that on November 23, 1937, the executor made his first and final account and filed a petition for distribution. Petitioner prayed that the court make its order requiring the executor to pay to petitioner interest on the legacy in accordance with section 162 of the Probate Code, i. e., “Legacies are due and deliverable one year after the testator’s death, and bear interest from that time, except that legacies for maintenance, or to the testator’s widow, bear interest from the testator’s death. ...” Appellant appeared, filed her exceptions and objections to the first and final account and to the petition for distribution on the ground that the account made no provision for payment to the widow of interest on the legacy. The first and final account, peti tion for distribution, petition for payment of interest on legacy, and exceptions thereto came on regularly for hearing on December 6, 1937. The following proceedings were then had. No testimony was introduced or proceedings had relative to the payment of the legacy to Minnie Hein, except as hereinafter expressly stated and set forth. Robert E. Hein testified that he had two agreements with Minnie Hein in connection with the payment of her legacy, both executed November 15, 1933, reading as follows:

Bobert E. Hein testified as follows:

On cross-examination the witness Robert E. Hein testified:

On February 13, 1934, and prior to said hearing, the court had duly and regularly made an order for the payment of family allowance in the total sum of $300, in accordance with the agreement. This sum was then paid to Mrs. Hein.

Appellant now claims that the evidence was insufficient to justify that part of the order settling the final account and decree of distribution wherein it is found, decided and ordered that the legacy to Minnie Hein had been paid in full and that the obligation for the payment of the legacy had been discharged and that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the executor and Minnie Hein entered into an agreement of accord and satisfaction for a valuable consideration paid by Robert E. Hein wherein and whereby Minnie Hein waived any or all interest on the legacy bequeathed to her.

Counsel for appellant argue that there never was any agreement between the executor and Minnie Hein regarding interest; that neither Minnie Hein nor the executor knew that there was such a law regarding interest and that none of the parties could have had interest in mind at any time prior to the acceptance of the balance of the principal, citing Weinberg v. John A. Vaughan Corp., 137 Cal. App. 55 [ 29 Pac. (2d) 862 ]; Estate of Hubbell, 216 Cal. 574 [ 15 Pac. (2d) 503 ]; Berger v. Lane, 190 Cal. 443 [ 213 Pac. 45 ].

Respondent endeavors to support the order of the court denying interest to appellant on the theory that under the evidence above quoted there resulted an accord and satisfaction or waiver, and therefore appellant is estopped now from claiming interest. Each of the agreements above quoted is a full, complete and separate agreement. Robert E. Hein had the privilege and alternative of carrying out either one of the agreements. He decided to carry out the agreement introduced in evidence as exhibit No. 1, and complied with all its terms.

It was held in Jones v. Maria, 48 Cal. App. 171 [ 191 Pac. 943 ], that a person who is in a position to assert a right or insist upon an advantage may, by his words or conduct, and without reference to any act or conduct of the other party affected thereby, waive such right. Once such right is waived, it is gone forever. The person who has waived the right will thereafter be precluded from asserting it.

In neither a criminal nor civil cause, in any circumstance, can one justify his act by the naked showing that he did not know of the existence of the law. Ignorance of the law is no excuse is a rule in our jurisprudence. It was therefore conclusively presumed to be a known fact that appellant was entitled to claim interest when the agreement was executed. (Rhodes v. Sargent, 17 Cal. App. 54 [ 118 Pac. 727 ].) This right to claim interest may be waived. (Dee v. J. C. Forkner Fig Gardens, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 606 [ 288 Pac. 149 ].) In this particular agreement above quoted Minnie Hein agreed to accept the legacy of $2,500 “in full settlement of all claims or rights of the undersigned in connection with the estate of her said deceased husband” and that 1 ‘ any other statutory claim which she as such widow may have against said estate will be compromised, waived, and released upon the payment to her of the sum of $300.00”, subject to the approval of the court. The distribution was made in accordance with the above agreement. The payment of any claim of interest was denied to appellant. By inference, the court approved the settlement. The legal right to claim interest existed when the settlement was executed. Under this agreement and the uncontradicted evidence, the court was justified in finding that appellant had waived her right to claim interest. (Fairchild v. Cartwright, 39 Cal. App. 118 [ 178 Pac. 333 ]; Johnston v. Burnett, 17 Cal. App. 497 [ 120 Pac. 436 ]; Civ. Code, secs. 1521, 1523.)

The order and judgment are affirmed.

Barnard, P. J., and Marks, J., concurred.