This is an action for declaratory relief whereby plaintiffs seek a declaration of the legal effect of certain joint tenancy deeds. The complaint contains two causes of action, each relating to separate parcels of real property, the allegations of both causes of action are substantially similar as are the answers of the respective defendants.

Plaintiffs Bonnie M. Fifield and Frances Irene Coffin with defendant Grace M. Taylor are the daughters and sole heirs-at-law of Vena J. Scott who died December 24, 1951. At that time decedent Vena J. Scott and defendant Grace M. Taylor were the record owners as joint tenants, of two parcels of real property, one in Los Angeles County (hereinafter referred to as the “Gardner Street property”), and the other in Orange County (hereinafter referred to as the “Balboa Beach property”).

The Gardner Street property is the subject matter of plaintiffs’ first cause of action, while the Balboa Beach property constitutes the subject matter of the second cause of action.

As to the first cause of action, it was alleged that an actual controversy exists between plaintiffs and defendant Grace M. Taylor with respect to the following:

At the trial of the action plaintiffs based their claims that the deed conveying title to the Gardner Street property was invalid as a joint tenancy deed, on three grounds:

The foregoing allegations also formed the gravamen of plaintiffs ’ second cause of action concerning the Balboa Beach property.

The trial court found adversely to plaintiffs on all three theories as to both causes of action. However, on this appeal we are confronted with only one theory and but one cause of action for the following reason:

In the appellants’ opening brief we find this concession:

Therefore, the single remaining issue presented to us is the correctness of the trial court’s determination (contrary to appellants’ contention) that Vena J. Scott, in executing the joint tenancy deed to the Gardner Street property, intended to create a joint tenancy and not a tenancy in common.

The trial court found as follows:

The rules governing an appellate tribunal in the determination of an appeal such as the one now before us are thus succinctly stated in the case of Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 444 [ 182 P.2d 557 ]:

With the foregoing rules in mind we proceed to a review of the evidence. The record reflects that Vena J. Scott, a widow, aged 69 years, died December 24, 1951, leaving as her survivors and only heirs-at-law three daughters, appellants Bonnie M. Fifield, and Frances Irene Coffin, and respondent Grace M. Taylor. Defendant Ross Greeley was named and qualified as executor of decedent’s estate. On June 1, 1950, Mrs. Scott was the sole owner of a dwelling house on North Gardner Street in the city of Los Angeles (the property involved in this appeal). On that day she executed a deed to said property as grantor to herself and Grace M. Taylor as joint tenants. This was a deed of gift wholly without any cash consideration. This property had been purchased by Mrs. Scott in 1934 and placed in the name of appellant Bonnie M. Fifield. In 1939 Bonnie deeded the property back to her mother. Sometime later Mrs. Scott took this unrecorded deed to O. L. Montgomery, a notary public, who added to the deed at Mrs. Scott’s request the following words after the name of the grantee: “and Grace M. Taylor, a married woman, mother and daughter, as joint tenants.” The notary initialed this alteration and the deed was recorded in October, 1944. Thereafter, on May 21, 1948, Grace executed a grant deed to the property to her mother. Grace testified that this deed and the one of June 1, 1950, were executed to correct any possible invalidity in the 1939 deed because of the alteration.

There was testimony that Grace and her husband, Robert, had lived in this home from about 1942. Mrs. Scott lived with the Taylors part of that time but for three or four years before her death she lived in her Balboa cottage. Bonnie testified that in 1939, when contemplating major surgery, she had a conversation with her mother with respect to her (Bonnie’s) property, which she held in joint tenancy with her husband. She asked her mother if she could make a will leaving her half of her property to her son. Her mother advised her that half the property was hers and that she could make such a will. This witness also testified that in 1945 or early in 1946, when her mother was convalescing from a stroke of paralysis, she had a further conversation with the latter wherein her mother stated that as soon as she was able to get around she was going to make a will; that she wanted ■to leave everything divided equally between the girls but that she could not as some of the property was “tied up”; that she would have to leave the Gardner Street home to Grace but that she would leave her (Bonnie’s) name on it to pro tect Grace so she couldn’t sell it, otherwise she, Grace, and her husband would run through the money; that she was sorry she had put Grace’s name on the deed but she would remedy it in a will as best she could.

Subsequently, on December 7, 1950, Mrs. Scott executed a will which was admitted to probate. She used a printed form commonly sold in stationery stores, filling in the blank spaces in her own handwriting. As to the Gardner Street property here in question, the will contains the following provision:

Evidencing support for the findings of the trial court we find in the record testimony that in December, 1942, Grace had a conversation .with her mother concerning the execution by the former of the joint tenancy deed to herself and her mother as joint tenants. As to this conversation Grace testified:

With reference to the aforesaid addition of her name as a grantee in the deed Grace testified as follows:

In answer to a question by counsel for appellants, Grace identified the deed dated June 1, 1950, as the instrument which she said her mother was going to make and that the subject of executing this deed came about as follows:

Grace had a later conversation with her mother concerning the latter’s reason for putting the Gardner Street property in joint tenancy, as shown by the following testimony by Grace:

Mr. Montgomery, the notary public, who inserted in the deed before recordation the words, “and Grace M. Taylor, a married woman, mother and daughter, as joint tenants” testified:

“Although respondent Grace M. Taylor did not actually pay any money to her mother for placing the Gardner Street property in joint tenancy, she and her husband “paid all utilities on the place and all the upkeep of the property, plus adding a great many new things.” They also did considerable improvement work such as painting, roofing, patios and carpeting. They also paid the taxes on the property and purchased all the food for decedent Mrs. Scott and themselves while they resided there. Considerable evidence appears in the record that the mother reposed trust and confidence in her daughter Grace, and there is no showing that the latter ever betrayed or violated her mother’s faith and confidence in her.

We are satisfied that, viewed in the light of the rules hereinbefore enunciated, the record contains ample evidence of sufficient substantiality to support the foregoing findings to the effect that Vena J. Scott at all times believed and understood that the execution and delivery of the deed here in question did have the legal effect of vesting title to said real property in herself and her daughter Grace as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and that such was Mrs. Scott’s intention.

The principal and distinguishing incident of joint tenancy .is the right of survivorship, and title by survivorship occurs only when propery is held in joint tenancy. And the parties by their agreement cannot change this legal incident of joint tenancy without necessarily changing the nature of the estate (McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal.2d 409, 412 [ 101 P.2d 690 , 129 A.L.R. 810 ]). That Mrs. Scott intended to create a joint tenancy is evidenced by her will wherein she used this language: “The property ... is in joint tenancy with myself Vena J. Scott and Grace M. Taylor the deed must never be changed out of her name.”

In the instant case survivorship was clearly declared in the conveyance, thereby evidencing an intention to create a joint tenancy in fee, and not a joint life estate with contingent remainder to the survivor and her heirs (Hart v. Nagasawa, 218 Cal. 685, 689 [ 24 P.2d 815 ]; Estate of Davis, 88 Cal.App.2d 704, 706 [ 199 P.2d 755 ]; 13 Cal.Jur.2d 292). And, the very form of the deed here in question created a presumption of intent to hold the property jointly (Sandrini v. Ambrosetti, 111 Cal.App.2d 439, 449 [ 244 P.2d 742 ]). The applicable rule is thus stated in Edwards v. Deitrich, 118 Cal.App.2d 254, 260 [ 257 P.2d 750 ]:

“That form of conveyance (joint tenancy) . . . itself raises the rebuttable presumption that the property is as described in the deed, and places the burden on the party claiming the property to be community to prove that fact. (Citing cases.) ” And further, the record discloses, as pointed out by respondent, “Mrs. Scott was not a novice insofar as joint tenancies were concerned. Between the time in 1934, when according to appellant Bonnie M. Fifield, the two of them discussed purchasing the Gardner Street property together in joint tenancy, and December 7, 1950, when she showed her understanding of joint tenancies in her will, Mrs. Scott had on five different occasions been a party to deeds conveying, or purporting to convey property in joint tenancy. ’ ’

The cases relied upon by appellants do not militate against what we have herein said. In Tyler v. Larson, 106 Cal.App.2d 317 [ 235 P.2d 39 ], the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact made by the trial court was not involved. In the cited case the appeal was on the judgment roll, and the court was required to accept as true the facts found. In Nunes v. De Faria, 107 Cal.App.2d 794 [ 238 P.2d 106 ], also cited by appellants, the judgment of the trial court was predicated upon a finding of fraud on the part of the party appealing and the facts of that case have no resemblance to those present in the case at bar.

With further reference to the execution of her will by Mrs. Scott some six months after execution of the joint tenancy deed here under attack, it might well be said, as pointed out by respondent, “Suffice it to say, that if Mrs. Scott had desired or intended to destroy the joint tenancy estate in the property, she could have done so, at any time before her death, by executing and delivering an appropriate deed of her one-half of the property, creating a life estate in Grace, with remainder over to appellants. But her last will discloses a firm purpose to have title to the entire property remain in Grace after her own death. ’ ’

An examination of Mrs. Scott’s will discloses that she did not attempt to will away her half of the property at Tier own death but that, at most, she attempted to do so in such manner that her will would take effect at Grace’s death after the latter had enjoyed the ownership of the entire property during the remainder of her life by virtue of her right of survivor-ship under the joint tenancy deed. And, insofar as the claimed effect of the provisions of Mrs. Scott’s will is concerned, the following language in Edwards v. Deitrich, supra, p. 262 , is pertinent.

“The mere fact that one of the parties would like to will away more than her share, and the other party orally acquiesces, is not sufficient to convert the property from joint tenancy to community. ’ ’

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

Doran, J., and Drapeau, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied May 23, 1955, and appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 23, 1955.