Plaintiffs, riding in an automobile operated by N. Lindsey South, were injured in a collision with a car driven by defendant Adams for defendant Retail Credit Company, Inc. South’s insurance company settled with plaintiffs and received a covenant not to sue, with an agreement to hold them harmless for any claims arising out of the accident. Plaintiffs then sued defendants, and they pleaded the instrument, claiming it was a release of other joint tort-feasors, releasing them also by operation of law. The lower court gave judgment on the pleadings for defendants on this theory.

Plaintiffs appealed. By order of the court, on stipulation of all the parties, the appeals were consolidated and heard on a single transcript. The instrument in question, in full, was pleaded in the answer, and is as follows:

It is unquestionably the law that the release of one of several joint tort-feasors operates as a release of all. (Tompkins v. Clay Street R. R. Co., 66 Cal. 163 [ 4 Pac. 1165 ].) But the legal effect of a covenant not to sue is not the same as a release. (Hawber v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 704 [ 268 Pac. 943 ].) The trial court was plainly in error. The document here is entitled a covenant not to sue. Its language is of covenant and indemnity, not of release. The trial court, however, ignored title and terminology, and held it to be a release, without permitting any evidence as to what it was. Since a covenant not to sue does not relieve other joint tort-feasors, the trial court was in error in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings upon the ground that the document executed by plaintiff constituted a release and satisfaction of the claim for injuries received in the collision of the two automobiles.

The judgment is reversed in each case.

Shenk, J., Thompson, J., Seawell, J., Curtis, J., Langdon, J., and Preston, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.