The plaintiff appeals on the judgment roll from an adverse order holding it subject to an inheritance tax upon a gift of real property. The trial in the superior court was had upon a stipulation of facts which incorporated the report of the inheritance tax appraiser from which it appears that in February, 1936, Germain Pouchan and his wife Louise conveyed the real property to the corporation reserving unto themselves a life estate upon an agreement executed by all parties that the Soeiete would admit the grantors to the hospital operated by it, and known as the French Hospital, as life boarders with all the privileges of hospital care and treatment together with board and maintenance. It was stipulated" That there were no conditions or restrictions in or attached to the said grant of the remainder of said property to the said corporation, and it was free to devote such property or its proceeds to such use as it saw fit, at or upon the death of the survivor of said grantors. ...”

The conditions of the grant were fully executed. The grantors moved to the hospital and were cared for as stipulated. Louise Pouchan died in November, 1937. Germain died in December, 1939. The value of the property conveyed was appraised at more than thirteen thousand in excess of the accommodations and services rendered the grantors upon which a tax of $971.86 was declared by the order from which this appeal is taken.

The appellant argues that it is exempt from any tax upon a gift of this nature under the provisions of section 6(1) (b) of the Inheritance Tax Act. (Stats. 1935, p. 1274; Deering’s Gen. Laws, 1935 Supp., Act 8495.) The material portion of the section, as it stood at the time of the transfer, reads:

This disposes of the contention that the appellant is a society engaged in or devoted to charitable work and as such exempt from the taxing provisions of the act.

But the appellant argues that, assuming that it is not a charitable corporation this particular transfer was “for a charitable purpose” and so exempt from the tax. It relies upon cases holding that a gift or a transfer of property may be made for a charitable purpose to either a charitable or noneharitable institution. The authorities are discussed at length in Estate of Henderson, 17 Cal.2d 853 [ 112 P.2d 605 ], and nothing need be added here except that notation should be made of the court’s comment on the failure of the court in Estate of Dol (supra) to consider the difference between the eases involving the charitable status of the institution and those involving the charitable nature of the particular gift. The rule of the decision, insofar as it relates to the question presented here, is' found in the paragraph commencing on page 859 and reading:

It should be noted that the court said that such a gift “may” become a charitable one. But the parties stipulated:

Appellant argues that it should be exempted from the tax under the provisions of the statute exempting associations engaged in or devoted to “public, or other like work.” Cases are cited from other jurisdictions which hold certain types of hospitals to be “public” charities. It would serve no useful purpose to cite them. Long before the original Inheritance Tax Act was passed in 1935 our Supreme Court in the Brown case held that appellant was not a public charity that it was “merely an association for mutual profit or benefit.” In December, 1945, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit, in a proceeding by the same society to test its liability under the Social Security Act reached the same conclusion. In that ease, United States v. La So ciete Francaise, 152 F.2d 243, 245 , the court gave a clear résumé of the nature of appellant’s organization and the manner of the conduct of its affairs. We quote (p. 245) :

The same distinction may be made here. The parties stip ulate that for the “four fiscal years ending February 29, 1940, the daily average number of hospitalized patients was 180.75, and the total annual average number of patient days at its hospital was: Members 45,565; non-members: 20,322; that said figures are exclusive of calls and consultations by members of the outpatient department, and which during said period, annually averaged 35,381; that said outpatient department comprises consultations by members at the clinic at said hospital, calls by staff physicians at members’ homes, and calls by members at offices of staff physicians.”

Under these circumstances it is idle to argue that the Societe is “engaged in or devoted to” charitable, benevolent, or public work.

Order affirmed.

Goodell, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 10, 1946.