Following the decision adverse to the respondent by the District Court of Appeal, the taxpayer’s petition for a hearing by this court was granted for the principal purpose of considering the direction to the superior court to enter judgment for the state. Subsequently, the attorney general rested his case upon the sole issue as to whether under the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, as it read in 1939, a taxpayer was entitled to file a protest with and have a hearing before the Franchise Tax Commissioner as a condition precedent to the levy of an assessment levied upon the ground of fraud. As the District Court of Appeal correctly construed the sections of the statute applicable to the one question now presented for decision, that part of its opinion is adopted as the opinion of this court. It reads as follows:

“Section 31, as it read before the 1939 amendment provided:

“ As for respondent’s argument that the act is unconstitutional if no right to an administrative hearing is provided, while it is doubtless true that a taxpayer, if he demands it, is entitled to a hearing at some stage of the proceedings for the collection of a tax, an administrative hearing is not such a prerequisite unless made so by statute. Constitutional requirements are met if a taxpayer is given an opportunity for a hearing in subsequent proceedings for collection of the tax or in an action for a refund where it is provided by the statute that he may pay the tax under protest and sue for its recovery. Both proceedings are provided for in the act under consideration. Section 30 provides for the latter course, and section 31 for the former, which was pursued here.

“In Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526 [ 16 S.Ct. 83 , 40 L.Ed 247], the court held that the Constitution of the United States was satisfied if an opportunity was given to question the validity of a tax either before the amount was determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection. That case is cited in Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 U.S. 550 [ 20 S.Ct. 485 , 44 L.Ed 583], Also, see, McMillan v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37 [24 L.Ed 335]; People v. Skinner, 18 Cal.2d 349 [ 115 P.2d 488 , 149 A.L.R. 299 ], and cases therein cited; State Tax Commissioner v. Board of Supervisors, 43 Ariz. 156 [ 29 P.2d 733, 739 ]; Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542 [ 74 P.2d 47, 51-52 , 114 A.L.R. 838 ].

“Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 [ 28 S.Ct. 47 , 52 L.Ed. 134 ], is relied upon by respondent. There actions were begun by the railroad company to enjoin the enforcement of executions issued for taxes assessed on shares of the stock of a railway company owned by plaintiff. Respondent reads that case as holding that an administrative hearing was essential; but such was not the decision, for there the decision of the comptroller as to valuation was, by the statute, made conclusive unless it could be shown that he had acted in bad faith. There was no provision for relief in the courts upon proceedings brought to collect the taxes, or by bill to enjoin their collection. The opinion states, page 141 (L.Ed. p. 143):

“ ‘As we have seen, the system provided in Georgia by the statutes of the state as construed by its highest court requires of the taxpayer that he return all his property, whether its liability is fairly contestable or not, upon pain of an ex parte valuation, against which there is no relief in the tax proceedings or in the courts, except in those cases where fraud or corruption can be shown in the action of the assessing officer. ’ (Italics added.)

“In that very case the court cited Security Trust & S. V. Co. v. Lexington, 203 U.S. 323 [ 27 S.Ct. 87 , 51 L.Ed. 204 ], stating that it had been there held that, before an assessment of taxes could be made upon omitted property, notice to the taxpayer, with an opportunity to be heard, was essential; that somewhere during the process of the assessment the taxpayer must have an opportunity to be heard, and that this notice must be provided as an essential part of the statutory provision, and not awarded as a mere matter of favor or grace; but it further held that where the procedure in a state court gave the taxpayer an opportunity to be heard upon the value of his property and extent of the tax, in a proceeding to enjoin its collection, the requirement of due process of law was satisfied.

“Furthermore, since 1933 section 31 has provided that the remedies therein set forth shall be cumulative. It states:

The respondent now strongly relies upon the action of the Legislature of 1945 in amending the taxing statute. By that enactment, which became effective after the briefs were filed in the District Court of Appeal, section 28 was amended to read as follows:

The respondent argues that this amendment is a clarification of the statute as originally enacted. But the new provision is quite different from the section as it stood at the time the Franchise Tax Commissioner levied his assessment. The 1945 enactment not only gives the taxpayer the right to a hearing in accordance with the procedure specified by section 25, but substitutes for the previous authorization of a “charge” which became “immediately due and payable,” a provision for particular steps to be followed by the commissioner which are consistent with the new requirement.

Ordinarily, any substantial amendment of a statute indicates a legislative intention to change the meaning of the enactment rather than to interpret it. (Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 75 [ 113 P.2d 449 ] ; Young v. Three for One Oil Royalties, 1 Cal.2d 639 [ 36 P.2d 1065 ].) The very fact of amendment evidences a desire to change the existing law. (Loew’s Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal.2d 746 [ 82 P.2d 1 ].) But insofar as the legislation now in controversy is concerned, the conclusion as to legislative intent need not rest solely upon these fundamental principles of statutory construction. When the bill to amend section 28 was being considered by the senate, the purpose of the proposed measure was stated by the Franchise Tax Commissioner as follows: “Amendment proposes to treat fraudulent assessment in the same manner as a deficiency assessment. Under the present act, taxpayer must pay immediately upon receiving the assessment without right of protest, etc. Amendment changes present law.” (Senate Daily Journal, 56th Session, May 22, 1945, pp. 3017, 3020.) Presumably the Legislature acted to carry that purpose into effect.

Under these circumstances, it appears beyond question that the Legislature of 1945 broadened the taxing statute to give rights additional to those which the taxpayer had at the time the assessment was levied against the respondent. This is a change of policy which does not affect the present litigation.

The judgment is reversed.