From a judgment in favor of plaintiff predicated upon the granting of its motions (a) to strike defendant’s answer, and (b) for a summary judgment under section 437 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, defendant appeals. These are the essential facts:

The complaint alleged that on or about August 10, 1935, S. J. and G. A. Chapman Corporation executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note in the principal sum of $18,000 bearing interest at 7 per cent per annum and that said note was secured by a trust deed executed by said corporation to the Los Angeles Trust and Safe Deposit Company as trustee covering certain real property described therein; that contemporaneously with the execution of the note defendant herein as an individual made, executed, and delivered to plaintiff a written guarantee of the aforementioned note. Paragraph VI of the complaint read thus:

Defendant in his answer, after admitting the execution of the guaranty set forth in the complaint, denied (1) that the sale by the trustee under the deed of trust was in every respect in compliance with the terms of said deed of trust and in accordance with the law in such eases made and provided, and (2) as affirmative defenses alleged:

Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment on these propositions:

Defendant’s first proposition is untenable and is governed by the following established rules:

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the instant case we find that defendant was sued upon a contract of guaranty; therefore it was unnecessary for plaintiff to allege compliance with the provisions of section 580 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to state a cause of action.

Defendant’s second proposition is likewise untenable. The rule is established that, when a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible. (Sec. 1639, Civ. Code.)

This rule is subject to the further rule that, when through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties and such mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings, then the erroneous parts of the writing may be disregarded. (Sec. 1640, Civ. Code; sec. 1856, subdiv. 1, Code Civ. Proc. ) In the present case no facts are pleaded in defendant’s answer showing any fraud, mistake, or accident, resulting in an imperfection in the writing, which evidenced the contract of guaranty executed by defendant. Hence, no imperfection in the writing is put in issue by the pleadings. The allegations that defendant executed the guaranty “purely pro forma” and “understood that he was executing said guaranty in effect for the Estate of his deceased father, S. J. Chapman” are pure conclusions of the pleader and are not allegations of matters of fact. As the defendant has failed to argue or present any points and authorities in support of the allegations in his answer denying that the sale by the trustee under the deed of trust was in every respect in compliance with the terms of the said deed of trust and in accordance with law, we will not consider that such allegations, which were mere conclusions of law, raised any questions which require discussion. (Bradley v. Butchart, 217 Cal. 731, 747 [ 20 Pac. (2d) 693 ].)

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., concurred.

Wood, J., concurred in the judgment.