From a judgment directing the issuance of a writ of mandate to defendants after the trial court overruled their demurrer to a petition requesting that defendants be required to include in an assessment improvements upon real property located in Palos Verdes Estates, defendants appeal. There are also purported appeals from the minute order and writ of mandate.

These are the essential facts:

Petitioner is the owner of several lots in Palos Verdes Estates and as such is a member of defendant Palos Verdes Homes Association, a corporation. The defendants, aside from the corporation, are a majority of the members of its board of directors.

In 1921, a trust indenture, known as the Palos Verdes Project, which covered the property which is the subject of the present litigation, was executed and recorded. This trust indenture provided for the organization of the Palos Verdes Homes Association, article VI, section 4H(1.) of said trust indenture, reading in part as follows:

Thereafter, pursuant to the trust indenture, defendant corporation was duly organized and its by-laws provided in article XVIII, sections 1 and 5 as follows:

September 7, 1938, in an endeavor to meet the requirements of article XVIII, section 5, of the by-laws of the corporation, defendant directors adopted a resolution reading in part as follows:

October 13, 1938, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate reading in part as follows:

These are the questions presented for determination:

It is important to determine what is meant by the phrase real property as used in the foregoing by-law. The phrase real property includes land and whatever is erected, growing thereon or affixed thereto. (City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 736 [ 262 Pac. 737 ]; 50 Cor. Jur. (1930) 746, see. 1.9; sec. 14, subd. 2, sec. 658, Civ. Code.)

Applying the foregoing definition to the provisions of the declaration of trust just quoted, it is clear that it was the duty of defendants to adopt a regulation fixing an assessment upon the land and the improvements thereon. This regulation by the by-laws of defendant corporation was required to be adopted prior to the fifteenth day of O'ctober each year.

The second question must be answered in the negative. Prom a reading of regulation No. 66 originally adopted by defendant corporation, it is evident that defendants were not attempting to act under an alternate plan but under the method first described in the declaration of indenture.

The third question must also be answered in the negative. One of the essential elements of estoppel, that the party relying thereon has been prejudiced as a result of another party’s acts, is not present in this case, and, therefore, this doctrine has no application. There is a total lack of any showing that defendants or either of them have been prejudiced in any way by petitioner’s failure in previous years to object to the assessment of land without the inclusion of the improvements thereon. (Estate of Fassetta, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 239, 240 [ 57 Pac. (2d) 1336 ]; Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32 Cal. App. (2d) 337, 350 [ 89 Pac. (2d) 732 ].)

No appeal lies from a minute order or other memorandum, the clear intent of which is that the court has merely authorized the issuance of another written order or judgment. (Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 101 Cal. App. 666, 668 [ 282 Pac. 19 ].) In the present case the minute order from which the purported appeal is taken was a mere preliminary entry authorizing the subsequent judgment.

The purported appeal from the minute order is dismissed.

A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding. (Sec. 577, Code Civ. Proc.)

An order is the direction of a court or judge made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment. (Sec. 1003, Code Civ. Proc.)

A decree is the judgment of a court of equity, court of probate, or court of admiralty.

A writ is an order or precept in writing, issued by a ministerial officer in the name of the people, or of a court or judicial officer. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 17, subd. 6.)

Section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that appeals may be taken from judgments, orders, or decrees. It does not provide for an appeal from a writ. Hence, the purported appeal from the writ is dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Wood, Acting P. J., concurred.

An application by petitioner to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on August 10, 1939.