Charles F. Herreshoff died testate in San Diego County on January 31, 1954. His will provided for the distribution of income and principal of his trust estate in the following language:

The trial judge in his decree construing the will and of final distribution, in effect, added the words “provided she does not remarry” to paragraph A(3) above quoted. The language used by the court appears on page four of the decree, page 14 of the clerk’s transcript, where the court, in providing for the distribution of the one-half of the net income as provided in the fourth provision of the will A(2), provides as follows:

Virginia T. Herreshoff appeals from the above italicized portion of the decree. No brief is filed on behalf of the respondent. Appellant contends that she has the right to receive one-half of the income from the trust estate after the death of the testator’s brothers and sisters, even though she may have remarried by that time. We are in accord with this contention. The testator, in providing for the one-half of the income to be paid to appellant under paragraph Fourth A(l) of the will, provided for the payment of the said one-half of the income to appellant as long as she remained a widow and in the event of her death or remarriage, the income would be distributed to his two sisters (paragraph A (4)). However, in providing for the payment of the other one-half of the income to his brothers, he provides in paragraph A(3) that upon the death of the last survivor of them the income would be distributed to the sisters, if living, and if not, to Virginia T. Herreshoff for and during her life. The language used is clear and unambiguous.

The objective in the interpretation of a will is to ascertain the intention of the testator as disclosed by the language he has used in his will. (Estate of Brunet, 34 Cal.2d 105, 107 [ 207 P.2d 567 , 11 A.L.R.2d 1382 ].) It is well settled that it is not what a testator wanted to do but what he actually did, as expressed in the words used, which governs in the absence of other evidence with respect to his intention. (Gardner v. Snow, 119 Cal.App.2d 546, 549 [ 259 P.2d 95 ].) A court may not, under the guise of construction, make a will for a testator to take the place of the one made by him if its intent is plain. (Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal.2d 108, 112 [ 77 P.2d 1052 ] ; Estate of Soulie, 72 Cal.App.2d 332, 335 [ 164 P.2d 565 ].)

The testator herein clearly provided in said paragraph A (3) for the payment of income to his brothers during their lifetime and thereafter to his sisters, if living. If not, said income was to be paid to his intended wife, the appellant herein, for and during her life. By adding the italicized provisions to this paragraph providing that appellant should not receive this income in the event that she should have remarried, the court added a condition not stated in the will and contrary to the plain intent of the testator. The decree is therefore modified by deleting therefrom the following language, appearing on page 14 of the clerk’s transcript, lines 29 to 32: “provided, however, she shall not receive any of such income in the event she shall have remarried, and distribution of income to her shall cease and terminate forthwith in the event she shall remarry after she has received any such one-half of such income. ” As so modified, the decree is affirmed. Appellant to recover costs.

Griffin, Acting P. J., and Burch, J. pro tern., concurred.

Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.